TACKLING EXTREMISM AND INTOLERANCE
IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY

CONFERENCE READER:

REFLECTIONS
ASSESSMENTS
PROPOSALS

ECTR
ROUND
TABLE

Monte Carlo
5-7th March, 2018

WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS FOR ECTR ROUND TABLE

SPEECHES AND DOCUMENTS

MESSAGE FROM THE ECTR

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

Intolerance and extremism has to be understood before it can be effectively resisted. The ECTR Round Table in Monaco "Tackling extremism and intolerance in a diverse society" is intended to explore such key challenges for the societies of Europe: rising intolerance; rising support for xenophobic and populist parties; parallel societies; Islamic extremism; rise of neo-Nazi ideologies; discrimination; loss of democratic freedoms; a possible clash between religious freedom and freedom of expression. However, these risk cannot be properly addressed without the analysis of the underlying processes and changes, like social and cultural insecurities, stemming from economic difficulties and sense of relative decline; large-scale immigration, both experienced and subjectively perceived (or manipulated); distorted images and harmful stereotypes; shortage of political wisdom and leadership.

The sudden and often unexpected emergence of the above challenges emphasizes that a new thinking on how to make tolerance more secure and sustainable in Europe is necessary. This requires detailed analysis and cross-disciplinary approaches. Therefore we have asked several of our speakers and participants, with different background and perspective, to prepare in advance their thoughts and reflections on paper. We publish these texts in this Conference Reader and will distribute it before the Round Table (in electronic format), and in a final printed format in Monaco. I do hope this Reader will give you the opportunity to familiarize yourselves with the subjects in more depth ahead of the Round Table meeting, inspiring for own thinking and formulating of conclusions.

Aside of these texts, we also attach few speeches and documents, which are the outcome of ECTR's previous projects and initiatives.

Ireneusz Bil
ECTR Secretary General

WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS FOR ECTR ROUND TABLE

RETHINKING TOLERANCE:
IN SEARCH OF A SECURE MODUS VIVENDI

John Gray, Emeritus Professor of European Thought,
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The ideal of toleration we have inherited from earlier times is no longer fit for purpose. The impact of globalised markets and large-scale immigration, the fragmentation of sections of society into closed ethnic communities and the rise of transnational terrorist movements, together with new technologies that enable people to communicate primarily with those that have similar values and world-views, have created a situation in which the goals and values served by the practice of tolerance in the past are no longer secure. We need to rethink what we mean by tolerance, so that it can be made more sustainable. In doing so, we will need to be critical of the theory and practice of toleration in Europe over the past decades. We would benefit from returning to the original meaning of toleration, which signified not a mere absence of coercion or persecution—which might well prove to be temporary--but a durable condition of *modus vivendi* throughout society.

The historical roots of modern toleration are in the European wars of religion, which engendered the ideal of peaceful co-existence among people who live by different world-views and values. As I wrote in my book *Two Faces of Liberalism:* "Contemporary liberal regimes are late flowerings of a project of toleration that began in Europe in the late sixteenth century. The task we inherit is refashioning liberal toleration so that it can guide the pursuit of *modus vivendi* in a more plural world."[1] In early modern Europe, toleration was a response to deep religious divisions. Yet the world of that time was in some ways more homogenous than Europe is today. The historic project of toleration must be renewed in societies that are more heterogeneous than in the past.

The stakes are high. During the first half of the twentieth century, the practice of toleration—always highly imperfect—was extinguished across much of Europe. In 1942, it has been estimated, there were only eleven functioning democracies. The catastrophes of the period, above all the Holocaust, generated attempts to prevent states terrorizing their own populations and singling out some among them for annihilation. The UN promulgated a charter of universal human rights, which could be used to judge and condemn the actions of sovereign states.

There can be no doubt that this was an important advance. But one of its consequences has been that tolerance has come to be understood as a condition that exists whenever human rights are not violated. Conceived in this way, tolerance is a by-product of a right-based society, which can be promoted by a policy of non-interference in basic freedoms. But in the conditions that exist today tolerance cannot be secure on this basis. A regime of rights is not free-standing; it relies on acceptance by most of the population, which can be undermined as a result of the actions of extremist groups. If the forces promoting intolerance are allowed to fester and spread, there will be an increasing risk of social conflict and political upheaval. It would be a mistake to assume that something like the catastrophes of the first part of the twentieth century could not recur in future.

1 John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p.1. Some thinkers distinguish between tolerance and toleration, but since it seems to me a distinction without a difference I treat the two terms as being synonymous.

Human rights alone cannot sustain the practice of tolerance when it is challenged by groups and movements that reject its original objective, which was modus vivendi among different religions, communities and lifestyles. Far-right movements and violent Islamist networks are at one promoting racism and anti-Semitism and launching terrorist assaults on particular groups and society at large. In these conditions the goal of modus vivendi must be actively promoted as an end in itself, rather than expecting it to emerge as an automatic result of protecting human rights. This will involve building conditions that resist the fracturing of society into self-contained and potentially antagonistic ethnic and religious enclaves, as well as re-examining how far movements that repudiate any kind of toleration should themselves benefit from it.
In political terms, the failure of the inherited project of toleration can be seen in the decline of centrist parties. Recent German polls suggesting that the anti-liberal AfD is approaching levels of popular support similar to those of the Social Democrats indicate that estrangement from mainstream politics has itself become mainstream. Similar trends are observable in the Netherlands, Austria and Scandinavia. The jubilation of liberals who greeted Macron's victory as proof that populism was on the retreat throughout Europe was not so much premature as misconceived. Returning in the later stages of her campaign to themes that echoed those of her father—as when she denied France's responsibility for the camps in Drancy that sent thousands of Jewish children to their deaths—Marine Le Pen was still able to attract over a third of the vote (34 per cent) in the run-off for the 2017 presidential election. Significantly, she attracted more votes from young people than from any other age group. A not wholly dissimilar situation exists on the left in Britain, where Corbyn's Labour party has benefited from the enthusiasm of young voters while tolerating virulent anti-Semitism among some of its activists.

Throughout much of Europe, centre parties have ceded ground to forces that preach and embody intolerance. In some post-communist countries, the collapse of the centre has been more complete. Illiberal democracies—regimes that claim to embody popular will while dismantling protections for individuals and minorities--have emerged in Poland and Hungary. The post-cold-war certainty that liberal democracy would spread throughout the world is yielding to an unexpected and disquieting reality. Democracy is morphing into illiberal forms.

The political shift that seems to be underway is too wide-ranging to be a result of diverse factors operating in different countries coming together by chance. It reflects a failure of centrist thinking. Rather than addressing public concerns about the erosion of security in everyday life, centre parties have acted on the basis that prevailing policies will command popular support if they are better explained and more consistently applied. Plainly, this is not happening. With established political classes seeking to renew a status quo that large sections of the population find decreasingly acceptable or legitimate, the vacant middle ground is being occupied by varieties of populism. Condemning this development is not enough; it would be more useful to understand why it is occurring. Populism is, among others things, the return to politics of issues that had been depoliticized on the ground that only one way of dealing with them can be rational or right. The rise of extremism on the right and the left is in part a consequence of this centrist stance.
Rethinking the theory and practice of tolerance requires that we understand the present in light of the past. At this point in history, it is surely time we recognized that peaceful coexistence is not the default condition of modern societies, but a succession of interludes in a history of recurring disaster. We can hope to thwart this sad cycle only if we are ready to think afresh about how to make tolerance more secure.

SECURE FREEDOM

Kiril G. Khodolovsky, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the Moscow State University and IMEMO Institute in Moscow.

One of the most pressing and painful issues of world politics today is the balance of freedom and security, which, as experience shows, are essential social and personal needs that, unfortunately, often contradict each other in practice.

Historically, these needs have developed and been met unevenly. If the need for freedom depends on the level of individual and social development, then the need for security has always existed, becoming more urgent when aggravated by domestic and international situations. The need for freedom has found its justification and gradual development in the postulates of the Euro-Christian culture, serving as one of the incentives for both business energy and economic progress, and for the success of democracy. In the modern era, influenced by international relations, and later by globalization, this process has found a certain, albeit limited, incarnation beyond the so-called developed countries.

The Reformation of the 16th century made the freedom of the individual the banner of the enlightened, thinking people of the Western world. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen placed freedom at the centre of public life. Since the end of the 18th century, liberalism (combined with nationalism) has become the ideological basis for the development of Western countries.[1]

The unconditional priority of freedom and the principles associated with it (tolerance, human rights) have become the leading value and ideological postulate of Western societies, finding a deep foundation in the writings and statements of the classics of world philosophy, from John Locke and the encyclopaedists to Karl Popper, Erich Fromm and Jürgen Habermas.

All of them were perfectly aware of the risks associated with the domination of freedom in the social life, a certain contradiction between the values of freedom and security, but they were confident that a free person would find the strength to cope with it. The theorists of liberalism resolutely rejected the approach of the German philosopher Karl Schmitt and his followers, who allowed human freedom to be restricted for the sake of security. Benjamin Franklin's statement that "He who sacrifices freedom for security deserves neither" is still widely popular. The rights of the individual and the restriction of state interference in his or her life and the life of society were further emphasized by ideologists of neoliberalism who emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century.

The end of the Cold War seemed to finally lead to the triumph of liberal approaches in politics to the problem of the correlation of freedom and security, with an intolerant attitude toward any limitations of human rights (law enforcement agencies have sometimes violated this principle).

However, the unconditional nature of the priority of freedom, which answered (albeit with certain reservations) to the conditions that prevailed in the social life of the West in modern times, was unlike anything seen in the rest of the world. The process of globalization that has developed rapidly since the end of the 20th century has put this situation into question. It was once possible, when formulating the basic principles of social relations, to ignore the world surrounding the West, but now this world has arrived in Western countries.

1 F.G. Voitolovsky, Unity and Disunity of the West: Ideological Reflection in the Consciousness of the Elites in the USA and Western Europe of the Transformations of the World Order. 1940-2000. M.: Kraft, 2007, p. 62

The absolute priority given to the value of freedom and human rights, accompanied by an underestimation of the value of security, which has been observed since the end of the Cold War in the neo-liberal West is beginning to threaten the very foundations of Euro-Christian civilization.

There is no doubt that the 21st century brought a new change in the situation. In addition to the dangerous explosion of violence and civil wars in the Middle East, the revival of the Cold War and the arms race, the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons, the weakening of the memory of the horrors of the Second World War and the Holocaust, "There is a militarization of consciousness. Especially among young people, among those who are interested in the arms race ... Many politicians do not realize that the single use of nuclear weapons will become a worldwide catastrophe".[2]

There is no doubt that the most serious dangers facing the world are the increased possibility of a nuclear war and the consequences of global warming, which threaten all of us. However, the problem of the impact on Western society of mass foreign immigration, especially from Muslim countries, is also quite serious and dangerous for the future. In the process of globalization, an uncontrollable influx of migrants from other parts of the world are bursting into all developed countries. These are refugees from countries suffering from political and military turmoil or cruel, despotic regimes, as well as economic immigrants seeking an escape from poverty and economic woes and more abundant resources in wealthier countries. Naturally, they all try to make their way to the countries with a high standard of living, like Germany, France, the UK, Belgium, Sweden and Austria. Of these, Germany is the leader in terms of the number of migrants admitted, while Sweden leads in terms of the percentage of migrants compared to the local population.

The inability of governments to find reliable countermeasures to this growing flow leads to a steady increase in the percentage of foreign immigrants and their descendants in the population, especially since the way is open for immigrants' families to enter the country, and the birth rate among Muslims is much higher than that of Europeans. For example, in France, one-third of newborns come from Muslim families. There are changes not only in the appearance of cities (hundreds of mosques in Berlin), but also in the ethnic composition of officials. The concentration of immigrants in large centres and suburbs makes their presence particularly noticeable. In Deptford, Milton Court and Pepys (districts of London), the share of ethnic minorities is close to half, and minorities are the majority in some areas surrounding the city. English journalist Melanie Phillips called the capital of Great Britain Londonistan.[3] In the early 2010s, between 47 million and 51 million immigrants or persons with "immigrant roots" lived in the EU.[4]

By the beginning of 2010, the total number of Muslim communities in Western Europe exceeded 18 million (4.5% of the total population). In 2015, fuelled by the events in Syria, the flow of refugees from the Middle East and illegal immigrants, that number has increased dramatically. In 2015-2016 alone, 1,090,000 thousand refugees arrived in Germany.[5] In 2016, the proportion of Muslims in the population reached 5% in Germany, 5.5% in the Netherlands, 6% in Belgium and 7% in Austria[6]. In 2030, the total number of Muslims in Western Europe could reach 30 million (more than 7%).[7]

In different countries, in different combinations, there are different models of relations between the local population and immigrants: either integration (immigrants' full participation in the life of the host country while preserving their cultural traditions), or assimilation (adoption by immigrants of new customs and traditions), or alienation or even marginalization (rejection of immigrants by local population, limiting their contacts with the local population).[8]

At the same time, there are two opposing processes among Muslims and other foreign culture immigrants in a contradictory combination: on the one hand, some of them adopt, mostly with difficulty and not completely, the values and traditions of the local population (such as women's rights, mixed marriages, birth control, the power of money, etc.); on the other hand, within their community, there is a process of radicalization, an outright refusal to accept modern values, self-isolation within the community, and even aggressive assertion of one's superiority.

2 V.V. Kantor's address at the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe // Novaya Gazeta, 11 January 2017
3 A.B. Berson, European Policy and Multiculturalism: Degree of Compatibility // Sovremennaya Evropa, 2011, No. 1, p. 67
4 G.I. Vainstein, Ethno-Cultural Conflict in Europe: Specificity, Dynamics and Some of Its Political Consequences // New Factors of Global and Regional Development: Aggravation of Ethno-Cultural Contradictions. Edited by E.Sh. Gontmakher, N.V. Zagladin, I.S. Semenenko. M.: IMEMO RAS, 2013, p. 65
5 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 October 2017
6 Muslim Population in Europe // muslimpopulation.com/Europe www.islamicpopulation.com
7 I.P. Tsapenko, Foreign Culture Migration and Cultural Diversity Management in Western Society / Novye Faktory..., quote, p.83
8 S. Khenkin, Muslims in Spain: Adaptation Problems // Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2008, No. 3, p. 57

Both processes coexist simultaneously and even intersect each other. Aggressive actions by radicals can sometimes evoke a sympathetic response among a seemingly peaceful and integrated segment of the foreign culture population, especially if they face negative reactions by local residents. (It's enough to recall the Prophet Muhammad cartoons in Charlie Hebdo, which faithful Muslims could only see as an insult to their values).

One factor that hinders the process of integration of immigrants is their isolation, a clear preference for members of their own group. Local authorities often encourage this isolation by placing immigrants in a kind of ghetto. On the other hand, Islamic businessmen often prefer to act in accordance with the rules customary in their home countries, which do not coincide with those accepted among modern Western entrepreneurs, thereby increasing the "grey zone".

The phenomenon of the self-isolation of Muslims undoubtedly has religious grounds. Islam, while it has external borrowings from Christian heritage, has special characteristics that clearly distinguish it from other faiths. First of all, it does not separate the religious and secular spheres. Sharia, a religious canon based on the Quran that contains not only religious rules, but also legal, moral and everyday norms, is designed to define the daily life and conduct of the faithful. Violation of the Sharia norms is interpreted as a serious deviation from one's moral and religious duties and must be strictly punished by the Muslim community.

Observance of Sharia laws by ever larger Muslim communities in Europe has destroyed the integrity of the institutional, cultural and ethical space of the Western world and led to the uncompromising and sometimes even offensive position taken by many adherents of Islam in the normative sphere, and their constantly increasing numbers threaten to erode the European identity.

For a long time, the European establishment did not recognize the danger associated with the influx of foreign culture immigrants. Businesses were interested in eliminating the shortage of cheap labour that existed since the second half of the 20th century, filling low-skilled jobs with immigrants. There was a belief that immigrants would not stay in Europe, and that they would eventually return to their home countries. Once governments realised that this would never happen, and that foreign civilisations were growing inside developed countries, they decided to regulate relations with them.

Thanks to the Canadian establishment, the concept and practice of "multiculturalism" has spread in Western Europe. Multiculturalism proposes the preservation of cultural diversity and mutual respect for the identity of the two opposing communities as a means of resolving ethnic and cultural contradictions. For several decades, multiculturalism influenced the public policy of Western European countries, primarily the UK and especially the Netherlands. As a result, the total number of immigrants and their descendants in Holland by the beginning of the 21st century exceeded 16-17% of the total population, and in large cities was much higher.[9]

However, reality has convincingly demonstrated the inconsistency of multiculturalism in the existing conditions. Almost the only consequence of this approach was the "encapsulation" of Muslim communities, which refuse to respect local traditions in response to the majority's respectful attitude to their culture. "Instead of the expected consolidation, social structures continue to fall into segments based on group membership; instead of strengthening the legitimacy and durability of a civil nation, there is a "loosening up" of national identity".[10] Multiculturalism does not lead to the socio-cultural integration of the society, and it does not prevent in any way the escalation of crime and terrorism.

Islamic faith and the norms of behaviour it prescribes consolidate the communities of immigrants and their descendants, preventing dialogue with the local population. One social scientist who studied the problems of migration stated that "ethnically homogeneous communities of migrants are actively and, it must be said, successfully forming an enclave habitat, which obviously tends to localize in relevant territorial boundaries".[11] "Old Europe," states another researcher, "does not stand up to the tests and challenges created by the principles of political correctness, which is not associated with ethical restrictions and often used thoughtlessly".[12]

9 I.S. Semenko, Integration of Foreign Culture Communities in Developed Countries // Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2006, p. 61
10 G.I. Vainstein, quote, p. 78
11 I. Dobayev, Islamization of Europe: Myth or Real Threat? // Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2008, No. 4, p. 52
12 I.S. Semenenko, Integration of Foreign Culture Communities in Developed Countries, quote, p. 63

By 2002 in the Netherlands, a special parliamentary commission studying integration of immigrants reported that multicultural policy had failed.[13] Similar assessments were later made in other countries. Even Angela Merkel, the main supporter of free entry for immigrants, had to admit: "This approach failed, completely failed". Cameron, Sarkozy and many other European leaders acknowledged the failure. But only European conservatives recognized this. Liberals and Social Democrats continue to insist on sticking to multiculturalism. In Sweden, multiculturalism remains an accepted political principle. In fact, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Germany, Norway, Portugal and Spain adhere to it, as well.

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, a new policy of "interculturalism" started to replace multiculturalism in some countries. Interculturalism focuses on what multiculturalism failed to achieve, i.e. contact, dialogue and interaction between cultures. Special areas are provided to hold meetings of representatives of different communities and to promote public discussion (some examples are Clissold Park in London and the Southeast cultural centre in the Italian city of Reggio nell'Emilia). Interaction is expected to go beyond culture to affect business and education. Copenhagen municipal authorities have even promised to turn it into "the most inclusive city in Europe".

Interculturalism is definitely a move in the right direction, a step forward from multiculturalism. Its weak point is the difficulty of encouraging interaction with a foreign culture community and of making the newcomers interested in such interaction. In practical terms, interculturalism is also limited to cities, which are usually the principal immigrant resettlement centres.

First-generation immigrants tend to be satisfied with their settlement at a new location, even with a minimum income level, but demands increase dramatically in the second and third generations. Because these individuals usually have a lower level of education and qualification and, accordingly, an unequal position in the labour market when compared to local peers, this creates grounds for discontent and serious conflict. Sometimes the local population, employers and local authorities further exacerbate this conflict with short-sighted discriminatory policies. Such ethno-social conflicts may resemble chaotic unrest, riots, pogroms, and looting, common in the period of early capitalism.

However, ethno-cultural protests by immigrants and their descendants against laws banning the hijab or other elements of Muslim clothing that emphasizes the isolation of newcomers are no less acute. Sometimes, immigrants even go on the offensive, seeking to remove crosses and other Christian symbols from hospitals and other public buildings. In Switzerland, the Muslim community even demanded that the cross be removed from the national flag.

In addition to acute clashes, there are quiet, hidden, slowly ripening moods of mutual discontent and confrontations between immigrants and locals that are extremely dangerous in Europe.

The revealed inability of current Western European society to integrate immigrants threatens to erode the European identity and creates a mass base for growing Islamist terrorism. The Islamic State doesn't need to send agents to Europe, since it can find them among the descendants of immigrants living there, and many of these agents having quite favourable living conditions. Even highly educated descendants of immigrants working in London and Glasgow hospitals tarnished themselves by attempting to arrange terrorist attacks at their hospitals.

"Cosmopolitan Islamic intellectuals, torn from their roots, whose language is predominantly English, not Arabic, are very often the bearers of radical ideas and ideologies. That is why many of the radical interpretations of Islam are born in immigrant communities in the West, and not in Islamic countries".[14] Zakat and other donations from European Muslims often go to extremist and terrorist organisations. There are over 100 Islamist organisations in 20 countries that support Islamists.[15] The force that unites extremist organisations of this type is the Islamic State, which has been banned in Russia.

At a conference of the International Union of Muslim Scholars in Istanbul, the president and spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood (also banned in Russia) Yusuf al-Qaradawi, called on the faithful to

13 A.N. Smirnov, European Multiculturalism: Metamorphoses of Perception // Novye Faktory..., quote, p. 71
14 Dobayev, quotation, p. 53
15 M.V. Fomin, Some External Factors of Destabilisation, Ethno-Social Conflicts and Extremism / New Factors, quotation, p. 32

recall the times when "Muslims were rulers of the world". "Now it is our duty," he said, "to turn the glory of the nation of Islam, the ummah to the days when Muslims were rulers of the world".[16]

While there were just a few serious terrorist acts a year in Western Europe at the beginning of this century (terrorist attacks in Madrid electric trains in 2004, when 191 people died, bombs in London subway that killed 52 passengers, etc.), and in some years (2008, 2011) there were none, there were 17 terrorist attacks in 2015 alone, of which the largest occurred in Paris on 13 November. There were 13 attacks in 2016, and the first nine months of 2017 have already seen ten attacks (explosions in the subway, a truck driving into pedestrians on the London Bridge, and an explosion at a stadium in Manchester, an assault on police and a terrorist attack at a train station in Brussels, an attack on police on the Champs-Elysées, a terrorist act in a supermarket in Hamburg, a terrorist attack in the Finnish city of Turku, and cars driving into pedestrians in Stockholm and Barcelona). In 2015, terrorist attacks killed 150 people; in 2016, they killed 135. The largest terrorist attack involving a vehicle was undoubtedly in Nice (86 dead).

The lack of an adequate response to Islamist terror creates a reverse wave of intolerance and nationalism, fraught with the revival of extreme forms of radicalism.

Surveys in France in December 2012 showed: 70% of the French believe that there are too many foreigners in France, and 68% did not feel as at home in France as before.[17]

In 2013, the majority of the French (72%) spoke against making school meals comply with religious requirements, and the same majority of respondents believed that traditional French values are not sufficiently protected. Fifty-four percent believe that Muslims have too many rights, and 57% consider racism directed against whites to be a widespread phenomenon.[18]

Sixty-nine percent of British citizens interviewed, 56% of Spaniards, 44% of French and 34% of Germans were in favour of reducing the flow of immigration. Seventy-seven percent of Spaniards, 75% of Greeks, 73% of British, 64% of French and Italians, 57% of Dutch, 51% of Germans, 48% of Portuguese, and 38% of Swedes expressed disagreement with official immigration policy.[19]

There is probably no satisfactory short- or medium-term solution to the problem of foreign cultural immigration and terrorism. The Western world is late with its response. "It is not ruled out that the erosion of the historical, sociocultural and ethno-confessional core of the national and state identity of EU states, the U.S. and Russia will become irreversible in the medium term".[20]

Urgent and important measures are required to ensure that this problem does not prove fatal for the fundamentals of Euro-Christian civilisation.

All this makes us return to the issue of the correlation between freedom and security, calling into question the thesis of the unconditional priority of the former of these values. This thesis is based on the enormous authority of such thinkers as Karl Popper, Erich Fromm, Jürgen Habermas, and the opposite point of view is somewhat compromised by the name of Karl Schmitt, who collaborated with the Nazis. Nevertheless, the criticality of the situation forces us to take the problem seriously.

In Western Europe, the gap between the officially proclaimed postulate of the unconditional priority of the principles of freedom, tolerance, human rights and the growing public concern for security is emerging and widening. "Obviously," said the psychologist Rainer Funk, chairman of the Erich Fromm Society, "a decisive shift in the public consciousness has taken place, as a result of which security rather than freedom is considered the highest good and unconditional value". Referring to this statement, leading legal scholar and former Minister of the Interior of Germany Gerhart Baum calls for planning both security and freedom.[21]

Prominent British historian and political philosopher John Nicholas Gray, concerned about the preservation of the values of freedom and tolerance, warns nevertheless about the danger of removing the state from the tasks of ensuring security. He believes that more dangerous than the hostility to liberalism of its sworn enemies is "the very liberal ideology that sees in government the main threat to freedom. In fact, liberal communities have a future only if Hobbes' protectionist role of the state is immediately restored.

16 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 November 2017
17 A.A. Preobrazhenskaya, Ethnosocial Problems in French Society // "New Factors", quotation, p. 96
18 Ibid., p. 97
19 A.V. Volovatykh, The European Union in the Grip of the Migration Crisis. // Problems of National Strategy, 2017, No.2 (41), p. 83
20 V.S. Martyanov, Conflict of Identities in the Political Project of Modernity. Multiculturalism or Assimilation? // Identity as the Subject of Political Analysis. M.: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 2011, p. 40
21 Gerhart Baum, Save Citizen's Rights: Freedom or Security? Polemic Notes. M.:Sektor, 2015, 136 p

Bringing freedom and security into balance does not promise to be easy. There are many conflicting freedoms, between which it is necessary to make a choice. But without the security requirement, freedom will soon come to its end". According to Gray, liberal societies must defend themselves, for which purpose it is necessary to weaken the cult of human rights.[22]

Another representative of the British public, retired Major General Charles Vyvyan, states that more freedoms means greater vulnerability in the face of terrorism and calls for an equilibrium between the powers of the state and freedoms, both civil and personal.[23]

Opponents of the liberals dispute the controversy between the protection of individual rights and the guarantees of personal security, arguing that among other rights a person has the right to security, the right to a protected existence, and that the right to life is the paramount human right.[25]

It is necessary to recall that it is not the first time this situation of danger has arisen in the Western world. For a number of years, Western governments faced the threat of aggressive Bolshevism, which proclaimed a course towards world revolution and created an international organisation (the Comintern) that served as its embodiment. These governments did not hesitate to take a series of security measures that ran counter to the liberal principles of the rule of freedom and human rights.

And there is a precedent of a different nature: attempts to appease Nazism and fascism, which naturally ended in failure and forced the Allies to resort to military force and other coercive measures to erase these aggressive forces from the face of the earth.

Much depends on whether the current choice is strategic or tactical, in other words, whether it is catastrophic, unconditional or temporary, situational in its meaning. It seems that at present it is in an intermediate position between these conditions. Whether it will go into the area of strategy or not depends on precise and correct tactical steps. There is still time, but it will not wait.

What may be the nature of this choice?

One could rely on the experience of developing policy to combine other needs that have challenged each other for priority. Primarily, this refers to the needs of economic development and the social interests of people at large. The rivalry and cooperation of conservatives, liberals and social democrats made it possible to find a flexible, mobile balance of these needs. The goal of clear tactical steps taken in this sphere should to find a flexible, mobile balance of freedoms, inalienable human rights and the security of citizens and the state, which does not exclude at some point, in one or another context the situational predominance of any of them. Therefore, it is inadmissible to make either need an absolute. Practice and scientific analysis should outline the specific nature of these steps as soon as possible.

Probably the same method – using the experience of the past (in this case the precedent with sanctions imposed on Iran) – can be used for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is important to note that a prerequisite for the success of the proposed tactics is a full-fledged political democracy. Only such a democracy is capable of a flexible, timely, adequate response to changing circumstances, making it possible to find the right forms of reaction to these changes, the right combination for ensuring both freedom and security, recalling that it is unacceptable to absolutize security, which contains the germ of totalitarianism. As a result, the practice of liberal democracy must change and become even more flexible to better meet the needs of our time.

The initiative of the European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation, which both warns of the danger of unlimited tolerance and developed a model statute drafted by a group of experts that contains concrete proposals for bringing tolerance into a clear legal framework, is extremely valuable. According to Council President Viatcheslav Kantor, the goal is "to transfer tolerance from the sphere of gentle, good intentions into the framework of solid science and strict legal practice".

Recognising that tolerance plays an important role in ensuring the successful coexistence of different groups in a single society, the authors of the statute emphasise that this coexistence should not affect the fundamental identity of society or its common values. Such coexistence requires mutual concessions from

22 John Nicholas Gray, Twilight Liberalism. // gefter.ru/archive/20067
23 Charles Vyvyan, Security and Freedom. // General Copybook, 2009, No. 3(49). otetrad/ru>arjticle-550.html
24 Pertici A. Terrorismo e diritti di persona. // Questione Giustizia./ questione giustizia.it/special/2016/1/terrorismo-e-diritti-della-persona_4ptp
25 A. Ilyinsky, Freedom and Security. // www.mobile.apr.ru/index.php?newsid=34440

individuals and groups and does not allow the weakening of ties that form society as a whole.

The statute proclaims freedom of expression, including freedom of faith, and at the same time requires the eradication of hate crimes and the repression of all forms of intolerance, including religious intolerance. Along with giving a full list of rights and freedoms, the authors simultaneously put forward a number of their limitations. Tolerance should not be used to violate national and international security, for release from responsibility for terrorist actions and undermining peace and stability. Tolerance does not mean that a group can secede from society without recognising communication with other groups or impose its customs. The statute says that tolerance is a two-way street.

The statute directly links legal provisions with the problem of immigration, with a search for a balance of migrants' rights and obligations. It points out that tolerance does not mean accepting forced marriages, polygamy and in general customs meaning the domination of men over women. Tolerance is also applicable to migrants, but they must follow the principles of coexistence with other groups of society. A migrant who has not yet obtained citizenship and clearly violates these principles may be expelled from the country. At the same time, the statute provides for the protection of vulnerable groups.

The statute also notes the role of mass media in maintaining an atmosphere of secure tolerance and the need to create school classes to improve knowledge about the concept. The statute also proposes creation of a dedicated administrative unit to oversee the state of tolerance.[26]

The model statute of the Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation was proposed to national parliaments for discussion. This project shall also be reviewed by the European Parliament in the nearest perspective. However, the project has influential opponents. The current leader of the German Social Democratic Party Martin Schulz believes that "it is very difficult to impose obligations to be tolerant by law. This is a matter of education and persuasion". However, Schulz does not object to confirming this principle in the legal sense.[27]

In the current situation, the first thing that is required from the ruling elite, Europe's political leaders, is immediately realising the scale of the approaching danger, understanding that without changing the attitude towards security issues, without implementing a comprehensive programme of measures, urgent and solidary in a scale of the whole Europe, Christian civilisation will face the destiny similar to the one of its Greco-Roman predecessor, which fell under the onslaught of barbarian tribes. Europe needs such people like Roosevelt, de Gaulle, Deng Xiaoping, who are able to step over short-term considerations and interests, first and foremost guided by the responsible tasks imposed on them by the history.

The migration crisis of 2015-2016, was caused by a sharp increase in the number of refugees from the Middle East and Africa. It prompted the European administration and the authorities of certain European states to take some urgent emergency measures. The migration crisis was the main topic of discussion at the meetings of the EU leaders. In April 2015, the fundamental principles of the new immigration strategy were adopted at the extraordinary summit of the European Council. The funds granted to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) were tripled. It was not only the matter of the rescue of refugees, numerously dying while crossing the Mediterranean Sea (according to the UN, 22,000 people died since 2000), but also the fight against smugglers who organise these risky naval affairs.

At the end of summer 2015, operation "Sofia" was set up to rescue the drowned and to control the Mediterranean water area. In December 2015, a special agency was established - the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, but its staff of 1,500 people, even considering the existence of former border guard service, Frontex (402 people), was inadequate to deal with the new conditions. A more effective procedure for expelling illegal immigrants was developed.

The most difficult thing was to establish the cooperation between certain countries in the distribution of burdens of immigration. In the autumn of 2015, a number of EU countries closed their borders for the reception of migrants. In order to reduce the dangerous concentration of immigrants in certain countries (Greece and Italy - the first countries where refugees arrived, Germany and other prosperous countries where

26 A Model National Statute for the Promotion of Tolerance. Submitted with a View to Being Enacted by the Legislatures of European States.
27 E. Naumova. Europe Developed the Law on Tolerance. // Vesti.ru.17.10.2012.

the refugees preferred end-points were), the European Commission set quotas for each country - the minimum number of refugees that they must accept.

But the solidarity of the EU members was not on a high note. Not only were the countries of the former Soviet Baltic states and from so-called Visegrád Group (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland) opposed to this decision but originally United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Finland were also opposed. When the resolution was adopted, most of the EU members preferred the tactic of non-fulfillment or underfulfillment of their obligations. Only Finland, Ireland, and Malta almost completely exhausted their quotas for the reception of refugees.

The decision to reach an agreement with Turkey was the most successful among taken measures, and it was not by chance: it became clear that it was impossible to influence the situation without going beyond Europe itself. Under an agreement with Turkey, executed in March 2016 after difficult negotiations, this country, previously a crucial transit point for the refugees, pledged to help reduce the migration to Europe by setting up refugee camps on its territory and ensuring optimal conditions there. The European Union provided Turkey EUR 6 billion to receive and set up arrangements for refugees. Surprisingly, Erdogan's government conscientiously fulfilled the difficult obligations under the agreement, and in 2016, migration across its borders was reduced by 97%[28]. At the end of 2015, the Turkish-Greek border was crossed by 6,000 people daily, in June 2016 - less than 50.[29] The Balkan migration route was actually closed. However, the future of the agreement is in question: Turkey is concerned about the EU's failure to keep the promise to accelerate the adoption of Turkey.

Meanwhile, the success of the agreement with Turkey prompted the European Union to try to achieve the same results in negotiations with African countries. In addition, the European Union has allocated EUR 3.6 billion to address the impact of the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the accommodation of Syrian refugees in other Middle Eastern countries.[30]

So far, the palliative measures taken by the EU governments aimed to restrict mass immigration and prevent terrorist acts have not yet significantly changed the situation with security and the removal of the threat to European civilisation. Either way, immigration and terrorism continue. And the relationship with the Muslims who already migrated to Western Europe is under the focus now.

What are the prospects for further development, what can induce the authorities of European countries to radically improve this situation? The practice of recent years has shown that only the dramatic deterioration of the current situation can stimulate a change in their policies.

According to a realistic assessment, there are currently three main scenarios, the specific implementation of which may differ.

Option 1. There is an extraordinary terrorist attack (by its scale and number of victims)
1a) Simultaneous and destructive attack on large and symbolically significant targets such as the American twin towers that were destroyed in 2001. These could be the Eiffel Tower, the Arc de Triomphe, Westminster Abbey or the Reichstag building, etc. The attack could be made from the air (as in the USA) or (less likely) prepared by the continuous accumulation of explosives in the immediate proximity of the object.
Of course, such an attack is a complex task, and it requires accurate and unmistakable preparation, during which the special services of the Western countries, warned by the fateful experience of 2001, have many chances to uncover the plot. But difficulties of this kind never stopped the Islamists, who are ready for any sacrifices for the sake of fulfilling their plans.
1b) In a crowded place (such as a market, a railway station, a theatre, etc.) a bloody massacre takes place, leading to numerous victims of at least a three-digit scale.
1c) Simultaneous terrorist attacks organised in at least two dozen capitals or major centres of several European countries.

28 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 October 2017
29 Vimont P. Migration in Europe. Overcoming Solidarity Crisis. //carnegie.ru./2017/02/09-ru-pub-67923
30 EU Faces Migration Crisis Challenge. Positions of European States. Edited by N.K. Arbatova, A.M. Kokeeva. M.: Institute of World Economy and International Relations of Russian Academy of Sciences, 2016, p.10

1d) Terrorists use weapons of mass destruction.
1da) Use of chemical weapons. According to some sources, it was already used in Syria.
1db) Use of nuclear weapons. The access of terrorists to nuclear weapons is facilitated by its presence in a country with an unstable political situation, like Pakistan, and a rogue country with an aggressive political elite, like North Korea. But terrorists do not need to resort to the use of arsenals of such countries.
In 2007, two groups of armed people broke into the facility in South Africa, where hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium were stored. They seized the control room and shot the duty officer. And, although they soon left the captured room, it does not alter the fact: a precedent is established. "Experts say that it is enough to manufacture a small explosive device using enriched uranium. A hundred thousand spectators would get a deadly dose of radiation in case of an explosion at a stadium during a popular football match. One of the worst scenarios: terrorists seize a nuclear power plant. If they disable the cooling system of the active zone of the reactor, the radiation will melt the protective shield, and the lethal nuclear radiation will burst into the atmosphere".[31] It is also possible to spray radioactive materials used in medicine and destroy many people by means of an ordinary explosion. Islamists near Mosul have already stated that they extracted cesium from radioactive materials.
The listed sub-options are more or less likely to happen. In all the mentioned cases, the reaction of European public opinion can be nothing but an outburst of such a strong indignation that would compel the leaders of the dominant political forces in the largest EU states to make a decisive turn in their policies, eliminating the underestimation of the problem of security and immigration restriction, and taking a number of measures to solve these problems.
Along with this quite possible option, there is also an **option 2.** It includes gradual, long-term growth of jihadist terrorism. One of the possible forms is the mass distribution of single terrorists committing vehicle-ramming attacks or using cold weapons.
The reaction to an obvious growth of danger is:
2a) Appearance of leaders of a new generation at the fore of their countries' dominant parties that will eliminate an underestimation of the problems of security and immigration in their policies, or -
2b) The breakthrough to power, at least in part of major European countries, of such political forces that seek to strengthen security measures and restrict immigration. Unfortunately, it is quite possible that these will most likely be right-wing populist or, less likely, left-wing populist parties or movements.
These processes are starting to happen now in some small countries. Sebastian Kurz, leader of the Austrian People's Party, which won in the October 2017 election due to his criticism of German Chancellor Angela Merkel for unlimited admission of refugees, intends to attract to the new government a right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria with anti-immigrant views. This turn of events forces traditional parties in other countries to follow their example and also increase their attention to these painful problems.
Most likely, option 2 is the most possible one. But the speed of the reaction of the political establishment is important to the growing threat as never before. Delays are dangerous.

Option 3 is also possible: the gradual weakening of the scale and severity of terrorism. A combination of two factors can lead to such a result: the military defeats of Islamist forces and the simultaneous strengthening of currently more or less passive moderate wing of Islam.
Most likely, the influence of only one of these factors will not be enough. For example, in the event of the defeat of the military forces of Islamism, only the movement of the centre of gravity of their operations towards the organisation of terrorist actions can occur. A completely different case is the combination of both of these factors. In the event of the weakening of terrorism, today's approach to the problem of terrorism and immigration is likely to remain the same, but the severity of the problem will decrease. The focus will be on establishing the dialogue with Muslim communities. Therefore, it is extremely important to achieve

31 L. Mlechin. Let us turn you into ashes. // Novaya Gazeta newspaper, 11 January 2017

the awakening of loyal, ready for civilised cooperation forces of the Muslim world - the so-called "European Islam" – by means of a smart and balanced policy.
However, option 3 is the least possible. In addition, it does not create guarantees for the future.

A real guarantee of security for the future cannot be created by a number of poorly coordinated restrictive and prohibitive measures like the ones, which were urgently adopted under the influence of the migration crisis of 2015-2016, but by a whole complex of political operations, where such measures form only a part. "We need a global agenda for addressing the entire complex of problems related to the resettlement of peoples".[32]

This global agenda, of course, includes persistent and at the same time cautious measures for social adaptation of immigrants and the establishment of dialogue with the Muslim world, the development of the idea of "interculturalism" and the overcoming of crisis in the European Union. The successful establishment of "European solidarity" is an indispensable condition for the effective separation of burdens of admission and adaptation of immigrants.

But at the same time, a decisive way out of Europe is required. First of all, it means the provision of persistent, not limited to temporary or partial measures, influence on the situation in the "Third World", actively extinguishing the flash points of military conflicts that cause the flight of civilians from there. This can hardly be achieved without restoring an atmosphere of harmony and constructive cooperation between Russia and the developed world. Finally, in order to reduce and normalise the economic migration, it is necessary to at least alleviate the enormous structural difficulties of the developing countries, and this task requires the effective limitation of the short-sighted egoistic policies of the owners of the global economy and the reduction of costs far exceeding the costs of the "Marshall Plan".

Much of this sounds like a kind of utopia. But who knows? History often took such a turn that no forecasters could predict. Who could foresee the victory of democracy in most European countries back in the 17th century, and the rapid revival of China after the excesses of Maoism in the 20th century?

One would like to believe that all the mentioned conditions for the preservation of the Euro-Christian civilisation are somehow feasible. It is clear that the solution of this problem, as well as other even more difficult and pressing problems (elimination of the nuclear threat, regulation of the planet's thermal regime, safe scientific and technological progress) will require the supreme strain of all the forces of mankind, the ability to rise above the needs of today, fearlessly look into the future, which the human race showed in its best moments.

32 N.K. Arbatova Reasons // EU faces migration crisis challenge. Positions of European states. Edited by N.K. Arbatova, A.M. Kokeeva. – M.: Institute of World Economy and International Relations of Russian Academy of Sciences, 2016, p. 4

POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN EUROPEAN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES: A SUMMARY OF DRIVERS, DYNAMICS, AND RESPONSES

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INTRODUCTION

There are primarily two contexts in which the world 'radicalisation' has come to be used. One is the radicalisation of young European Muslims who have become supporters of jihadist organisations like Islamic State, including many who have travelled to Syria and Iraq in order to join the group's self-declared caliphate. Another is the increasing polarisation of European societies, which has resulted in growing support for far-right political parties such as France's National Front, the Alternative for Germany, or the Dutch Freedom Party.

At first glance, the two phenomena could not be more different. After all, jihadists and far-right populists profess to hate each other. They recruit from different pools of people and stand for radically different concepts for how to govern societies. But they have more in common than meets the eye. As much as they hate each other, their first and most immediate enemy is liberal democracy, especially modern European societies in which people from different ethnicities, faiths, and cultural backgrounds have equal rights and can live together peacefully. They promote exclusive identities, which rely on 'us versus them', and have inspired violent and non-violent forms of action. Not least, they are fundamentally modern movements, which are connected internationally and make extensive use of information technology, while promoting the return to a (largely imaginary) 'golden age'.

This paper will argue that, despite their many differences, jihadism and far-right populism are responses to the same political, economic, and social forces that have transformed European societies in recent decades while, at the same time, causing fears, insecurity, and dislocation. Countering extremism in an era of unprecedented change and insecurity requires a new and spirited defence of European liberalism, which should involve being tough on violence, confident in the defence of liberal values, and consistent in addressing grievances.

UNDERLYING DRIVERS[1]

The fertile soil on which extremist movements in Europe have recently flourished consists of the feelings of insecurity and confusion which years of unprecedented political, economic, and social changes have caused. Many liberals have been slow to recognise the significance – and legitimacy – of these grievances, because they generally welcomed, if not championed, the very changes whose unsettling consequences extremists have sought to exploit.

1 This section contains excerpts from my book Old and New Terrorism, which have been reproduced with the publisher's permission. See Peter R. Neumann, Old and New Terrorism: Late Modernity, Globalization and the Transformation of Political Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 87-93.

As early as the mid-1990s, the American futurologist John Naisbitt observed a 'global paradox', whereby increasing levels of economic and political interconnectedness did not necessarily lead to more understanding and dialogue, but caused people to emphasise markers of difference, such as ethnicity, language, and religion.[2] Writing at the same time, the political scientist Benjamin Barber summed up this phenomenon with the metaphor 'jihad vs. McWorld', arguing that fundamentalism – be it ethnic, cultural, or religious – and globalisation were two sides of the same coin, with 'jihad' being 'a dialectical response to [the drivers of] modernity'.[3]

One of the drivers that Naisbitt and Barber identified was technology. While making products cheaper and better, the increasing reliance on computers, robots, and the internet has resulted in fewer jobs and increased competition among lower-skilled workers. Moreover, and in a broader sense, technology has challenged people's sense of control over their destinies. In the words of the columnist George Will, modernity has '[multiplied] … dependencies on things utterly mysterious to those who are dependent – things such as semiconductors, which control the functioning of almost everything from cell phones to computers to cars'.[4] As a consequence, some people have experienced technology not as empowering but threatening.

Equally important have been social changes. Starting in the 1980s, the rise of structural unemployment, part-time work and the concept of job mobility – most recently, the so-called 'gig economy'[5] – have made job histories less predictable. This has coincided with dramatic changes in social norms, especially with regards to family and gender equality. People in Western societies get married later and divorce more often, as well as having more sexual partners and fewer children. The certainties of (heterosexual) marriage, family, and lifetime employment, which had brought stability to biographies in the decades following World War II, are no longer the norm. Life in modern Western societies offers more choices and opportunities, but also comes with greater expectations and risks.[6]

Some of the most significant changes have resulted from globalisation. From a purely economic perspective, global trade has created massive economies of scale, which have allowed companies to produce their goods in multiple countries and take advantage of cheaper labour in foreign countries. While consumers in Western countries have benefited from lower prices and more choice, entire industries have been 'outsourced' to Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, with job losses among lower-skilled and, increasingly, skilled workers.[7]

Another consequence has been migration. Never before in human history have so many people been 'on the move'. Western countries – still the most prosperous and productive in the world – have been transformed by the influx of foreign labour, whose settlement has turned mono-cultural into multi-cultural societies. In practically every Western European country, this has challenged existing ideas of national identity and raised (often uncomfortable) question about what it means to be British, French, or German. Among the descendants of immigrants whose parents migrated to Europe, it is common to find 'conflicts of identity', which scholars have linked to transnational ideologies (see below). Among ethnic Europeans, on the other hand, migration has resulted in fears about jobs, culture, language, social norms, and religious identity. Combined with declining birth rates, this has given rise to the impression that Western civilisation and the European 'way of life' are under siege.

Needless to say, not all of these concerns are empirically true or universally shared. But they demonstrate that the forces which liberals have unleashed have had ambiguous consequences. Their 'objective' social and economic benefits may be unquestionable, but they have not 'migrated' as fast as people's expectations, nor has everyone benefited equally or at the same time. As the Indian journalist Anand Giridharadas put it:

Societies are not monolithic blocs… Social change has early and late adopters, and the choices of the timely alter the options among which the tardy most subsequently choose… And so [modernity may

2 John Naisbitt, Global Paradox (New York: Avon, 1995).
3 Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Ballantine, 1995), p. 157.
4 George F. Will, 'Building a Wall against Talent', Washington Post, 26 June 2008.
5 See Nicole Kobie, 'What is the gig economy and why is it so controversial?', Wired, 11 July 2017.
6 The German sociologist Ulrich Beck coined the term 'risk society'. See Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1986).
7 See, for example, Holger Görg, 'Globalization, Offshoring and Jobs' in Marc Bacchetta and Marion Jansen (eds.), Making Globalization Socially Sustainable (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2011), pp. 21-47.

have] freed untold millions from inherited destinies, even as it makes others feel as though their control over fate is sleeping away.[8]

It is precisely among those who feel alienated, confused, fearful or threatened by change, and who look for certainty, belonging and a scapegoat to resolve their feelings of unease, that extremists find supporters. During a period of unprecedented change, it should be no surprise that the demand for certainty, simple answers and clear, unambiguous identities has become greater than ever before.

JIHADISM[9]

Although groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State have attracted a range of recruits from different backgrounds, including a disproportionate number of ethnic European converts, the majority of their followers are from Muslim backgrounds. Indeed, the population group which has received most attention in the context of jihadist radicalisation in Europe are the descendants of Muslim immigrants from North Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and Turkey. Strictly speaking, they are no longer migrants, because they were born in their country of residence, speak its language, and – in many cases – are full citizens. Nevertheless, based on their names, religion and/or cultural background, some European governments describe them as people with 'migration backgrounds'.

As many studies have shown, people with migration backgrounds are more likely to experience 'crises of identity' which result in them questioning their sense of belonging. This means that they no longer fully identify with the culture and traditions of their parents or grandparents, whose countries they often only know from visits, but that they are equally alienated from their countries of residence, where they feel unaccepted and sometimes experience discrimination.[10] Scholars such as Robert Leiken, Marc Sageman, and Olivier Roy believe that this is the principal dynamic which explains why a number of especially second and third generation descendants of migrants have been receptive to jihadist groups.[11] From the jihadists' perspective, the alienation that 'crises of identity' produce represents a 'cognitive opening'[12] in which to insert their narrative of the 'West vs. Islam' that simultaneously provides an explanation for people's discomfort and offers a new, defiant and – therefore – seemingly more powerful identity.

Another population group, which has recently come under scrutiny, are so-called new migrants, that is, first generation immigrants such as the recently arrived refugees who become vulnerable to radicalisation as a result of their migration experience. The underlying driver may be a sense of cultural and social dislocation – being removed from family and friends, overwhelmed by a new country, culture, and language, and with no clear perspective or certainty for the future. Over time, this sense of dislocation can be amplified by thwarted expectations, experiences of rejection, and economic frustrations. As with the descendants of migrants, this mix of experiences and perceptions offers jihadist groups a pool of grievances that they can activate and channel into violence or an extremist political project.[13]

FAR-RIGHT POPULISM

Throughout history, democratic societies have seen the rise of populist movements, which have claimed to represent the interests of 'ordinary people' against supposedly corrupt and out of touch elites. Their rise has frequently coincided with periods of economic uncertainty, when jobs were lost and the gap between the 'establishment' and the rest of the population became more visible. What distinguishes left-wing from right-wing populists is the deliberate scapegoating of racial or cultural 'others', which has allowed

8 Anand Giridharadas, 'The Paradox of "Choice" in a Globalized Culture', International Herald Tribune, 12 September 2008.
9 This section contains excerpts from a recent report I produced for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They have been reproduced with the Chairmanship's permission. See Peter R. Neumann, 'Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Good Practices, and Recommendations from the OSCE Region', OSCE, 29 September 2017.
10 See, for example, Robert S. Leiken, 'Europe's Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism', Center for Immigration Studies, April 2005; Peter R. Neumann, Joining Al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe (London: Routledge, 2009); Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam (London: Hurst, 2004); Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2008).
11 Ibid.
12 For an explanation of the concept of 'cognitive opening', see Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam' in Peter R. Neumann, Radicalization, Major Works Collection, Vol. 1 (London and New York: Routledge, 2015).
13 I am grateful for this insight to Dr. Thomas Hegghammer.

right-wing populists to mobilise supporters based on ethnicity and articulate fears about culture and identity. As the Dutch researcher Cas Mudde has pointed out, not all far-right populists are racists or enemies of democracy (in fact, they frequently claim to be champions of the 'silent majority'), but they generally oppose liberalism.[14]

In the European context, the most popular far-right narrative is what Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens has referred to as the 'Islamisation conspiracy', that is, the idea that European societies are systematically taken over by Muslim immigrants who seek to subvert democracy and establish sharia law.[15] An important element of this narrative are demographic changes, which far-right populists believe demonstrate that Muslims will soon be a majority, and that a 'European civil war' is looming. All negative actions by Muslims – say, incidents of crime, rape, or terrorism – are blamed on 'Islamic culture' and 'ideology', while practically everything that European elites have done to accommodate the continent's changing reality – for example, by allowing the construction of mosques, acknowledging Muslim holidays, or promoting immigrants in the police or public television – is described as part of a process of 'submission'.[16]

The ideas that are underpinning contemporary European far-right populism have resonated not just among 'losers' and the jobless but also, and especially, among the middle and lower middle classes who feel anxious about their futures, and whose motivations – both economic and cultural – cannot easily be separated.[17] In most countries, the main vehicle for translating those fears into political action have been far-right populist parties, such as France's Front National and the Alternative for Germany. Even so, the same ideas and narratives have also produced street movements like the English Defence League and the German PEGIDA, as well as terrorism, such as Anders Breivik's attack on members of the Norwegian Labour Party's youth wing in July 2011.

RECIPROCAL RADICALISATION

Although it is common for researchers to focus on single actors or groups, there are many conflicts in which it is equally important to understand the interactions between them. In Northern Ireland, for example, many Catholics viewed the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as defenders of the community against Protestant paramilitaries, while Protestant paramilitaries were seen by their own community as defenders against the IRA. Radicalisation into the conflict was, in many cases, driven by a desire for revenge, 'tit for tat', and the fear that one's own community could be victimised by the other.[18]

Needless to say, the current situation in Europe is far from reaching the levels of violence and intensity of the Northern Ireland conflict. But, just like in Northern Ireland, today's jihadists and far-right populists mirror each other's rhetoric, and rely on each other to produce the polarisation that is necessary for their respective narratives to resonate. When jihadists carry out a terrorist attack, far-right populists are typically the first to say 'we told you so'. In their minds, every act of jihadist terrorism illustrates that 'Muslims' cannot be trusted, that 'they' will never integrate into European societies, and that Europe's ruling elites have been complicit in their countries' destruction. The jihadists, in turn, will draw on such statements to convince their own supporters that trying to integrate into European societies is pointless, that being European and being Muslim are mutually exclusive, and that they have a duty to fight the ones who hate them.[19]

As a result, jihadist and far-right extremism are not just negative and destructive on their own, they risk creating 'vicious circles' in which European societies are becoming more polarised, and the space for liberal voices, who seek accommodation and compromise, is shrinking. While there is no realistic danger that terrorists – be they jihadist or far-right extremist – can physically destroy European societies, they threaten the pluralist consensus that allows people from different faiths and ethnicities to live together in peace and security. In that sense, the jihadists and far-right populists that are described in this essay present

14 Cas Mudde, ,'Populism isiken't dead. Here are five things you need to know about it', The Guardian, 7 July 2017.
15 Alexander Meleagrou Hitchens and Hans Brun, A Neo-Nationalist Network: The English Defence League and Europe's Counter-Jihad Movement (London: ICSR, 2013), p. 41.
16 Ibid.
17 See Matt Golder, 'Far Right Parties in Europe', Annual Review of Political Science, 19 (2016), pp. 477-97.
18 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat (London: John Murray, 2006), p. 115-16.
19 See Julia Ebner, The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism (London: IB Tauris, 2017).

a challenge not just to security agencies, but also – and even more seriously so – to democracy and the European societal model.[20]

RESPONSES

The dramatic political, economic and social changes that have unfolded in recent years have not just created new opportunities but also fear and unease, especially among those who feel uncertain about their future and identity. Extremists have taken advantage of this, and although their programmes and actions are radically different from each other, both jihadists and right-wing populists are – effectively – responses to the same set of factors. Their joint enemy is liberal democracy and pluralism, and they both require polarisation and confrontation, so they can radicalise and recruit potential supporters.

For those who wish to promote security and liberalism, both jihadists and right-wing populists are adversaries who need to be confronted with vigour and confidence. In the words of the Austrian philosopher Karl Popper:

> "If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them … We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant."[21]

Turning Popper's vision into reality requires a new and spirited defence of European liberalism. This entails zero tolerance for violence, the protection of threatened communities, and strong and consistent punishments for those engaging in terrorism or any other form of politically motivated violence. It also means a robust defence of liberal values, that is, confronting illiberal practices as well as making available liberal rights and opportunities to everyone regardless of how long they have been part of society or what religion they belong to.

Finally, rather than compromising with extremists, liberals need to recognise and work towards addressing the grievances which extremists so shrewdly exploited. For far too long, liberals have believed that globalisation, technological and social change will eventually – and necessarily – be accepted for everyone. Making sure that the benefits of these changes are felt, and that those who do not experience them (yet) are offered other pathways and opportunities, is as much part of a robust defence of liberalism as the endless repetition of its values.

20 Peter R. Neumann, Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West (London: IB Tauris, 2016), p. 3.
21 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1: The Spell of Plato, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 293.

THE RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULIST CHALLENGE TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

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In early 2000, Austrian politics made headlines in Europe and beyond. For the first time in postwar history, a mainstream European party, the center-right ÖVP, agreed to form a coalition with a political party deemed of the extreme right, Jörg Haider's FPÖ. At the time, Austria's EU partners expressed grave concerns and reservations, going as far as to threaten to politically quarantine Austria within the EU. 17 years later, history repeated itself; but this time, the formation of a new Austrian center-right coalition government that includes the FPÖ elicited hardly any major response.

The FPÖ is one of Europe's major radical right-wing populist parties. Its leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, entertains cordial relations with Marine Le Pen (Front national), Geert Wilders (PVS), and Matteo Salvini (Lega Nord), among others. Together, they represent the face of a new, refurbished version right-wing extremism that combines populist rhetoric with nativist discourse. This discursive blend has proven to be a winning political formula, which to a large extent informs the upsurge of electoral support for the radical right in what commonly is referred to as "advanced liberal democracies." The nativist turn has allowed radical right-wing populist parties to deflect the charge of racism and advance the strategy of "*dédiabolisation*" (Marine Le Pen) designed to make right-wing radical thinking *salonfähig*.

The recent formation of an ÖVP/FPÖ government in Austria (together with coalition governments in Norway and New Zealand) suggests once again that radical right-wing populist parties are close to entering the political mainstream. In the past, established parties have insisted on shunning and politically marginalizing these parties (via a strategy of *cordon sanitaire*). Today, even left-wing parties are no longer averse to making a deal with the populist right (as, most recently, in New Zealand), if only to have a chance to maintain or regain a grip on the levers of power.

For the analysis that follows, populism is defined as a political doctrine that holds that society is divided into two antagonistic groups, the vast mass of ordinary people (the "low") and a relatively small elite (the "high"). The latter are charged with systematically ignoring the will of the former while showing nothing but contempt for them, their values and wants. Populism claims to seek to restore to ordinary people the value they deserve and to guarantee that politics once again expresses the will of the people.

Central to nativist discourse is the notion that the "descendants of the original inhabitants" of a country or region should be accorded priority, if not exclusivity, in terms of rights and resources. Non-natives, by contrast, should be treated as temporary guests and behave accordingly (Kuper 2003). Governments should show a "reasonable partiality towards compatriots" by, foremost of all, promoting and protecting the welfare and well-being of native-born citizens (Miller 2005). This is the logic behind catchy slogans such as *La France aux français and Les français d'abord* (Front national).

It is often maintained that contemporary radical right-wing populist parties are primarily defined by their strident nationalistic, xenophobic ideology, with populism only serving as a peripheral and largely irrelevant addendum. This view, however, is rather misleading. It underestimates the central role populist tropes have played in laying the ground for the transformation of the extreme right over the past several decades. The initial surge, some thirty years ago, in electoral support for parties as diverse as the Front national, the FPÖ, the Lega Nord, and the Scandinavian Progress parties was largely owed to their ability to

appeal to political disaffection, mobilize anti-elite/anti-establishment resentment and promote themselves not only as the only sincere and committed advocates of ordinary people and their interests but also of "genuine" democracy.

The early programs of the Front national, for instance, charged that in France, democracy had been "confiscated" by an "oligarchy" which stifled the "just aspirations" of the French people and systematically ignored their concerns. In Austria, the FPÖ (under the new leadership of Jörg Haider) soared in the polls after it started to vigorously attack the country's corporatist *Proporz* system and denounce patronage and privilege. The same held true in Italy where the Lega Nord campaigned against the Roman "partitocracy" mired in clientilism and corruption. In each of these cases, the parties promoted themselves as uncompromising advocates of fundamental socioeconomic and sociopolitical change, nothing short of a revolution (the title of a book by Umberto Bossi from 1993). The avowed goal was to deconstruct the sclerotic postwar institutional system and replace it was a new one -- a genuine "citizens' democracy" (Haider's *Bürgerdemokratie*), where the people would get back their voice (the FN's *rendre la parole au peuple*).

If radical right-wing populist parties were successful in this initial phase (the FPÖ increased its support from roughly 5 percent in 1983 to almost 27 percent in 1999), it was to a significant extent because their populist rhetoric resonated with, and managed to exploit, growing public sentiments of political disenchantment (in German *Politikverdrossenheit*) and distrust in democratic institutions and their representatives (particularly the established political parties). The case of the Front national is emblematic. The party took off in the European election of 1984, garnering more than 10 percent of the vote. This was hardly a year after François Mitterrand's (in)famous "U-turn" which put to an abrupt end his experiment with "Kensianism in one country," subjecting France to the *rigueur* of the *franc fort*. In its aftermath, large numbers of working-class voters turned their back on France's traditional left (both socialists and communists) and deserted to the Front national. This resulted in a growing "proletarization" of the FN vote – a development that increasingly came to characterize the electoral base of radical right-wing populism throughout Western Europe.

In its wake, nativism began to play an increasingly prominent role in radical right-wing populist discourse -- and that for good reason: The lower classes -- what in French is known as the *couches populaires* -- have proven to be particularly sensitive to the question of immigration. Not only because migrants are seen as direct competitors for dwindling job opportunities as well as allegedly privileged beneficiaries of increasingly niggardly social benefits; but also because they are seen as fundamentally threatening society's culture, identity and way of life.

The radical right's nativist discourse has largely adopted and responded to these concerns, informing three types of nativist programmatic output – economic nativism, welfare chauvinism and symbolic nativism. In the initial phase of radical right-wing populist mobilization, nativist discourse largely consisted of the first two. As the German Republikaner pithily put it in the early 1990s: "Save the welfare state: Expel bogus refugees! Eliminate unemployment: Stop immigration!" This was a rather crude way of articulating widespread public misgivings, which found its programmatic expression in slogans such as the Vlaams Blok's *eigen volk eerst* (our own people first) and seeming panaceas such as the FN's call for *préférence nationale*. Welfare chauvinist positions continue to be a staple of contemporary radical right-wing populist programs. Marine Le Pen, for instance, has charged that "mass immigration" cannot but destroy "national solidarity" and in this way erode the foundation of the welfare state.

Over the past several decades, however, the significance of economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism in radical right-wing discourse has steadily declined, its place taken up by symbolic nativism. Symbolic nativism is informed by the notion that migrants challenge, undermine, and/or threaten the cherished cultural heritage, norms, and values that define a nation's identity. It reflects a type of nostalgic reaction to the growing presence and particularly increasing visibility and assertiveness of non-natives, often perceived as irritants, which finds expression in the reaffirmation of a common cultural identity. The result is a process

which has aptly been characterized as a reversion/retreat to tribalism -- a new form of identity politics based on the binary logic of us versus them.

Symbolic nativism marks a departure from the once dominant simplistic doctrines of racial superiority, embracing instead the notion of "cultural pluralism" which accepts that all cultures are equally valid, but claims that not all are compatible with each other. Its conceptually most important trope is "the right to difference" – first introduced in the 1970s by Alain de Benoist, the leading intellectual theorist of the French *nouvelle droite* --, which lies at the heart of contemporary radical right-wing identitarian politics. Its proponents maintain that every culture has a right (if not obligation) to safeguard and preserve its distinctiveness, since only the preservation of cultural distinctiveness guarantees the maintenance of cultural variety. Politically, this translates into the demand that migrants assimilate by fully embracing the norms, customs, habits and values of the host country. Otherwise they should be sent back. As the Vlaams Belang has bluntly put it: *Aanpassen of terugkeren*! (assimilate or go home).

Politically, symbolic nativism encompasses both an effort to reaffirm and restore cultural distinctiveness and construe a line separating "us" from "them." A case in point is UKIP's 2010 manifesto entitled "Restoring Britishness" designed to counter what the party considered the dominant ideology of multiculturalism and supranationalism propagated by the "British cultural left." Against that, the party promoted the notion of a "single British culture," a "uniculturalism" allegedly capable of accommodating "all races, religions and colours." At the same time, however, the party conjured up the specter of the "Islamicisation of Britain" -- a catchphrase, which by the early 2000s had increasingly come to dominate radical right-wing nativist discourse.

It reflects a broad-based rejection of the notion that Islam constitutes a legitimate part of Western European culture. The contemporary radical right's mobilization against Islam – as well as the growing presence and visibility of Muslim minorities – is largely framed in terms of a broad "civilizational" rather than national confrontation (Brubaker 2017). Its ideational roots lie in the early 1990s, a time when the question of Islam was hardly politically salient. As early as 1990, Bruno Mégret, when he was still the FN's number two, argued that Islam was "the foundation of a civilization" that was "incompatible with the civilization of Europe" (Mégret 1990). Subsequent years saw a further hardening of the radical right's anti-Islamic rhetoric with leading exponents of hard-right parties such as the Vlaams Blok and the German Republikaner charging that Islam was anti-Western religion of conquest. Depicting Muslim migrants as constituting an invading army radical right-wing parties increasingly promoted themselves as counter-subversive movements determined to thwart the "incursion" of Islam in Western societies by, among other things, mobilizing against the construction of mosques and minarets (most notably in Switzerland) and for the retention of Christian symbols in public spaces (such as crucifixes in public schools)..

It was the irruption of the flamboyant, openly gay Pim Fortuyn onto the Dutch political scene, which provided a decisive ideational boost to the radical right's anti-Islamic mobilization. During his campaign for the 2002 parliamentary election, Fortuyn offered a programmatic blend that combined anti-Islamic rhetoric, a frontal assault on political correctness and a resolute defense of gender equality, gay and lesbian rights, and fundamental liberal values. Famously charging that Islam was a "backward culture" he maintained that neither he nor his fellow citizens had any desire "to start all over again with the emancipation of women and gays."

Fortuyn's innovative way to frame the question of Islam in western societies in terms of liberal values proved both influential and contagious on the radical right. And for good reasons: It allowed even parties with a compromised genealogy, such as the FPÖ, the Vlaams Belang, the British National Party, and the Sweden Democrats, to promote themselves as staunch defenders of western, Enlightenment-inspired liberal values – if with a nationalist twist. For Fortuyn had not framed his position in terms of defending universal values, but of Dutch values, which he claimed were the result of a long tradition of tolerance particular to the Dutch. Other parties have followed suit, most notably in Denmark and Sweden, but also in France,

1 It is hardly a coincidence that after the departure of Florian Phillipot (who is gay), Sébastien Chenu (also gay) has become Marine Le Pen's most trusted advisor.

where Marine Le Pen has promoted herself as the campion of the revolutionary heritage of republicanism and *laïcité*.[1] In this way, the radical right has not only managed to "nationalize" liberal values by "celebrating the moral goodness of the nation" but also to strongly imply that "their national collectives [are] superior to others that they dislike" (Margulies 2017).

For the radical right, if the moral superiority of Western culture is no longer recognized, it is largely the result of the "liberal" western elite's embrace of the notion of "cultural relativism," which has fatally weakened the resolve to confront the Islamic challenge. As Geert Wilders has repeatedly charged, cultural relativism, which "dictates that all cultural are equally moral and valuable – though in practice, Western culture is often presented as inferior to all others" (given its history of racism, colonialism and imperialism) is the main reason for the political elite's failure to arrest the advance of Islam in Europe (Wilders 2012). With this argument, the link between radical right-wing populism and nativism comes full circle. What informs Wilders' charge – a charge certainly shared by others on the radical right – is a profound sense of resentment fed by the sense that western cultural and political elites, even if they are not necessarily sympathetic toward Islam, embrace and defend it and its less savory features (such as the treatment of women) because they despise their own culture, dismissed as imperialist and fundamentally racist, and seek redemption by embracing anything non-western.

Framing their mobilization against Islam in these terms has paid off handsomely for the radical populist right – both at the polls and in terms of public appeal. Populists derive their legitimacy largely from the claim that they give voice to the common sense of ordinary people, too long ignored, belittled and outright disparaged by the elite. Nowhere is this more obvious than with regard to the question of Islam. Ever since the question of Islam in western societies has become a salient political issue, public opinion polls have overwhelmingly shown that large majorities have a thoroughly negative view of Islam, which is largely consonant with the radical right's case against Islam. A British survey from 2016 is emblematic. When asked whether Islam with compatible with British values, the number of those disagreeing with the statement was twice as large as that agreeing (56 percent/28 percent) with the statement.[2] In an Italian poll from the same year, more than two thirds of respondents agreed with the statement that if Muslim migrants failed to integrate it was because Islam was fundamentally incompatible with Western values.[3] And in France, a majority of respondents (56 percent) agreed with the notion that Islam was incompatible with the values of the Republic.[4]

These and similar poll results, more often than not prominently displayed on the front pages of major print and online media, cannot but confirm the impression that the radical populist right is the only genuine voice of a "silent majority" – a voice that dares to express what ordinary people only dare to think (a slight modification of the well-known FPÖ slogan "He [i.e., Haider] says what you think"). This also explains why "scandalous" books such as Thilo Sarazin's *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (2010) or Éric Zemmour's *Un quinquenat pour rien* from 2016 (which starts with a 37-page polemic against the place of Islam in France) made it to the top of the bestseller lists in their respective countries, despite almost universal media opprobrium, if not condemnation. They reflect what one might call an "in-your-face" syndrome, combined with a strong dose of vindictiveness and *schadenfreude*, which have always been the secret weapons of the weak.

How have we arrived at this point? Until recently, scholars and pundits trying to explain the current surge in support for the radical right have largely focused on structural features, such as mass unemployment, socioeconomic inequality, societal modernization, globalization, insecurity, and (im)migration. One of the best known theses stemming from this approach is the notion of the "modernization/globalization losers." Outcompeted by low-wage workers in developing countries, tossed aside by the latest technological revolution, incapable of dealing with the complexities of a rapidly changing world, they are depicted as easy prey for demagogic populist leaders peddling simplistic solutions. The thesis has proven quite influential, not least because of its seductive simplicity. Reality, however, often proves far messier.

Both Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have shown that most scholars and pundits know

2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/36346886/uk-attitudes-towards-islam-concerning-after-survey-of-2000-people
3 Libero, September 2, 2016.
4 http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Societe/Grand-sondage-Match-les-Francais-sans-tabous

little to nothing about the lives of ordinary people. It was only in the wake of these political earthquakes that journalists from major newspapers ventured out on ethnographic fieldtrips to get a grip on the mindset of "angry white males." Their findings, together with a growing number of academic studies on psychological factors associated with support for the radical right, reveal a considerably more complex picture than socioeconomic structural accounts would us believe. They suggest that socioeconomic measures designed to compensate the losers of globalization are unlikely to quell the populist revolt; nor will the time-honored panacea of enlightening and educating the supposedly misguided. The reason is that socioeconomic factors only seem to play a secondary role in explaining support for the radical right. Significantly more important appear to be are psychological factors, i.e., emotions such as anxiety, fear, and *ressentiment* as well as personality dispositions such as authoritarianism and agreeableness. Dutch researchers, for instance, have shown that lower levels of agreeableness (characterized by, among other things, trust towards others and tolerance) are significantly correlated with voting for the radical right (Geert Wilders' PVV). Others have focused on status anxiety as a "proximate factor inducing support for populism" (Gidron and Hall 2017). Anxiety in general is a particularly important emotion in the context of the radical right. It has been argued that anxious individuals are disposed to seek out political information, but focus particularly on "threatening news" resulting in less tolerant views than if they had been exposed to the news (Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2015). The implications for the question of immigration are obvious. They suggest that more education, more raising awareness, might prove counterproductive.

The psychological approaches on the roots of populism suggest that the traditional focus on socioeconomic compensation (a central feature of trade theory) is not enough to respond to the rise of radical right-wing populism. What is needed is a large dose of "psychological compensation" to respond to the cultural anxieties, the fear of social decline, the disaffection of those who feel they no longer count and are left hanging out to dry. These are the voters who supported Donald Trump after he successfully promoted himself as the champion of the "forgotten people;" these are the voters who came out in support of Marine Le Pen who smarketed herself as the spokesperson of *la France des oubliés*. Reversing the advance of the radical right entails above all winning back these voters. It seems, however, that this is easier said than done.

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ONLINE AND DIGITAL MEDIA HATE SPEECH – BEYOND THE ALGORITHM

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At any given moment, almost half of the world's 7.6 billion people can be online[1], even if not all of them might be accessing the net at that particular moment. This obviously means that the internet has replaced all other forms of human communication as the primary site for expressing and receiving information, ideas and emotions. For the first time in human history, this public expression is entirely unmoderated, in the sense that there is no third party present at the interaction between the author and the indeterminate number of his recipients. Outside of the net, this situation occurs in – usually intimate – one on one encounters, normally moderated by i.a. the consideration attached to the other person's feelings, opinions, or the author's status. While such social settings can be reproduced on the net in one on one interactions, e.g. the exchange of private emails, in most circumstances the situation is different. The author speaks to an unknown number of recipients, without necessarily having to consider their reactions, as he is protected from them by different levels of real or just assumed privacy.

In direct public speech, as opposed to one on one interactions, the possible impact of expressing hostile or contemptuous views of other people, either as individuals or members of a group, is moderated by the possible reaction of the addressees or of third parties. These might range from disapproval through contempt to physical violence, and a person expressing such views in real-life circumstances has few possibilities to shield herself from it. Furthermore, written, or otherwise recorded speech, is normally reproduced within a framework (e.g. the media) for which third parties are responsible, thus also usually eliminating gratuitous hostility. As those third parties are often vested with a certain authority, the possibility of being censored – and thus censured – by them in itself might constitute a somewhat effective deterrent to expressing views which might incur that fate. These mechanisms, though obviously also responsible for intimidation and censorship, nonetheless ensured, until the onset of the internet, a certain level of civility in most public exchanges. Furthermore, that civility was expected and became interiorized – while obviously also making public exchange blander and possibly poorer than it otherwise might have been.

None of this obtains on the net. It is therefore probably unsurprising that, as a 2016 UK survey[2] of young internet users shows, 34% of 12 to 15 year olds report they encounter hate speech on the net "sometimes" or "often". In a 2014 Finnish study[3] of those 15 to 18, this indicator rises to 67%, possibly reflecting a sensitivity which increased with age. Yet another study, of Finland, Germany, the UK and the US in 2015[4], found exposure rates of 48, 31, 39 and 53% respectively, among 15 to 30 year olds. While differences in exposure rates might indicate different methodologies, areas, times and other factors, it seems clear that hate speech has a major presence on the internet, probably rivalling only porn. It also is as old as the world-wide web, with the first issue of the neo-Nazi and White supremacist website *Stormfront* having been published as early as 1995.

It is obvious that the possible impact on young minds alone would be reason enough to try and counter the online dissemination of hateful content, but both anecdotic and empirical research data clearly indicate that hate speech leads to hate acts. An excellent recent study by University of Warwick[5] researchers has proven the existence of a strong correlation between the incidence of hate speech directed at Muslim refugees and that of violent acts directed at them. While correlation obviously does not establish causation, the study contains strong indications that hate speech in fact spurs hate acts, albeit under certain circum-

1 http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/; accessed Jan 29, 2018
2 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/media-literacy-research/childrens/children-parents-nov16; accessed Jan 29, 2018
3 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266392546_Exposure_to_Online_Hate_among_Young_Social_Media_Users; accessed Jan 29, 2018
4 http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/kapitel-pdf/nordicom-information_37_2015_3-4_29-37.pdf; accessed Jan 29, 2018
5 https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=242115122088113090106001092093102101027076009064056023123096067121091065105093015127024118056032024004118109013013126011005102021075093045010122001028110073029000074022045021003093071027021125064073108071003093112015064109123024072006125008118097120087&EXT=pdf; accessed Jan 30, 2018.

stances. The Warwick study looked at the incidence of posts expressing hostility to refugees in the Facebook activity of the extremist AfD party in Germany, and found a stunning correlation of four such posts per each recorded anti-refugee incident. Furthermore, it found that the mere expression of hostility to minority groups, including Muslims, did not produce such correlation and that, when the quality of internet service decreased, so did the number of incidents. Clearly, this study shows that there is ground for serious concern – which in itself is obviously is a truism.

In fact, 79.3% of EU citizens agreed that it is important that hate speech is punished, both online and offline, according to 2015 survey by the No Hate Speech Movement[6] A consensus about the necessity of taking action exists – but the nature of that action remains unclear. Obviously preventive clearance of internet expression is both unfeasible for technical reasons, given the sheer dimensions of internet traffic (an estimated 400 hours of content are uploaded each minute on YouTube alone), and would be illegal in countries enjoying freedom of expression. Such a measure, furthermore, would on the one hand give countries which do not enjoy these freedoms the possibility of selectively hosting traffic involving such expression, making the measure pointless, and on the other – legitimize their denial of such freedom, making the measure itself a threat to the values it intends to protect. The only feasible method, therefore, is some form of signaling contents viewed as unacceptable to the administrators of the medium which carries it, obliging them to make a decision on whether they should be removed. This, in fact, is a key element of the EU Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online[7], agreed with the major social media. It demands that procedures for the examination of flagged posts be put up, and that removal requests be examined within 24 hours. Both consistency and speed are crucial here: decisions for obvious reasons cannot be arbitrary, nor can they be delayed, as that would make them irrelevant: the damage would already have been done.

Yet a 2016 review of the implementation of the Code of Conduct[8] showed that only 40% of the removal requests are reviewed within the 24h deadline. This probably reflects both the sheer workload of the reviewers, and difficulties in reaching a final decision. A recent case, in which YouTube briefly pulled down a WWII documentary film sequence[9] showing the destruction of swastikas by US troops, illustrates the point. "Wired" magazine[10] quotes an expert to illustrate the issues involved in both automatic and human decision-making:

> Jana Eggers, CEO of Nara Logics, a startup that incorporates artificial intelligence into its software for companies, uses the World War II Nazi video to explain the challenge of writing such rules into software. "The tech is at a blunt state: anything Nazi take down," she says. Mistakes such as YouTube's will prompt a revision: "Anything Nazi take down, unless from a historical perspective." Then someone will point to pro-Nazi historical videos. "We'll have another iteration: anything Nazi take down unless from a historical perspective and not pro-Nazi. Then, someone will point out that Leni Riefenstahl's work–a historical example of propaganda–has been banned." Should we take down content that's being used in a context to rally current neo-Nazis? Probably. But should we also preserve historical examples of propaganda for educational or other purposes? That's another tough call that AI can't make just yet. Tech companies will have to decide where they stand on these issues before such decisions become automated.
>
> So why would human moderators recommend that the historic Nazi video be taken down? They may lack context as well. "People get sensitive, and if they don't have the cultural understanding of what that destruction meant to people, then they don't understand how important it is to see that destruction," says Eggers. She compares the state of content reviews to former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's description of pornography: "I know when I see it."

It is hard not to feel for the difficulties decision-makers have to face. Yet it would seem that though, with the restoration of the video, an obvious absurdity was eliminated, issues remain. Even a cursory glance at the discussion following the video (of the 412,712 viewers, 322 have elected to leave their comments in

6 http://www.nohatespeechmovement.org/survey-result; accessed Jan 30, 2018.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/hate_speech_code_of_conduct_en.pdf; accessed Jan 30, 2018.
8 http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=50840; accessed Jan 30, 2018.
9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PzEBp9EV2pg; accessed Jan 30, 2018.
10 https://www.wired.com/story/defining-hate-speech-online-is-imperfect-art-as-much-as-science/; accessed Jan 30, 2018.

writing) shows there still is a problem. "the only good nazi is a dead nazi" reads the first comment – a feeling many, including this author, would empathize with, but still an expression of hate speech, using Justice Potter Steward's definition. A few lines down someone else opines that "Downvoters [i.e. those who oppose the publishing of a particular post] are Nazis and should be cut down by a machine gun". The target here are not members or supporters of the NSDAP, but individuals advocating this video be pulled down – including, presumably, the YouTube employee or employees who actually had reached that decision."i'm so glad a lot of americans died in ww2", writes a third commentator, only to correct himself and say, in a second post, "i mean nazis". His first post had not been pulled down, indicating that it did either not violate hate speech rules – or the correction was deemed sufficient (even if you have to click a "Reply" icon to see it, while the original statement is visible to every viewer). Clearly, then, expressing satisfaction at the death of certain people, or calling on them to be killed, does not violate YouTube's hate speech standards.

Yet admittedly Nazis are a minor object of online hate. The already cited EU factsheet indicates that Jews are the leading target (23.7%), followed by others identified by diverse national origins (21%), Muslims (20.2%), others identified by race (11.7%), and others identified by various ethnic origin (9.5%). Other "others" (presumably sexual minorities etc.) made up the remaining 13.9%. This clearly identifies the two main targets of hate speech and hate acts in Europe today – Jews and Muslims. Statistics on a pan-European level are hard to come by, but different country studies support the thesis that these two groups are among the most affected by hate crime, together with Roma and the LGBT community. A correlation between hate speech and hate crimes clearly exists and can, as the Warwick study has shown, be empirically supported.

While hate speech can trigger hate crime, hate crime can also be the cause of a more effective repression of hate speech. In one anecdotic example, within a week of a shooting at a mosque in Quebec City which left six fatalities last January, police had arrested three people whom they had accused of making threatening comments about Muslims, while two more were arrested later that year[11]. At no point, however, did the police indicate that those arrested had a direct connection to the crime committed at the mosque, even if their arrests were caused by it. "It's OK to exchange ideas on social media, but there really is a limit to respect so that it doesn't become criminal," Mélissa Cliché, a spokesperson for Quebec City police, said following the arrests. While the principle of police repression of hate speech is obviously sound, it is somewhat worrying to find that the level of that repression is a result of events which were not connected with the words and deeds, if any, of those experiencing it.

Yet the Canadian Police do not themselves monitor online behavior; they react to reports sent to INSET, a special unit in the force, by concerned internet users. INSET controls the flagged post, and – if there are grounds for it – takes action, as in the case of the five arrests mentioned above. Thus trust in the unit's non-arbitrariness is crucial for its success; if that trust is weakened, people presumably will be less inclined to report contents to it. Yet INSET not only acts when it has established a clear-cut case of online hate speech.

> Police may also opt for "disruption tactics" if there is insufficient evidence of a crime, but enough to concern investigators. "We will go out and meet this individual, if we've identified them, and ask them to explain themselves," [INSET operations head John] Athanasiades said. "If necessary, we will continue to monitor that individual, if we're not satisfied that this individual is not going to stop, or if we believe that individual is a threat."[12]

The journalist covering the INSET story commented only that this kind of intervention "faces a problem of scale", which it obviously does. It would seem, however, that a situation in which police, unhappy with someone's online activity, go meet that person, monitor her and use – in their own words - "disruption tactics" against her, the issue is also one of possible infringement of constitutional freedoms, not to mention police abuse. Yet scale is also a problem: in Canada, for example, there has been a 600% increase in the use

11 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-mosque-shooting-police-online-hate-1.4501653; accessed Jan 20, 2018.
12 Ibidem.

of racist and intolerant language on social media just between November 2015 and November 2016, a report by Cision, a media research group, has found[13]. Clearly, no human assessment staff can keep up with monitoring that amount of traffic. Interestingly, some media analysts believe that this increase is due to a "Trump effect": the political success of the presidential candidate known for his hateful language has, in this interpretation, empowered those who earlier hesitated to use it online. In other words, the increase represents a growth not in the number of users of hate speech, but in their willingness to use it. Furthermore, automatic or human monitoring can access only posts made on publicly accessible sites. Many purveyors of hate speech, however, provide their services from cloaked sites, which are purposefully protected from such monitoring.

All this notwithstanding, the understandable pressure on governments to "do something" about the swelling wave of online hate speech is forcing them to take action. This is due to the fact that such speech not only is hurtful in itself, but clearly is a causative element of real-life hate crimes, and as such constitutes a direct threat to public safety. Apart from voluntary monitoring as practiced e.g. by YouTube in the example cited above, and mandatary police monitoring such as described in the Quebec case, governments are inching towards passing and enacting more repressive legislation. They usually do this reluctantly, aware as they are of the obvious conflicts with constitutional guarantees of free speech. This is in fact a more serious issue than in the case of legislation affecting freedom of such expression as is voiced directly or through traditional print or broadcast media. There the number of cases was limited, and therefore, apart from broad measures such as those which e.g.in many European countries penalize the public expression of denial of the Shoah, individual examples of questionable expression could be adjudicated on a case by case basis, thus contributing to the establishment of a body of precedent. Even more importantly, cases in which democratic countries penalized expression were relatively rare. It seems reasonable to assume that this was due to the existence of a large consensus regarding contents that can be expressed in public. If fear of being sued might have played a role in the establishment of that consensus, more important probably was the fact that all such expression was, as it was stated earlier, moderated in one way or the other by third parties. Authors refrained from expressing contents which these third parties might object to out of fear of their reaction, or out of deference to their status. In online expression, as we have noted, this is emphatically not the case – and legislative monitoring and control mechanisms take up the role previously played by these third parties.

On January 1 this year, a new, muscular German law, known as the NetzDG, on combatting online hate speech, came into effect. It makes it obligatory for social media to remove within 24 hours offensive content which has been reported to them. Within hours of the law coming into effect, a first such post was indeed deleted. It was a tweet from an important AfD party politician, which referred to Muslim men using a highly derogatory term. Unsurprisingly, this first implementation of the new law gave the tweet a notoriety it would otherwise never have had. Screenshots of the tweet became the most reposted item of the day, and AfD actually launched a propaganda campaign centered around this "attempt to censor freedom of expression". Though many saw in this notoriety proof of the failure of the new law – contents which was to be banned became in fact widely publicized – I would argue that the opposite is true. What had been publicized was not the contents, which in any case was already known to recipients, since the derogative term used by the AfD politician was obviously known to Germans before she had used it – but the message that such contents is unacceptable and banned, and that ban is being implemented. Our concern should not be so much about the reproduction on the net of terms and images which constitute hate speech, but rather the dissemination of the message that their use is prohibited, because such is the democratically and legitimately expressed will of our civic community.

In other words, we need to strive to replace the role once played by third party moderators of discourse. One way of doing that is by insisting that those expressing opinions on the web should take responsibility for them, by registering their true identity in a verifiable way. While this might seem a violation of the cherished internet anonymity, it is only reasonable to point out that such anonymity in fact no longer exists, and that anybody active on the net can be identified – but not by anybody: one needs specialized skills for that. Establishing registration would simply reintroduce a level playing field for everyone, and

13 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/marketplace-racism-online-tips-1.3943351

should be demanded of any social media striving to gain the public's trust. Other social media should be free not to make such demands of their users – but it should be made evident that this fundamentally invalidates their reliability. Thus different classes of social media would be brought into being, a separation somewhat akin to that which still separates quality and tabloid newspapers – even if quality newspapers are often tabloid format today, and only a dwindling minority of users reads any newspapers anyway.

The experience of my newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza, shows that this can be done. After consistently failing in moderating the internet debates following our articles, which were often so full of hate speech emanating from trolls that it drove away many legitimate potential participants, we decided to limit comments to registered subscribers only. Though the discussions are still being moderated, moderators have to remove at worst a few posts from among dozens, while before they had at times to remove a third of the traffic and more, especially if there article's topic or writer could in any way be considered Jewish. Registered subscribers can be identified, and this seems to have an internalized moderating effect. Just as plausible, however, is the explanation that advocates of hate speech will be markedly under-represented among those who had chosen to pay for the electronic subscription of a liberal newspaper – in other words, we have drastically limited the conversation to those who largely agree with us in the first place, or at least do not hate our guts. This is debatable, however, as discussions still tend to be often critical, but that criticism is being expressed in a civil manner. What is not debatable is that the number of participants has sharply decreased, as we have many more online readers, many of them occasional, than regular subscribers.

The case of another early victim of the NetzDG gives, in my eyes, more grounds for concern. The account of a satirical magazine - Titanic – was blocked, for having reproduced the AfD tweet. The point is, however, that Titanic had reproduced the tweet in order to lampoon it, and there can be no satire without identifying the object of the lampooning. This, obviously – like the YouTube swastika video – is not a difference that an algorithm can readily identify. It needs human assessment – and, if there is disagreement over the assessment, a court ruling. Even more telling was the case of a Jewish restaurant owner who posted on Facebook a six-minute long video of a German man ranting against Jews. The poster's intent was to sensitize other users to the fact that antisemitism is still alive in Germany, but Facebook decided that the post is antisemitic content and pulled it down. After protests, however, the video was unblocked again.

Censoring expression is always a bad thing, and can be justified only if done to prevent something even worse; this kind of conflict of interest is inherent to a democratic system of law. The offensive and violence-inducing character of online hate speech makes it necessary for it to be regulated, but the sheer volume of internet traffic means that the regulation will often have to be, at first attempt, largely automated, creating clear issues of understanding content, which will necessitate human intervention. Yet, as in other cases of regulating expression, that human intervention might be challenged, with the issue ultimately having to be resolved, not necessarily satisfactorily, in a court of law.

Yet such measures, if necessary, address only symptoms, and not causes. It seems clear that online hate speech will remain a major concern, until the attitude of internet users towards it changes. The internet age has given unprecedented numbers of authors' access to unprecedented numbers of recipients, under a presumed cloak of anonymity, and without any third party mediation. The result has been an unprecedented volume of garbage, strewn among other contents. Algorithms and laws for removing it are fine, but only a change in authors' behavior can radically decrease the flow. This would necessitate the removal of a largely fictive anonymity, and the extension of the principles which guide one on one communication in real life to mass communication on the internet. Such a change would certainly not eliminate online hate speech: we are, after all, perfectly capable of expressing it to someone's face, even if in most cases we don't. But owning up to it, and realizing that it represents a radical break from usual practice, will mean we will much less be inclined to resort to it also on the net. As with other changes in human behavior, this is not achievable without a majority of those concerned becoming convinced that such a modification is in fact in their interest. But since we have largely been able to internalize garbage segregation and emission control, the cause might not be as hopeless as it appears.

HUNGARY AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS
A CASE OF INSOLIDARITY?

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Hungary (and the V4 countries) have been accused lately of insolidarity and discrimination against refugees and migrants for openly rejecting refugee quotas. The strikingly aggressive campaign against foreigners launched by the Hungarian governing party, Fidesz, has been widely criticized by liberal intellectuals inside and outside Hungary, but it served the party's purpose to cement its camp and strengthen its position before the 2018 parliamentary elections. This paper will attempt to show that PM Orbán's campaign against migrants has not created a new reality in Hungary, but rather strengthened existing prejudices and fears against foreigners (especially coming from non-European countries). The responsibility of Fidesz lies in its cynical approach of playing on and even exaggerating the concerns of a society without any (positive) experience of multiculturalism. The governing party, instead of consciously educating present and future generations to tolerance and thus paving the way for a prosperous future - entirely disregarding that due to shrinking demography, the country will soon need migration - used the "migration-issue" almost exclusively for domestic and electoral purposes. This paper is also trying to give some historical explanation of why East-European societies have a more reserved and in some cases, a more hostile approach to foreigners than West or South-Europeans.

UPS AND DOWNS IN XENOPHOBIA IN THE POLLS

To start with, it is important to take a look at the developments of the Hungarian society after the 1989/1990 transition. TARKI, a respected Hungarian polling institute, carried out regular surveys about xenophobia and discrimination since 1992. They found curious "waves" in the Hungarian society's attitude towards refugees in the 1990s, a stagnation during the 2000s, but a clear upward tendency of rejection from 2011. However, the question asked by TARKI is rather simplified and the possible answers are sadly black and white: would you accept all refugees into Hungary? Answers: accept all, balancing/depending on the situation, accept none of them. Those rejecting all refugees are usually considered as openly xenophobic by the researchers. Interestingly though, those who are "balancing" (also called real-politicians by some researchers) usually tend to favor only ethnic Hungarians, and when followed up, they reject all other groups. Some researchers call them latent xenophobes, however, others argue that they are only "more outspoken" than most West Europeans.[1]

In the early years of the democratic transition, the ratio of those openly xenophobic rose rapidly from 15% (1992) to 40% (1996) in Hungary. In the first years of democracy, the society seemed relatively open towards the idea of accepting refugees, with more than 10 percent saying all refugees should be welcome and a massive two-thirds characterized as "balancing." It is perhaps less known, that a year before the democratic transition (1989), there were already 18.000 refugees registered in Hungary, mostly from Ceausescu's

1 http://regio.tk.mta.hu/index.php/regio/article/view/114

Romania: not all ethnic Hungarians, but Romanians, Serbians or Roma. Measured by the ratio of refugees per 10.000 inhabitants, Hungary was at the time the fifth most popular destination in Europe. From 1992, they were joined by the refugees fleeing the war in Yugoslavia and from Bosnia. At this time, discrimination or intolerance was undetected in the society, and the first democratically elected government had not even thought of playing out the card of xenophobia to strengthen its rapidly melting popularity.[2]

The first detection of a radical increase in xenophobia was during 1995: the severe economic and social challenges experienced by the population, the massive increase of unemployment, social insecurity and the decline of living standards explain this rise. There is a definite correlation showing that the prejudices against foreigners grew especially in the lower social strata, which felt to be the losers of the transition. It should not be forgotten that during the 1990s Hungary accepted around 80.000 ethnic Hungarians from Romania and Vojvodina[3], who were not always very welcome. Although they spoke the language and were culturally similar, this social stratum treated them as potentially threatening and competing for jobs with "real" Hungarians.

In the mid-1990s (1996) anti-refugee feelings declined but skyrocketed again to 43% by 2001. There is little research on what could have fueled this increase; therefore, we can only speculate: the liberal-turned-conservative Fidesz governed between 1998-2002, and although their political propaganda machine was much less capable than today, they apparently followed a much more nationalistic line in foreign and domestic politics than the social-liberals before (and afterward). Another factor which may have contributed to the surge of anti-refugee feelings was the real experience of war in the neighborhood (Balkan Wars) and a well-based concern of being dragged into the conflict.[4] A third factor could have been the terrorist attack against the US (9/11), which was interpreted as an attack on Western civilization and seriously undermined the belief in the future of multiethnic societies.

There is a reason to believe that a one-time event could have played a role, since from 2001 on, until the end of the decade, xenophobia plateaued (between 24-29%), and even during the financial crisis, there had not been significant increases. However, during the second and third Fidesz government, it returned to the 40% level and hit 53% (more than half of the population rejecting ALL refugees) by 2016. In 2016, only 1 percent of the Hungarian society said that all refugees should be accepted and even the ratio of those "balancing" fell to 43%, an all-time low. Three factors can explain this significant shift: a massive anti-refugee/anti-migrant propaganda offensive campaign launched by the government, the rather poor record of the EU in handling the crisis and the first wave of terrorist attacks in Europe, attributed directly to refugees by the propaganda.

It is not just refugees, but migrants in general, who are viewed with reservation by the majority of Hungarians. The Europe-wide European Social Survey reveals that Hungarians consider migration a detrimental thing[5], although very few people - apart from ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries - had migrated to (and stayed in) Hungary since the transition. Researchers usually attribute xenophobia to lack of education or higher age, but in the case of Hungary, it is striking that even the young and educated massively reject immigration from non-European countries. Hungary is the only country in Europe, where the ratio of those willing to accept non-European migrants is less than 20 percent, according to the survey of European Social Survey. It would be easy to blame it on geography or history, but it is a striking difference that in neighboring Slovenia 80 percent (!) of the population would be willing to accept non-European migrants.[6] However, the importance of education may be exaggerated, since it varies from one society to another. Research by the Hungarian Republikon Institute, based on Eurobarometer data, finds that intolerance can be efficiently fought by education in some societies (in Ireland or Portugal) while in others, like Hungary or Slovakia, the level of prejudice does not sink significantly depending on the years spent in the education system[7].

2 http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/a-szolidaritas-menete-96398
3 http://www.demografia.hu/kiadvanyokonline/index.php/demografia/article/viewFile/583/729
4 Note that Hungary joined NATO in March 1999, just as NATO began its three-month air offensive against Yugoslavia.
5 The exact question asked was: Was your country made a better or a worse place to live as a result of migration?
6 https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/findings/IE_Handout_FINAL.pdf
7 http://republikon.hu/elemzesek,-kutatasok/tolerancia-az-europai-unio-orszagaiban-es-magyarorszagon.aspx

THE HISTORICAL LESSONS NOT LEARNT

It is essential to draw a line here and try to explore the reasons of such a hostile attitude, bearing in mind that the Hungarian government often blurred the two categories - refugee and immigrant - into one. The general assumption was that ALL asylum seekers are in fact economic migrants, who are - another assumption - not needed, not wanted and most dangerous. Hungarians, with no colonial history nor decades of blossoming economic growth that would attract foreigners who are willing to do jobs that the local population refrains from (typically guest workers), first faced real multiculturalism (multiethnic societies) in their first journeys to the West. Coming from the previously closed Socialist bloc, visiting some Western capitals seemed to be an exotic journey.

Countries like the UK or France - due to their colonial past - had a historical advantage of several centuries of coexistence of people, cultures and religions. Even Germany and the Nordic countries have got accustomed to the mixture of cultures and languages gradually, opening up to immigrants in the last few decades. Hungary, a monoethnic country since the 1920 Trianon peace agreement[8], had minimal interaction with the non-European world. One historical experience which underpins the reservations against Islamic immigration may be 150 year-long occupation by the Ottoman Empire, which is until today, treated as one the most brutal chapters of Hungary's history. Although 500 years have passed since, this trauma is kept alive in children's' rhymes, bedtime stories, and novels, which are on the mandatory reading list of children. On the other hand, political ties between the increasingly authoritarian Turkey and Hungary are blossoming, indicating that if there is a political will, cultural or religious differences play a much smaller role.

Another historical lesson the region has learned is that multiethnic societies are bound to collapse; therefore, multiculturalism can poise an inherent danger to stability. Examples abound from the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian monarchy, falling to pieces after World War I, to historical constructs like Czechoslovakia which managed to split under friendly terms, but primarily Yugoslavia, which collapsed during a long and bloody war.[9] Note also the level of mistrust and insolidarity among Hungarians themselves is high in itself; therefore, it is challenging to expect a different attitude towards foreigners. It is telling that in the last major poll by the European Commission about the major challenges ahead of the EU, Hungarians chose migration, while Germany and he Nordic countries opted for social inequalities and the Southern countries unemployment.

And finally, as many researchers emphasize lately, xenophobia is usually linked to authoritarianism: the more authoritarian a society is, the more prejudices and ill-feelings it has towards anything or anybody who steps out of line or is in many ways - culturally, ethnically, sexually or ideologically - different. An authoritarian personality - as described by Theodor Adorno-, is a person full of anxieties, who tries to lower its inner insecurity by building up a scapegoat or an enemy. By doing so, he can keep the group where he feels safe intact and mobilizes against anything which might threaten those values. These are the chords the Hungarian government is playing on, but this is by no means a Hungarian or Central European speciality. Well beyond our borders, political communication experts have long discovered the constructing of an artificial enemy as a popular and useful tool.

THE IRRESPONSIBILITY OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

All the above does not serve the purpose of justifying xenophobia and the total rejection of refugees or stigmatizing immigrants, but to highlight the responsibility of the political leadership, the political elite

8 This is still a national trauma for many, after World War I and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which resulted in the loss of two-thirds of its territory and more than half of its population.
9 https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2015/oct/22/refugee-eastern-europe-trauma-governments-bigotry

and the media in capitalizing on the fears and prejudices of the society. Basic correlations between an open economy dependent on its export markets and an open society have not been explained. A gradual opening up and familiarizing of the society with the global world and global movements like immigration, tolerance, and solidarity should have started at the beginning of the transition, with a conscious education and media program, yet, education and media fell prey quickly to political party interests. The present hostile attitude is a consequence of many factors, where history and the language barrier is just one: economic weakness (Hungary has never attracted guest workers until today) and the lack of integration policies all played a role, beside the closed structures of the society. As research shows, the lack of having contacts with foreigners/migrants/refugees increases the prejudices and the fears: those having a friend or colleague from abroad, are much more willing to accept diversity, proving that tolerance can be achieved as "learning by doing." But if there is no chance to have personal connections, due to the absolute lack of immigrants, feeding prejudice and hostility is all so much easier. This explains why East-European societies, with a very low level of foreign-born population are much more concerned about immigration than West-Europeans.

Delivering a positive message and undertaking the enlightenment of the citizens was evidently not the goal of the Hungarian government when it started its first anti-migrant campaign at the beginning of 2015, after the brutal attacks on the offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris.

As a good tactician and a politician who was aware of his party losing popularity in Hungary against far-right Jobbik, Orbán was looking for an enemy against which he could rally his party. In his speech in January 2015, in Paris, he already set the political direction for the next years, first, linking migration to an increased terror threat and secondly, putting refugees in the category of "economic migrants." Soon afterward, the government launched its famous national consultation on immigration, asking manipulative questions which - according to many sociologists - lacked any scientific and moral basis, and although shielded as a poll, it was, in fact, a sheer political campaign. Letters were sent out to 8 million citizens (financed by taxpayers' money), and although only one million were returned, it set the agenda in public speech, media, political and even ordinary, everyday conversation.

The turbulent events in the summer of 2015 just played into the hands of the government, which was deliberately not prepared to handle hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers. Although thousands of Hungarians volunteered to help refugees during the hectic days in the summer of 2015, the government stopped short of assisting the people in need-actually putting the burden to NGOs, which are now under attack, as "pro-migration" organizations. The series of successive anti-refugee and anti-migrant campaigns - and the series of terror attacks in other European countries - have borne frightening fruits in the society. In the last part of the paper, I would like to show two examples which indicate well the massive influence centrally orchestrated hate-campaigns can bring about in a society.

CASE 1:
REBELLION AGAINST REFUGEES

In October, 2017 a few families with already granted refugee status had been invited by a small entrepreneur in the southern Hungarian village Öcsény to spend a few days there. When the local population was informed by the public media of the "danger" of soon having foreigners around, the whole village rebelled. The entrepreneur was threatened, his car was vandalized, and the mayor of the village had to resign. Rumors spread that young men will threaten local peace and everyday life. "First, only ten come, but then they will be followed by 100" – as a villager told the public media. The truth was, however, that families with small children who previously lived behind barbed wire in a detention center would have started their integration there. Serious communication errors have been committed by the organizers (Migration Aid),

who were not aware of the psychological damage the government's propaganda had made and did not prepare the local population to welcome the refugees. But the most astonishing reaction came from Prime Minister Orbán, who said in his usual radio interview that "he absolutely understands the people in Öcsény for rejecting the refugees". Not a single word uttered about the obligations of the state to protect the people it decided to grant asylum to.

A poll conducted after the Öcsény scandal by Publicus Institute[10] revealed that this was not an isolated case: 80% of the Hungarians participating in the poll said they would protest if refugees moved into a hostel nearby, but according to 70%, the reactions of the villagers were exaggerated. The same poll shows that 82 % of Hungarians think that too many refugees arrive in Europe (in fact the numbers are much lower than in 2015) and 56% were on the opinion that we are not morally obliged to help them. Note that still back in 2015 – at the height of the refugee crisis - 64% still said we had to help those in need. It is just another indicator how persistent propaganda campaigns and the lack of rational debate can turn the opinion of the majority around. As in the last four years the majority of Hungarian media outlets have been taken over by the government or government-close oligarchs, who partly bought up their media empire from foreign investors keen on leaving the Hungarian market for some extra cash, it is no wonder that very few media outlets are in the position today to voice basic Western values of tolerance and solidarity – let alone challenging the government or the society on the very minimum legal standards set by the Geneva convention, signed by the Hungarian government after the transition.

CASE 2: "THE MIGRANT THREAT"

The second case is not comparable to the first in its depth, some would call it simply sad, however, it is also very telling. Police were alerted in a dark November day in 2017 by the locals of Perbál, a village of less than 2000 inhabitants in the vicinity of Budapest, as they met three young men with darker skin strolling along the main street. The locals feared that they were "illegal migrants". Fortunately, the police cleared the misunderstandings as it turned out that the three "migrants" were in fact young university students from Sri Lanka, invited by AIESEC university organization, volunteering to help in the local institution of physically and mentally disabled. They had arrived to Hungary with valid passport and visa just the day before the incident. There has been news of alerting police in another Hungarian city when locals met Arab tourists who later were rumored to be Saudi policemen taking part in a training organized by their Hungarian colleagues. But by all means the most absurd case was when a Hungarian waterpolo team, travelling in the night in its minivan, was mistaken as migrants on their return from a regional competition.

CONCLUSION

This paper is not intended to absolve the Hungarian society of its responsibility for taking an extremely negative position regarding refugee policy and migration. Instead, I aimed to show the roots of this attitude, the historical background with which Hungary - and evidently, some other Central- Eastern European countries - entered the European Union, the reasons of intolerance which often equals to ignorance and lack of proper information, and mostly the effectiveness of propaganda. The most striking lesson is perhaps how easily centrally orchestrated hate-campaigns can manipulate societies on the brink of the 21st century. Even societies that acquired some ability to be skeptical towards political propaganda by living under totalitarianism and centralized media, fall easily prey to new politicians often using old methods. A

10 https://mno.hu/belfold/publicus-tulzo-a-magyaroknak-az-ocsenyi-eset-de-eros-az-idegenellenesseg-2422911

most basic instinct of human beings – fear and the fear of the unknown – can be played upon by unscrupulous politicians just as centuries before. Another valuable lesson which the refugee crisis taught us is the inability of otherwise successful politicians becoming real statesmen, bearing responsibility not only for the present but the future of their country. How to fight these challenges? Despising Central-European societies as morally inferior and lamenting on their lack of solidarity is not the best solution, but instead the focus should be on sharing truthful and credible information on global phenomena like migration, providing opportunity to the young generation to personally experience the coexistence of cultures and religions, counteracting negative propaganda with facts, and continually challenging political leaders in public debates.

HOW THE FAKE NEWS INDUSTRY IN HUNGARY IS SPREADING ETHNIC HATRED

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FAKE NEWS: A CHALLENGE FOR THE WORLD

Fake news is an issue in all over Europe. The US presidential elections, the Brexit vote, the French election campaign are obvious examples for this trend. And given that fake news work – they can divert votes, and they can bring profit – it is sure that they will remain here with us, or even amplify themselves. The "post-truth World" is not a sensationalist, apocalyptic vision. This is already the reality.

Fake news is not innocent, and can often fuel, catalyze, or spark, ethnic hatred. The fake news stories over refugees are raping, killing people all over Europe is an obvious example. But they can be even more malevolent: in Myanmar for example, fake news spread via the social media by played a very important role in turning ethnic hostility to ethnic violence against the Rohingya minority – who were depicted as agents of the Islamic state, all terrorists, and blamed for planning an ethnic cleansing against the Buddhist majority.

It increasingly seems that the enemies of democracy and ethnic peace can exploit the advantages of social media way more efficiently, throughout the World. Social media can be used for good and bad as well - but recently, it rather became an efficient tool in the hands of dictators and enterpreneurs of ethnic violence. And social media is becoming an increasingly important information resource worldwide. In Myanmar for example, more people uses the social media than have electricity in their house.

THE CASE OF HUNGARY

In Hungary YouGov survey found 68% of Hungarians use social media as a news source, while 74% uses television, 24% radio and 20% the printed press. The advance of social media as one of the populations' primary news sources is problematic for the reason that these media outlets generally serve as the main source of fake news and offer a platform for their dissemination. And yes, there have been a lot of fake news and conspiracy theories that were popping up – after the Crimean annexation, and even more at the time of the beginning of the refugee crisis. Fake news sites are full of stories that directly aim o breed ethnic and national hatred.

But this is something that we can see all over the West. What makes the Hungarian case specific is that the fake news industry in Hungary is the real mainstream. It is not only run on marginal social media platforms – but the Hungarian public and pro-governmental media. We call it "government organized media", because they have the same logic as "government organized NGO-s", with the control coming from above, and very small level of independence.

"The channels used to distribute pro-government propaganda in Hungary are not automated Twitter bots or untraceable Facebook accounts, but media outlets supported with government money, including widely read newspapers dependent on state advertising, online news sites teeming with government-funded banners, and morning talk shows on the public television channel." – summarizes the state of affairs Márton Bede concisely[2].

The Hungarian government-organized media practically depicts the West as like the zombie apocalypse movies: because of the large number of immigrants, the life of the people in direct danger all the time, because migrants want to rape them, rob them, or kill them. Contrary to these apocalyptic landscape on the West, Eastern Europe is a safe haven, as it is free of immigrants, There have been several fake news piece in the Hungarian government-organized media, but just to pick up two: in Leipzig[2], some Hungarian sportsmen claimed that they cannot even go out to the streets, as they were exposed to brutal attacks of the refugees. A news piece in a pro governmental regional outlet claimed that Finnish youth are provoking bloody violent conflicts and burning churches[3]. And the list goes on and on: every false fake news information on the refugees and migrants find their royal route to the taxpayer-funded big, Hungarian pro-government fake news empire.

A big leap towards fake news could be observed after the 2014 Hungarian elections, for three main reasons:

➔ The Hungarian government's well-documented plan to dominate the country's media landscape. Orbán signalled his intention to have most Hungarian media companies in Hungarian hands – a goal that he has now nearly accomplished. He saw this is the guarantee for national sovereignty.

➔ Orbán and his advisors recognised that the media environment was changing and that they needed a new communication style to capture a new, younger audience. The prime minister even used the English words "fancy", "cool", and "sexy" when describing what he had in mind. This recognition led to the creation of a group of Breitbart-style websites, including 888.hu and the aforementioned Pestisracok.hu, some of which are directly controlled by Árpád Habony, Orbán's unofficial chief strategist.

➔ The third factor – and possibly the most important – was the European refugee crisis of 2015, which turned out to be a godsend for the Hungarian government. The crisis both in itself and as a driver of "fake news" and disinformation became an excellent propaganda tool to further Orbán's political aims. "The government is more and more conscious and strategic about using fake news directly, and via what we call the 'Government-Organised Media'",

The Hungarian propaganda industry has only partially succeeded. Despite all the attempts to destroy its credibility, the EU is still popular in Hungary, and the Western orientation of Hungarians is unquestionable. But there are some signs of that fake news is pretty efficient in brainwashing the Hungarian population. Vladimir Putin has become more popular than Angela Merkel, mainly as a consequence of the anti-refugee narratives in Hungary. Also, Hungarians consider George Soros and Brussels a bigger threat than Russia – also as a consequence of the brutal campaign, again, from taxpayers money, against George Soros and Brussels as the main collaborators in importing "economic migrants" from the Middle East in order to weaken nation states and Islamize Europe.

The Hungarian government-organized media[5] is often quoting genuine fake news sites such as daily caller, yournewswitre, infowars, or RussiaToday, as their primary targets.

The Hungarian government exploited migration to reshape the political system and to transform liberal democracy to an illiberal regime. But of course, this issue has a much broader range. The topic of

2 https://ipi.media/analysis-hungarian-taxpayers-fund-unique-fake-news-industry/
3 https://24.hu/kulfold/2017/07/27/ha-belepusztul-is-migransbunozest-akar-latni-az-m1/
4 https://www.bama.hu/publicisztika/a-finn-modell-1190087/
5 http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/12/30/russian-influence-on-the-hungarian-government-organized-media/

migration is suitable to disrupt European unity and shake EU citizens' confidence in European institutions. Also, Fake news and anti-immigrant propaganda underpin the European far right's political vision on immigration: cultural war, the impossibility of integration and all immigrants being public security threats are all views featured both in anti-EU parties' rhetoric and the articles on pro-Russian propaganda sites. Disinformation methods therefore help propaganda outlets support the immigration policy of far-right parties and they are also perfectly suitable for delegitimising the very foundations of the current European system[6]. Unfortunately, the Hungarian government, using genuine far-right narratives, have practically become similarly destructive for Europe than the political far-right in national parliaments and the European parliament.

Those who disseminate fake news have a wide range of tools at their disposal to misinform their audience ranging from satire to fabricated content. The false context method involves disinformation outlets publishing correct data on a pick-and-choose basis, only selecting the pieces that underpin their views. Misleading information allows disinformation outlets to publish available facts in a way that helps them define an issue on their terms. Fabricated content is 100% false information solely intended to cause harm. In the case of Hungary, we can see the whole spectrum of disinformation.

The issue of fake news has become the focus of much attention in the wake of the US presidential election in 2016. Since then, significant efforts have been undertaken to counter the influence of disinformation. Legal solutions to ban outlets spreading fake news are harshly criticised by experts due to the such measures restricting the freedom of speech, but anti-hate speech legislation may offer a legal remedy. Some of the most promising initiatives are self-regulation measures implemented by media giants such as Facebook and Google, aimed at filtering out disinformation and cut the financial resources of disinformation outlets. Nevertheless, educating the youth on assessing the credibility of information they read on the internet might prove to be the best solution to restrict the influence of disinformation. But when the state invests in systemic disinformation instead of education against disinformation, it can result in an Orwellian situation. Why we sometimes have the illusion that the mankind became more receptive to propaganda and disinformation after the Second World War and the collapse of the communist regimes, it seems that brainwashing, in dictatorships and democratic regimes alike, can be similarly efficient than centuries ago and the lessons of history have not been learnt.

6 http://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/FES_PC_FakeNewsMigrationStudy_EN_20170524.pdf

IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND NATIONALISM – A MULTICULTURALIST'S POINT OF VIEW

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INTRODUCTION

It is rarely remarked that multiculturalism is now always defined by its critics – a situation we would not accept of, say, liberal democracy or feminism. This paper is one of those rare occasions in policy-oriented conceptual analysis where multiculturalism is presented by one of its advocates. I argue that multiculturalism is a mode of integration that does not just emphasise the centrality of minority group identities but argues that integration is incomplete without re-making national identity so that all can have a sense of belonging to it. In this respect, multiculturalist approaches to national belonging that has some relation to liberal nationalism and a majoritarian interculturalism. It however makes not just individual rights but minority accommodation a feature of acceptable nationalism. Importantly, however, unlike cosmopolitanism it is national-focused but is not against immigration controls (subject to certain conditions).

For these reasons multicultural nationalism unites the concerns of some of those currently sympathetic to majoritarian nationalism and those who are pro-diversity and minority accommodationist in the way that liberal nationalism (with its emphasis on individualism and majoritarianism) or cosmopolitanism (with its disavowal of national belonging and championing of open borders) does not. **It therefore represents the political idea and tendency most likely to offer a feasible alternative rallying point to monocultural nationalism.**

MODES OF INTEGRATION AND MULTICUTURAL NATIONALISM

The need for integration arises when an established society is faced with some people who are perceived and treated unfavourably by standard members of that society (and typically the former also perceive themselves as 'different', though not necessarily or at all in a negative way). This may relate to various areas or sectors of society and policy, such as employment, education, housing and so on.

It, however, also has a subjective and symbolic dimension, which has a more general or **macro character**: how a minority is perceived by the rest of the country and how members of a minority perceive their relationship to society as a whole (Modood, 2012). Sectoral integration, even when achieved in a number of

sectors, is not full integration without some degree of subjective identification with the society or country as a whole – what the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain called 'a sense of belonging' (CMEB 2000) – and with the acceptance by the majority that you are a full member of society with the right to feel that you belong. Hence, it has been rightly said by a Commission on these topics in Quebec, 'the symbolic framework of integration (identity, religion, perception of the Other, collective memory, and so on) is no less important than its functional or material framework' (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). This is particularly so because the current sense of crisis about multiculturalism and integration is operating at this macro-symbolic level. This is evident when one considers how few are the policies that could be said to be about integration, or how small the funds involved are compared to the headline importance that the issues regularly achieve. In thinking about a general ethos or policy orientation at a national level, it is therefore important to engage at this macro-symbolic level.

Multiculturalism is the idea that equality in the context of 'difference' cannot be achieved by individual rights or equality as sameness but has to be extended to include the positive inclusion of marginalised groups marked by race and their own sense of ethnocultural identities. The latter is reinforced by exclusion but may also matter to many individuals as a form of belonging. Multiculturalism therefore grows out an initial commitment to racial equality, the elimination of white discrimination against non-whites, into a perspective that allows minorities to publicly oppose negative images of themselves in favour of positive self-definition and institutional accommodation.

Multiculturalism, then, is not opposed to integration but emphasizes the importance of respecting diverse identities. It should be understood as a mode of integration, just as assimilation is a mode of integration (Modood, 2012). Let us consider two variations of multiculturalism, which offer alternative interpretations of the role of majority culture in the national citizenship. The first position is that of liberal nationalism and argues that the existing national identity of a liberal democratic country cannot be reduced to political institutions and a public sphere, or what is sometimes referred to as a civic national identity but requires a cultural component consisting of a language, a history, ways of thinking and ways of living (Miller, 1995). These cultural dimensions cannot be detached from a sense of peoplehood or country and is essential to the solidarity that underpins a liberal democratic national identity, common welfare, willingness to pay tax to help one's fellow citizens and common public services and to all other aspects of social justice (Miller, 1995; Kymlicka, 2001). It follows therefore that this foundational or national culture is also necessary for multiculturalism and so multiculturalism must not so loosen these bonds of belonging and mutual identification that appeals to national identity are not strong enough to call for individuals to be concerned for the good of the whole.

The second variation of multiculturalism is Quebecan **interculturalism** (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008; Bouchard, 2011; Taylor, 2012).[1] It distinguishes itself from Canadian multiculturalism by alleging the latter believes that all cultures are equal and none is more Canadian than another in the eyes of the state, while Quebec, however, is and must continue to be committed to the preservation of its foundational Francophone culture. Hence all cultures are not equal, one of them is the ground upon which all others must be accommodated.

One common ground between these two positions and multiculturalism more generally is that each assumes **that the liberal state is not culturally neutral** – all states support a certain language(s), a religious calendar in respect of national holidays, the teaching of religion(s) in schools and/or the funding of faith schools, certain arts, sports and leisure activities and so on. If so, that means that the majority culture already has recognition of some sort – that is what is meant by saying the liberal state is not neutral. For multiculturalism, it is a matter of extending this valued condition to minorities. Multiculturalism puts a special value on identity and so is consistent with the idea that liberal democratic states may promote a national culture (within liberal limits and respecting other group identities) and this would be of benefit to the society or polity as a whole. Appeals to majority cultural heritage cannot be described as illegitimate per se. The mul-

1 There are other variations of interculturalism, those which reduce the role of national belonging by focusing on the local, especially cities, and/or the transnational, and so are best covered as forms of cosmopolitanism as per below (Modood, 2012; see also Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero, 2016, Antonsich, 2017).

ticulturalist point is that the predominance that the cultural majority enjoys in the shaping of the national culture, symbols and institutions should not be exercised in a non-minority accommodating way.

The liberal nationalist goal, then, is legitimate but it should be recognized that the constraints are not just about traditional liberal freedoms of the individual. The latter may be enough to ensure non-discrimination and non-coercive assimilation, but multiculturalism goes beyond that to emphasise respect for post-immigration ethnoracial, ethnocultural and ethnoreligious group identities. This respect is both a constraint on the kind of national cultural identity building that may be pursued but, more positively, it is an opportunity for creating a certain kind of national identity, namely one which is not just constrained by those kinds of group identities but includes them in the revised or reformed national identity, critically reforming but without displacing the narrative of the majority within the national identity. Minorities may wish to contest dominant narratives which exclude them or fail to respect them and their contribution but they do not compete with the majority in a zero-sum game. The process should be seen as a kind of egalitarian levelling up, not a form of dispossession (Modood 2003). More positively, going beyond liberal nationalism towards what we might call '**multicultural nationalism**', the accommodation of minorities should not be seen as a drag on the national identity but as a positive resource; not as diluting the national culture but vivifying and enrichening it. Whilst liberal nationalism is often offered in relation to facilitating the solidarity that enables social democratic redistribution of resources, the distinctive goal of multicultural nationalism is to allow people to hold, adapt, hyphenate, fuse and create identities important to them in the context of their being national co-citizens and members of socio-cultural, ethnoracial and ethnoreligious groups. In some ways this brings multiculturalism closer to Quebecan interculturalism but the crucial distinction is that while multicultural nationalism recognizes the legitimacy of the recognition of majority culture, it denies that the majority have the right to deny the accommodation of minorities simply because it runs counter to majority culture or majority preferences and does not breach any liberal democratic rights. The majority and the minorities should stand in a dialogical relationship, in a two-way or multi-way adaptation, in which both the majority and the minorities may seek to have aspects of their core (albeit evolving) cultural identities preserved; neither has a unilateral right to impose this exclusively upon the other in a way that the other identity is not allowed to co-exist.[2]

'Rethinking the national story' was the most important – yet the most misunderstood – message of the report of the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000; aka The Parekh Report). It argued that the post-immigration challenge was not simply eliminating racial discrimination or alleviating racial disadvantage, important as these were to an equality strategy. Rather, the deeper challenge was to find inspiring visions of Britain – which showed us where we were coming from and where we were going, how history had brought us together and what we could make of our shared future. The Commission did not want to paint neither the past nor the present in rosy, pastel colours, recognising conflict and contestation of narratives as ever-present but nevertheless insisting that through dialogue and egalitarian commitment a vibrant, new Britishness at ease with itself beckoned. We had to rethink what it means to be British, to remake our sense of country so it was inclusive of all fellow-citizens. No one should be rejected as culturally alien and not sufficiently British because of their ethnicity or religion but rather we had to reimagine Britain so that, for example, Muslims could see that Islam was part of Britain; and equally importantly, so that non-Muslims, especially the secularists and the Christians could see Muslims were part of the new, evolving Britishness.[3]

Hence the idea that an emphasis on citizenship or Britishness was a substitute for multiculturalism is quite misleading. Indeed, it is often overlooked that the theorists of multiculturalism have regarded citizenship as a foundational concept, and explicitly developed multiculturalism as a mode of integration, albeit of course a difference-respecting integration, not assimilation or individualistic integration. Moreover, they have tended to emphasise not just minoritiy identities per se but the inclusion of minority identities in the national identity. This is also how the Canadian and Australian governments have understood multiculturalism and continue to do so (if the Australian government under Howard gave up on that idea it has

2 I leave aside the complication that sometimes competing national identities are involved. This is most relevantly the case with multi-national states such as Belgium or Britain or Canada, where state-level national identities may compete with sub-state national identities.
3 In relation to such an understanding of multiculturalism I have argued that the first New Labour government (1997-2001) has so far been the most multiculturalist government that Europe has seen (Antonsich, 2015).

been revived subsequently). If we look at what multiculturalists have argued (as opposed to the caricatures presented by their critics), this has been the dominant interpretation in Britain too.

Let me given an example of what this kind of multiculturalism means in practice. The Church of England is clearly an institutionalised feature of England's and Britain's historical identity. This is reflected in symbolic and substantive aspects of the constitution. For example, 26 Anglican bishops sit by virtue of that status in the upper house of the UK legislature, the House of Lords. It is the Archbishop of Canterbury that presides over the installation of a new head of state, namely the coronation of the monarch. Given the rapidity of changes that are affecting British national identity, and the way in which religion, sometimes in a divisive way, is making a political reappearance, it would be wise not to discard lightly this historic aspect of British identity, which continues to be of importance to many even when few attend Church of England services and when that Church may perhaps have been overtaken by Catholicism as the largest organised religion in the country. Yet, in my advocacy of a multiculturalised Britain I would like to see the Church of England share these constitutional privileges - which should perhaps be extended - with other faiths. However, multiculturalism here does not mean crude 'parity'. My expectation is that even in the context of an explicit multifaithism the Church of England would enjoy a rightful precedence in the religious representation in the House of Lords and in the coronation of the monarch, and this would not be just a crude majoritarianism but be based on its historical contribution and its potential to play a leading role in the evolution of a multiculturalist national identity, state and society. Both the historical and the multiculturalist contributions to national identity have a presumptive quality, and usually they qualify each other, but where they are complementary the case for 'establishment' is enhanced and most of all where there is simultaneously a process of inclusion of non-Anglican faith communities and humanists.

MULTICULTURALISM AND IMMIGRATION

Multiculturalism in Canada, Australia and Britain developed alongside a restrictive immigration policy. Perhaps it was regarded as a price for multiculturalism, but it was in the main not engaged with by most multiculturalists, except in terms of demanding that it be non-discriminatory, and in relation to its most egregious manifestations. Some anti-racists were against the kinds of immigration policies that were pursued, arguing that controls implied that immigrants were the problem rather than the general level of racism in the country (Sivanandan 1982). But in the main, as multiculturalism emerged as a distinct political idea it did not radically challenge the consensus on or itself focus very much on immigration. Political theorists who emerged as advocates of multiculturalism in the 1980s and 1990s did not have much to say about immigration policy but on the political and ethical challenges in relation to post-immigration inclusion, participation and needs of minorities in relation to equal civic status, national discourses and the public culture. Political theorists of multiculturalism have not written much on immigration and immigration control (Joe Carens 1987 and 2013 being an exception), but in general their implicit position seems to have been that whilst immigration has been and continues to be of benefit to countries such as those of Western Europe and North America, that immigration controls have been explicitly or implicitly racist and emphatically should not be but that a country can have 'a moral right to its territorial and cultural integrity including the right to limit the entry of outsiders' (Parekh, 2006). Multiculturalists have accepted this fundamental moral right. Just as, analogously, one can accept that foreign investment is of benefit to one's country without suggesting that it is always of benefit or the scale of overseas ownership is not important or that overseas investors have a right to invest in our country if the returns earned are higher in our country than their own (or elsewhere).[4] Paradoxical as it may seem, multiculturalist countries such as Canada and

4 In effect saying to overseas investors: we know we are denying you an equal opportunity to invest but national interest considerations must sometimes trump global equal opportunities to invest.

Australia led the way in being choosy between applicants, scoring them on the basis of the needs of the country. While countries who declared themselves opposed to multiculturalism could have extensive and less choosy immigration and be very keen on making immigrants into citizens, like France; or be very generous in relation to asylum seekers and refugees while being heterophobic within a mono-ethnocultural conception of citizenship, such as Germany or Greece. And of course different EU countries could experience different scales of migration from within the EU and have different views on its contribution to the country. So, even though multiculturalism has had little to say about immigration policy, regarding it as a separate policy area to the question of the relations between citizens and the remaking of national citizenship to respectfully include difference, nevertheless there is a connexion that has, for example, been asserted by the broad centre of British politics since the 1960s, famously summarised in the 1960s by the Labour politician, Roy Hattersley: 'Without integration limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible'.

This is not to ignore the presence of the xenophobic, racist or Islamophobic sentiments that are present and indeed rising everywhere. Rather, it is a recognition recently well expressed by the Australian Minister for Justice, Michael Keenan:

> "We know that the public's tolerance for cultural diversity improves when they are secure in the knowledge that borders are being managed appropriately".

Moreover, we must allow that people can be genuinely concerned about lack of control in relation to scale and pace of flows and can be felt by ethnic minorities, just as they feel other effects perceived by white citizens, such as downward pressure on low wages or strain on local services. By 'genuine' here I mean that the sentiment is sincere, not contrived, the reasons given are operative; as well as that they are reasonable concerns. In some cases, perhaps even in a lot of cases, there may be mixed motives, and the mixture may include xenophobia, Islamophobia, racial prejudice and so on, but the concern in question is not reducible to these, can and does exist without racism, and so has to be considered in its own right: it may be accepted even where the racism is rejected (Katwala, 2014). Moreover, while it is known that the media, especially the tabloid press, can exacerbate the sentiment, it does not mean that the sentiment does not have to be addressed. Some perceptions about the scale and effects of migration are likely to be mistaken and so while they cannot be regarded as self-validating, nor can they be ignored. The situation is similar to when we take perceptions of racial discriminations as indication but not proof that discrimination is taking place; an indication that there may be a problem that should not be dismissed but requires investigation and discussion.

As noted by Keenan such anxieties can have effects on intolerance, racism and on attitudes needed to make multiculturalism work. Multiculturalists will insist that immigration policy, prospective migrants and migrants are not talked about in ways that undermine the sense of citizenship of ethnic minorities in their own eyes and/or in the eyes of others. Indeed, that all groups of people, including prospective immigrants and more generally, should be spoken of and visually represented respectfully, and that questions of policy should not be in terms of negative discourses about immigrants or groups of people. One will want to attack the anti-immigration rhetoric and the concept of the nation implicit in that discourse; yet, it is important to do so in a way that will not inflame but dampen down that rhetoric and movement by addressing some of the reasonable concerns of the public. The risks to existing majority – minority relations should be considered not just in relation to discourses but also in relation to the effects of the immigration policies themselves. Restrictions on immigration may be an appropriate policy response.[5] Such policies must not be discriminatory on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion but they could rank by other categories those seeking admissions, eg., give lesser priority to temporary workers. In the present context of a major humanitarian crisis in relation to refugees trying to enter Europe, it is worth thinking about letting those EU coun-

5 The kind of multiculturalism I am outlining assumes therefore the continuing right of states to control immigration. Of course it may pool it as per Schengen or as per 'freedom of movement' in EU. In any case, even EU member states believe they have the right to restrict the entry of nationals from those outside the EU.

tries who take a large share of refugees being able to temporarily restrict other mobilities, eg., people looking for work across national borders in the EU (assuming that this could be properly agreed, which perhaps is not very likely at the moment). Whatever restrictions or selections that are applied must be consistent with what David Miller calls the 'weak cosmopolitanism premise', meaning here that the policy 'must offer relevant reasons to those excluded', showing that their claims have been counted but outweighed by other considerations which they can recognise as reasonable considerations even if they would weigh the considerations differently (Miller, 2015: 400).

MULTICULTURALISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM

I earlier contrasted multicultural nationalism with liberal nationalism and Quebecan interculturalism. I would now like to contrast it with cosmopolitanism, some of the key points of which are a rejection of the reality of groups, seeing them all as 'socially constructed' and usually with a view to dominate subordinates of one's own group or another group or both. Instead, what exist and need to be liberated from groups are individuals in their varied, hybrid and fluid identities (for a longer discussion see Modood, 2012 and Modood, 2013: chapter 7). This is said to be evident if we stop speaking at the level of national models and national policies and study cities, localities and everyday experiences and see how urban life manages very well without normative theory (Wise and Velayutham, 2009). In everyday multiculturalism people become indifferent to group identities and relate to each other through multiple social roles such as neighbours, colleagues, users of local schools and public services and so on. Moreover, it is argued, migrants as well as later generations may remain connected to their countries of origins or to certain diasporas and imagined transnational communities such as a black Atlantic diaspora or an ummah, and these transnational networks, ways of living and self-identities are more real than national identities, multiculturalist or otherwise (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004).

Cosmopolitanism, I believe, could only replace multiculturalism if the problems that it addresses no longer needed addressing or could be addressed by cosmopolitanism. Yet neither of these is true. The problems of anti-racism, ethno-religious group 'difference', assertion and accommodation are live, ongoing issues and despite the progress made they have become larger and more pressing, as collected together under the rubric of 'integration'. Moreover it is difficult to see how cosmopolitanism could digest a multiculturalism based on concepts of national citizenship and group accommodation, when its take on such concepts is intellectually and normatively negative.

Yet cosmopolitanism makes a contribution of its own, evident in the light of some recent trends - to do with mixed identities and diverse neighbourhoods, migrants of many different kinds and statuses and who are not so interested in settling in one country and so on – which multiculturalism has a less good traction with. It seems, then, that we need both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism and should advocate both as complementary (pace some of the advocates of each, who see them in a competitive relation).

If, however, the immigration policy that resonates with cosmopolitanism is something like the view that the growing transnational character of life in developed countries, and especially so in the context of freedom of movement for citizens of member states within the EU, and that people who wish to enter, temporarily or permanently, are large in number, and many are escaping conditions of war, persecution, economic underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty; we should, it is argued, have a much more open immigration policy, perhaps extending the freedom of movement pioneered by the EU to people coming from outside the EU too (for a powerful statement that makes a claim like this at its boldest, see Carens, 2013). Then it is difficult to see what complementarity could be like on this point. While it is possible to have

a multiculturalism that encompasses group accommodation and culturally independent, mixed individuals, it is difficult to see how to compromise between the view that a multicultural society requires control of immigration and the view that it requires freedom of movement across borders.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Multiculturalism was developed in a context of immigration control and does not challenge the right of the state to control immigration, while insisting that it must not be exercised in ways that are discriminatory in relation to the composite and overlapping criteria of race, ethnicity and religion that are at the heart of post-immigration multiculturalism. Recent perceptions by large proportions of various publics that the pace and scale of immigration has been too high and too unregulated are based on a number of factors, which can include racism and xenophobia, which are damaging to multiculturalism and have to be challenged. A related factor can be cultural identity questions which cannot be simply dismissed as majoritarian, let alone as majoritarian prejudice. Multiculturalism is a national identity remaking project, which may in some circumstances lead to legitimate concerns about the identity effects of immigration, including its effects on existing citizens and minority groups, as well as of the possible consequences of large-scale migration flows per se, and of people who are admitted on the understanding that they are not to be thought of as on a pathway to settlement and national citizenship. While a cosmopolitan version of multiculturalism is also present in, say, Britain and is largely compatible with a more political, communitarian multiculturalism, the two seem to have incompatible views on immigration control.

Multiculturalism has to engage with migration at three levels. **Firstly**, identifying and opposing negative/racist/othering discourses, actions and policies against migrants, no less than citizens (whilst recognising that some citizenship-constituting rights and opportunities will not be available to migrants, eg., rights of residence or access to full welfare benefits). **Secondly**, protecting/promoting the policies, forms of governance and understanding that constitute the core of post-immigration multiculturalism, especially in relation to accommodation and civic recognition of ethnic minority citizens and accommodation of ethno-religious groups. **Thirdly**, protecting/promoting the multicultural nation-building project. Cosmopolitanism is very strong on the first of these but ambivalent on the second and gives up on the third.

I cannot help but think that multiculturalism, while continuing to point out the on-going benefits of immigration should re-affirm immigration control. This must of course be within the context of and within the limits of re-affirming that multiculturalism is a citizenship-based nation-remaking project. The incompatibility between multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism in relation to migration is seriously problematic for progressive politics today but one to which I cannot see a solution.

Given that majoritarian nationalism seems to the dominant politics in so many parts of the world today (in Russia, China, India, many Muslim-majority countries as well as the USA and across Europe) and that classical liberalism, aka culture-neutral civic integrationist individualism is one of the casualties. I have only one policy recommendation and it is at the level of an 'ism' rather than a specific action: **multicultural nationalism unites the concerns of some of those currently sympathetic to majoritarian nationalism and those who are pro-diversity and minority accommodationist** in the way that liberal nationalism (with its emphasis on individualism and majoritarianism) nor cosmopolitanism (with its disavowal of national belonging and championing of global open borders) does not. **It therefore represents the political idea and tendency most likely to offer a feasible alternative rallying point to monocultural nationalism.**

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ENLIGHTENMENT AND POPULISM: THE QUEST FOR EUROPEAN IDENTITY

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THE IDEA OF EUROPE AS AN "EMPTY" UNIVERSALISM

Why is the question of European identity so paradoxical? On one hand, Europe has different particular traditions (as complex and plural as can be), like any other cultural family in the world. On the other hand, its most important and exceptional *particularity* consists precisely in its tendency toward the emancipation from tradition –let's say in its tendency toward universalism, in its internal struggle against the authority of its own particularities. This division between tradition and emancipation has been one of the most important features of European Modern History, and the fundamental cause of its rare and spectacular dynamism.

Julien Benda wrote in 1932, in a context in need of no further explanation, his *Discours à la nation européene [Discourse to the European nation]*. Few texts have grasped so deeply this discours the unavoidably paradoxical nature of European identity. Benda, the enemy of nationalism and irrationalism, the arch enemy of the XIX Century, radically sided with emancipation and understood Europe as an immaterial, ascetic and universalistic union, "necessarily impious, but less impious than the nation"[1].

This points out the fascinating distinction between Europe as a carnal reality and Europe as an idea. The Old Continent was often crystallized in a reality through History, but this reality did not contribute to create the Europe Benda advocates for: we sometimes did live as Europeans in a union of interests and feelings, but we did not *think* and consciously create Europe as such. This is crucial, because, "in history, the idea that men make of their actions is even more fertile than their own actions."[2] In a quite Hegelian manner, Benda said that this new idea needed more time to come to our spirit because its nemesis, the fragmented Europe, the Europe of divided Nations, was not historically exhausted, as it did not completely fulfill its destiny of overcoming the Feudal organization.

So, "Europe will be a product of your spirit, of the will of your spirit, not a product of your being – wrote the author of the famous *La trahison des clercs [The Treason of the Intellectuals]*. If you do respond that you don't believe in the autonomy of the spirit, that your spirit is nothing but an aspect of your being, then I declare that you will never build Europe. Because there is no European being."[3]

In this sense, Europe is the fatherland of the Spirit, the homeland of Philosophy, and Philosophy is the pursuit of the Good regardless of the We –that is to say, regardless of the answers that our own individual tradition has provided to the question of the good life. Of course, this position can be assimilated with that of the most radical wing of the Enlightenment project, which basically sought rational purification of everything that has been inherited. From this perspective, Europe is also the land of cosmopolitism, simply because rationality is universal and heritage is always particular.

1 [Translation is ours] Julien Benda, Discours à la nation européene, Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1979, p. 126.
2 Ibíd., p. 30.
3 Ibíd., p. 67.

POPULISM AND ENLIGHTENED CHAUVINISM

In order to better understand the relationship between Populism and European identity, it is very interesting to link this philosophical attitude with social stratification. Somehow, cosmopolitism has been associated with elites that feel more attached to their privileged fellows around the world, than to the people of their own land, and popular classes have also demonstrated an obstinate attachment to their cultural identity and traditional belonging. Therefore, we can say that there exists a kind of *natural sympathy* between populism and nationalism as political ideologies. They both side with the people against the elite –understood most of the times as a transnational and cosmopolitan class.

Still, in the past years, we have increasingly witnessed a populistic defense of European identity understood as a kind of rational and enlightened project. This defense, that we can maybe name here *enlightened chauvinism* (is that an oxymoron?), needs to be distinguished from the mere orthodox vindication of traditional Europe. Indeed, politics can make strange bedfellows, but this is quite a striking example: Dutch libertines and old post-fascists on the same side. Nonetheless, this political alignment cannot dilute the fact that they have opposed ideas backing their similar contingent political positions.

Ian Buruma says in his *Murder in Amsterdam. The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance* that "one of the main claims of Enlightenment philosophy is that its ideas based on reason are by definition universal. But the Enlightenment has a particular appeal to some conservatives because its values are not just universal, but more importantly, 'ours', that is, European, Western values."[4] And – he added later– "because secularism has gone too far to bring back the authority of the churches, conservatives and neoconservatives have latched onto the Enlightenment as a badge of national or cultural identity."[5]

Still, it looks contradictory that certain values incarnate a particularity and remain universal at the same time. For this very reason, there is a clear incompatibility between defending Europe as the land of Enlightenment, and defending Europe as a particular identity amongst others. This has constituted the centuries-old existential problem of the West with its own identity, and this has been the problem of Europe with Enlightenment: we can say that enlightened values are ours, but if we defend them *as ours*, they will lose their meaning and *superiority*.

Nonetheless, when a secularized Europe had to deal in a more direct and intimate way with other cultures and religions, as it has happened in the past decades, the antagonistic nature of the division between tradition and Enlightenment has become obscured –at least in the discursive realm. From the perspective of those who side with emancipation, some have recognized that, nonetheless, European traditions are more liberal than other traditions. From the perspective of those who side with tradition, some understood the advantages of arguing and defending the exceptionality of Europe based on its greater *openness*. Both sides have then apparently converged in defending freedom as a fundamental part of the European identity: the ones have accepted the *Europeanness* of Enlightenment, the others have incorporated the vindication of freedom into the cause of tradition.[6]

Márton Gyöngyösi, politician from the Hungarian radical right wing party Jobbik, has understood the incompatibility between these two types of "defenders of Europe" and, therefore, remained very skeptical when it came to envisage possible alliances between his own party –*identitarian* and traditionalist– and the populists that make use of the Enlightened discourse. He said that the greater enemy of his party "is not people who have a different culture or a different religion. The common enemy of traditionalists, regardless of where they come from, is liberalism, which wants to sweep away every type of tradition and culture. [...] I think the division line is between traditionalists and liberals, not nations or cultures."[7] Is it not this exact problem that is causing the breakup of Alternative für Deutschland? On the one side, we have national-liberals; on the other, traditional *identitarians*.

4 Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam. The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance, New York, The Penguin Press, 2006, p. 29.
5 Ibid, p. 34.
6 One of the most interesting questions regarding this issue is why European traditions have experimented this openness. Some authors tried to explain it referring to an endogenous cause to Judeo Christian worldview: Marcel Gauchet, René Girard, Peter L. Berger of Gianni Vattimo, for instance. The most conventional answer, however, is the one which refers to exogenous reasons: Christianity have been forced to soften itself in his fight against the Modern State and Enlightenment. Pim Fortuyn or Hirsi Ali use to state that Judaism and Christianity have passed through Enlightenment, while Islam not.
7 http://budapesttimes-archiv.bzt.hu/2014/02/22/jobbik-to-wilders-and-le-pen-liberalism-and-zionism-are-the-enemies-not-islam/ [Consulted on February 15th, 2018.]

Even with all that, this antagonism has not prevented that, most of the times, as we said, public opinion has perceived this convergence as something that happens naturally. And, in spite of what Gyöngyösi said, both streams are confronted, due to diverse reasons, to the same enemy: immigration. The ones are offended by the traditionalism of other cultures, the others by its mere otherness. Anyway, such a clear assumption of the Enlightened discourse by part of the Right, at the very same time that, inversely, the Left has adopted a strong cultural discourse in their defense of immigrants, is possibly the most important ideological change that has occurred since the sixties. The Netherlands is one of the initial places where this new scenario was clearly brought to life, where the Left fully embraced multiculturalism until the early criticism in the 90's (with, for instance, the publication of Paul Scheffer' *Het Multiculturale Drama [The Multicultural Disaster]*), and the Right started defending this kind of Enlightened Right Wing Populism, not only with Pym Fortuyn, but, before that, with the liberal-conservative Frits Bolkestein.

When Fortuyn, ex-Marxist and professor of Sociology, openly homosexual, insistently stated that Islam was "hostile to our culture", he was certainly not referring 'our culture' to a kind of traditional world. The warnings about the thread that multicultural society meant to homosexuals or to the equality of women was always an essential component of his provocative political discourse. Multiculturalism, in this sense, was not understood as a harmless protection of cultural minorities, but as an active support to Islamic culture, which is an extraordinarily affirmative culture, with a strong expansive capacity to hatch opaque horizontal networks where individual freedom is at danger.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the popular Somali-born and Dutch writer, now living in United States, is an advocate of the Radical Enlightenment that declares to be a disciple of Spinoza and Voltaire. Deeply critical of Islam, its main combat is to emancipate individuals from the burden of the ancestors. This struggle, which is a strictly enlightened one, has led her to a right-wing liberalism, even if some of her ideas are the same as the ones defended by what we call here *enlightened chauvinism*. In a recent interview, Hirsi Ali stated that the Left is thrown into the idea of justice, while the Right is dedicated to the idea of freedom. Therefore, considering that her priority is the liberation of individuals from their own culture, it's not strange that freedom seem to her preeminent to justice. "It was the Left who used to defend..." is a leitmotiv that this feminist writer uses when she vindicates the freedom of the individuals to choose their own lifestyle regardless of their tradition.

Hirsi Ali also believes that Westerners have become too accustomed to liberties and are, in some aspects, unconscious about their fragility and the conditions that support them. In this sense, the Left, in the name of recognition, has helped some backward cultures to maintain the subjugation of individuals inside open societies. "For example, the mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, called on secular people to respect the unifying power of religion. As is typical of so much muzz-headed, empty political rhetoric, it is unclear what he was really asking, but he apparently believed that Islam is primarily a religious practice that provides comfort to immigrant followers by drawing them together in a community. He seemed to be making an appeal to the Dutch people to adopt an unreflective, unexamined tolerance of Islamic communities and their activities. With this "appeal," however, he blatantly ignored the desperate situation of Muslim women in his own city. And he seemed to believe—mistakenly—that this "benevolent" sentiment and attitude would help the integration of Muslims into Dutch society. It will not. It does exactly the opposite: it makes a virtual institution of Muslim self-segregation and isolation."[8]

The fact that many of the Right-wing populists happen to share this same view on moral emancipation is of course problematic. The perfectly opposed vision of Hirsi Ali is that of Robert Rediger, one of the main characters of Houellebecq's recent and very controversial – as almost always – *Submission*. The novel takes place in a close future in which a new political party that aims to gather the support of Muslim population in France, the Muslim Brotherhood Party, has strong possibilities of winning the next Presidential Elections in 2022. In front of them, the only party capable of snatching their victory is Marine Le

8 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin. An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam, New York, Free Press, p. 54.

Pen' National Front. In a context of pre-Civil War, the political alignments of other forces perfectly reflected this new ideological distribution.

Robert Rediger is the instigator of François' (the main character of the novel) conversion to Islam. A French intellectual who was close in his youth to the *Identitarians* and the French radical Right, Rediger later converted to Islam himself. For him, a disciple of Friedrich Nietzsche and René Guénon, this conversion was the only coherent way out for a real conservative in the context of the decay of Europe. It seemed natural that "when I started looking for a way out of atheist humanism, I have gone back to my [European] roots."[9] Then, as he realized that Christianity could not be revived, Islam represented the obvious way to recover the values undermined by the Enlightenment, by Atheism, etc., and restore *natural hierarchies*. For Rediger, *islamogauchistes* were the ones who absurdly contradicted themselves.

On the other side, the candidate of the National Front, Marine Le Pen, pronounced on the election night a discourse –probably written by Renaud Camus– "republican, even anticlerical [...]. Skipping the usual reference to Jules Ferry and the secularist reforms of the 1880s, she went all the way back to Condorcet and the historic speech he made before the Legislative Assembly in 1792, when he evoked the ancient Egyptians and Indians 'among whom the human spirit made such progress, and who fell back into the most brutal and shameful ignorance the moment that religious power assumed the right to educate men'."[10] The Left, on the contrary, "paralyzed by its antiracism", preferred to support a Muslim force whose ascent to power, in the practice, will lead to policies that are much more distant to their ideals than those that would have produced a victory of the National Front.

This new ideological distribution of cleavages is therefore very clearly presented in Houellebecq's roman, and it shows how paradoxical is today's use of *identity politics*.

CONCLUSION

Immigration and the confrontation with strong non-European cultures is radically changing the way in which emancipation and tradition have opposed each other in European History. The tension produced by these changes can be observed in the way Populistic Right-wing European parties differently deal with the idea of Enlightenment and with the role of religion in public life.

When Europe confronted over the authoritative role of its own tradition, the Right defended culture and the Left defended emancipation. When confronting the authority of *other* traditions, it looks like the Left defends culture and the Right is starting to defend emancipation. Still, this new defense of culture is not a vindication of "ancestral tradition or divine law, but of subjective rights" of individuals that belong to a minority.[11] Nonetheless, this complaisance on the subjective right to express one's minority culture sometimes hides a quite ingenious view on how individuals and cultures relate. On the other hand, the defense of emancipation often represents an undercover defense of *Europeanness*. In any case, it looks like European identity is still going to be caught in the constant dialectics of Enlightenment and tradition. And the European Right-wing populism will certainly remain existentially trapped in this paradox.

9 Michel Houellebecq, Submission, London, William Heinemann, 2015, p. 332-3.
10 Ibid., p. 146-7.
11 Alain Finkielkraut, La seule exaxtitude, Paris, Éditions Stock, p. 52. [Translation is ours.]

SOFT DESPOTISM AND STABILITOCRACY IN THE BALKANS

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Political extremism and radicalization in liberal democracies are not new phenomena. For the past several hundred years, Western thinkers have struggled to determine how far a citizen of a liberal democracy could legitimately go in expressing his or her beliefs and, more importantly, acting on them. They have also wrestled with the related question of how limited government—institutionalized in the doctrines of checks and balances and the separation of powers—can best support individual endeavors and aspirations whilst defending the constitutional order against those who seek to endanger it.

Contemporary debates on counter-terrorism, for instance, are conceptually not that far off from 20th century debates about countering totalitarianism on both the left and the right. Then, as now, the line was usually drawn at sedition: one may publicly criticize all one wants whilst making use of the electoral process to effectuate the change one seeks—this legitimately falls within the proscribed limits of free speech and lawful political action.

An altogether different problem arises when a liberal democracy—especially one in its nascent stage—becomes incapable of countering the nefarious ambitions of an elected leader who pays lip service to the institutions of the constitutional order, however imperfect these may be, to rule in a manner that endangers its core tenets; in other words, when a leader abrogates his fundamental responsibility to the people by equating the perpetuation of his personal reign with the ongoing authority of the state.

Some of the most insightful writings on this problem are to be found in the final volume of Alexis de Tocqueville's magnum opus, *Democracy in America* (1840)—in those chapters that constitute an examination of challenges common to democracies *tout court*. The French political philosopher warns of the dangers of "soft despotism," whereby a leader conspires against his own citizenry, endeavoring to weaken, isolate, and alienate each of its members through the creation of an "immense tutelary power."

All-powerful and elected, such an "irresponsible" leader sees himself as "alone tak[ing] charge of assuring citizens' enjoyments and watching over their fate." This would resemble, Tocqueville writes, "paternal power if, like that, it had for its object to prepare men for manhood; but on the contrary, it seeks only to keep them fixed irrevocably in childhood; it likes citizens to enjoy themselves provided that they think only of enjoying themselves. [...] It wants to be the unique agent and sole arbiter of that," and "penetrate the sphere of private interests more habitually and more deeply."

This modern form of what Tocqueville calls "servitude" is achieved in part through "subjugation in small affairs, [...] constantly thwart[ing] [men] and brings them to renounce the use of their wills. Thus, little by little, it extinguishes their spirits and enervates their souls." It renders citizens "so dependent on the central power" through habituating obedience that they "lose little by little the faculty of thinking, feeling, and acting by themselves." [...] "Thus, after taking each individual by turns in its powerful hands and kneading him as it likes, the sovereign extends its arms over society as a whole; [...] it rarely forces one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to one's acting; it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born."

Tocqueville's portrait of despotism arising in democracy is "soft" when compared to, for example, the Jacobin terror, Leopold II's heart of darkness in the Congo, Stalin's gulag archipelago, Hitler's totalitarianism and its culmination in the Holocaust, or the Khmer Rouge's genocidal social engineering. Yet by propagating anxiety, doubt, and uncertainty; hindering any prospect of hope, the driving force behind all democratic institutions; and systematically imposing tutelary dependence and servility on an unsuspecting populace, it represents a degradation of the human spirit just the same.

Soft despotism propagandizes the prestige of unlimited royal power and denigrates the democratic majesty of the rule of law, exerting enormous influence on the course of any society it enshackles. It encourages uniform mass opinions, gives birth to prejudices, and fosters ever-deepening divisions. It designates as mortal enemies those who oppose its stranglehold on the nation, delivering the fate of an entire people to the savage political instincts of those most capable of channeling society's fears, vices, and fissures.

Regrettably, soft despotism continues to manifest itself in various forms in a number of nations across the Old Continent, including in those parts of the Balkans that remains outside the European Union.

Specific circumstances have eased the way for the sort of despotic leaders described by Tocqueville to seize power and establish a type of regime that has come to be known as *stabilitocracy*.

Political scientists like Florian Bieber, Srdja Pavlović, Antoinette Primatarova, and Johanna Deimel have contributed to defining this contemporary phenomenon: a reactionary manner of personal rule that claims to secure stability, feigns the espousal of European values, and professes to support EU integration whilst in reality relying on authoritarian means to stay in power. These include: promotion of a single-party political culture; reliance on informal kleptocratic structures; significant electoral irregularities; control of the media landscape; slanderous vilification of opponents; collaboration with organized crime figures; extensive exploitation of state resources for political advantage; suppression of citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms; downgrading of parliamentary debate; and regular production of crises to undermine the rule of law and subordinate the independence of state institutions like the police, the military, the judiciary, and the tax authority.

Stabilitocracy is distinct from what has been defined variously as managed, illiberal, hybrid, or majoritarian democracy for two reasons. First, it distinguishes between those countries whose EU aspirations are widely understood as realistic such as the Western Balkans, others that although geographically proximate have no credible chance to join the Union, and still others that are already members. Second, it adds the crucial factor of a grant of external legitimacy to the understanding of contemporary Balkan despotisms.

This last is the most distinctive feature of stabilitocracy, one that thinkers such as Tocqueville did not consider in their writings. The modern-day Balkan stabilitocratic despot relies on what is portrayed as the public support of the European Union and its member states, as well as other external actors, to maintain his grip on power. This rule is reinforced by what appears to be a tacit agreement between the despot and certain European decisionmakers that as long as the former maintains the semblance of "stability" in his country, the latter would turn a blind eye to the increasing manifestation of authoritarianism. At the same time, both would seem comfortable with maintaining the illusion that accession negotiations remain steadily on track, even though there is no realistic end in sight to the process.

The contours of this pact for "stability" are not normative, but rather circumstantial. At the height of the migration crisis, for instance, it was understood to mean doing what was asked to stem the flow of refugees from the Middle East transiting through our region on the way to Central and Western Europe. More recently, it has been assumed to require high-level engagement with regional foes or competitors in theatrical exercises that have the appearance of endeavoring to overcome various unresolved issues in the Balkans.

One can trace the origins of what can be interpreted as a *quid pro quo* arrangement to what a 2017 report of the European Council on Foreign Relations characterized as the "trinity of economic uncertainty,

cultural anxiety, and political alienation" present throughout the EU for a number of years. One manifestation of this general feeling of malaise is heightened skepticism of Europeans towards expanding the Union, as illustrated by the results of an October 2017 representative poll of Germans commissioned by the Körber-Stiftung, in which two-thirds of respondents voiced opposition to Balkan membership in the EU.

It is thus safe to say that the void created by enlargement fatigue facilitated the emergence of stabilitocracy in the Balkans, although one could argue that it is also part of a broader decline of democracy in the world. Freedom House has noted in its most recent *Freedom in the World* report that there has been eleven consecutive years of decline in global freedom, with setbacks being observed in political rights, civil liberties or both even in countries categorized as "Free." The same report concluded that "nearly one quarter of the countries registering declines [...] were in Europe."

One of these was Serbia. Another recent Freedom House report, entitled *Nations in Transit*, determined that its "democracy score has dropped to the lowest level since 2005"—the year that Freedom House began issuing annual reports on the subject.

Similar conclusions have been drawn with regards to other Balkan stabilitocratic despotisms. The case of Serbia, however, is particularly egregious. Since 2012, it has been ruled by Aleksandar Vučić, who served as information minister under Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s.

For nearly six years, he has held firmly in his despotic hands the destiny of the largest country in the Western Balkans: first as deputy prime minister, then as prime minister, and now as president. The nature of his despotic rule is such that whatever formal position he holds in the constitutional order at any given moment is trumped by the absolute control he exercises over state institutions through tight-knit, informal, and opaque networks. Such a denigration of the rule of law constitutes the very definition of abuse of power in a liberal democracy.

Vučić continues to operate on the assumption that state institutions must not serve as barriers to the exercise of his will-to-power whilst brutally manipulating public opinion in favor of his own selfish interests. Indeed, his despotic ability to impede citizens' access to the free flow of information represents the core of his stabilitocratic 'achievement.' As Tocqueville wrote: "servitude cannot be complete if the press is free. The press is the democratic instrument of freedom par excellence."

In Serbia, that instrument has been almost fully broken: virtually every major media outlet has surrendered its objectivity and independence to Vučić's demands of fealty and subservience—becoming, in the process, clear-cut instruments of propaganda and manipulation. A cult of personality is on offer, with the bias of the state-owned public broadcaster's flagship nightly news program being surpassed only by that of the country's most-watched private television networks. The time and quality of coverage devoted to Vučić dramatically surpasses that of anyone else. On the mainstream networks and daily newspapers, disapproval of his regime is virtually non-existent, and the popular political programs on television—those that have not been taken off the air, that is—rarely, if ever, feature critical views or contrary opinions.

Non-political programing largely takes the form of a variety of surreal reality shows whose content Tocqueville, for one, would comfortably describe as advancing the ultimate goal of soft despotism: "to take away entirely the trouble of thinking" from individuals by fostering "general apathy." These spectacles, which draw sky-high ratings, encourage viewers to live entirely in the present—devoid of hope for a better future. And because what they watch is at once both astoundingly vulgar and vapid, the subliminal message is that they should feel content in their circumstances. It's what passes for catharsis in a society weighed down by resignation.

About a year ago, the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, a think-tank I helped establish in late 2013, added a question to the monthly public opinion surveys we commission: "would you encourage your child (or children) to emigrate from Serbia if such an opportunity presented itself?" At no time have fewer than 50.8 percent of respondents answered 'yes'—on one occasion 61.8 percent gave an affirmative reply. Such alarming numbers have been ignored by the mainstream media; the

same goes for figures indicating tens of thousands of educated young people have left the country annually since Vučić won his first election.

It is also not at all surprising that the country's dismal economic performance has not been widely discussed. Vučić came to power promising at least 5% annual growth; and a lot of his backers and supporters, both at home and abroad, seemed to think it was an eminently reachable target. It turns out they were dead wrong, for as Zimbabwe's former finance minister Tendai Biti said a couple of months ago, "you can rig elections but you can't rig the economy."

IMF and World Bank statistics for the relevant timeframe indicate that Serbia's GDP and GDP per capita have declined, as have wages; interest payments on the country's external debt have nearly doubled, as has the public debt; the debt-to-GDP ratio has also grown significantly. Also, Eurostat data indicates that Serbia is the country with the most extreme income inequality in Europe. And despite offering generous subsidies and emphasizing low labor costs, Vučić has not been able to attract much FDI over the past five years.

The precipitous erosion of Serbia's economic performance is even more deplorable when compared to virtually any other place in the Balkans: in the last five years, Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Romania all grew at higher rates. The World Bank projects that the Serbian economy will continue to grow less than the regional average in 2018 and 2019, widening the performance gap even further. These facts make a mockery of the regime's claim that Serbia has become the economic leader of the Balkans.

Vučić's sophisticated propaganda machine, which grows more effective the longer it is allowed to operate with impunity, has so far been able to ensure he maintains his stranglehold on the levers of power. Other Balkan strongmen have had similar 'success.' So far, only in Macedonia have we seen popular discontent produce a democratic restoration.

The good news coming out of Skoplje has not gone unnoticed in Europe. Prime Minister Zoran Zaev's recent democratic triumph may have even served as a long overdue catalyst for the EU's tolerance for stabilitocratic despotism in the Balkans to reach an inflection point.

As this publication was going to press, the European Commission released what may turn out to be a game-changing report entitled *A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans*.

The mere fact that the Commission underscored the "firm, merit-based prospect of EU membership for the Western Balkans" and stressed that "joining the EU is far more than a technical process; it is a generational choice, based on fundamental values" may represent the beginning of the EU's change of heart vis-à-vis stabilitocracy.

But other parts of the communication have gone even further: for the first time in a publicly released document, the EU painted a realistic picture of the dismal state of democracy in the region. The passage that follows could be considered a repudiation of the lenience heretofore accorded to the region's democratic despots: "Today, the countries [of the Balkans] show clear elements of state capture, including links with organized crime and corruption at all levels of government and administration, as well as a strong entanglement of public and private interests. All this feeds a sentiment of impunity and inequality. There is also extensive political interference in and control of the media. A visibly empowered and independent judiciary and accountable governments and administrations are essential for bringing about the lasting societal change that is needed."

For those of us who have opposed the region's stabilitocratic despots and fought to dismantle the immense tutelary power at their disposal, the EU communication reads like a small breath of fresh air, opening the way for a truly stable and prosperous Western Balkans to become an eminently reachable goal in this generation.

HOW BEST TO RESPOND TO THE RISE OF POPULIST EXTREMISM

Rafal Pankowski, Professor at Collegium Civitas in Warsaw and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Polish Magazine Nigdy Więcej (Never Again)

Populist extremism – and its accompanying phenomena such as racism and xenophobia - is a multi-faceted problem, which goes well beyond voting patterns. It has broader social and cultural aspects. Any durable solution needs to go beyond party political considerations, too.

It has been argued that populist extremism arises out of structural issues such as the uncertainties of the global economy. On the other hand, the actual nature of the populist response is largely determined by the cultural setting, which is often conditioned by the peculiarities of national traditions. The cultural context is crucial to determining the boundaries of socially acceptable and unacceptable forms of expressing social anger. The normative aspects of populist extremism cannot be underestimated. At its ideological core, racist populism questions the very basic values of contemporary civilization: human rights and the equal dignity of all human beings. Therefore, it poses a threat to the very fabric of contemporary pluralist democratic society.

Although Europe is thought of as a beacon of progress and human rights, dangerous right-wing populist parties entered governments in several EU countries in the recent years. One such relatively recent example is Poland in 2006-2007, when the Kaczynski government included populist extremist leaders. Can any lessons be learnt from the cultural-political struggles of that period? Arguably, the confrontation of cultural resources was an important element during those emotionally charged months.

The entrance of extremists into government was a fruit of a longer social-cultural process which made expressions of xenophobic populism socially acceptable. A shift in the electronic media market accompanied a record level of unemployment in the absence of a progressive discursive alternative. It led to an increasingly simplified and aggressive style of delivering the political message. The anachronistic political vision of the nationalist radicals could, paradoxically, fit well in the quintessentially modern (or post-modern) virtual reality of media discourses. The crude identity message of ethnonationalism circulates well in the chaotic and disoriented culture of post-industrial media society. The nationalist and anti-Semitic Radio Maryja provided the main symbolic framework for the coalition and the Radio Maryja founder, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, was instrumental in bringing the partners together.

The conservative-populist coalition in Poland lasted for just a little longer than a year. It was voted out of office in October 2007. It did not fundamentally change the country's basic outlook. Nevertheless, its immediate effect could be observed through the rhetoric climate it created and through the government's hardline language. Discursive acts are also an important part of the construction of political reality, especially on the part of elected leaders. Political statements ('representations of reality') are as 'real' elements of the public realm as policies themselves. According to Jon Fiske, 'To the extent that representations are real in their effects, they produce what passes for real in any particular conditions. Social reality and representation are mutually constitutive, and the relations between them are necessarily political'.[1]

The leader of the extreme-right League of Polish Families (LPR), Roman Giertych, became the Minister of Education and set about injecting his radical ideology in the school curriculum. That appointment led to a particularly intensive series of protests. Demonstrations by students and teachers, and other forms of protest against Giertych's policies were a common feature during the Kaczynski government period. Moreover, the mainstream media published a series of highly damaging revelations on neo-nazi connections and behaviour of members of the LPR. As a result, the public's indifference to the extreme-right infiltration of the political mainstream became much reduced.

On the other hand, an alternative cultural-political mobilization took place, with a broad coalition of anti-fascist and human rights groups as well as intellectuals, artists and various other figures voicing their resistance to the increasingly intolerant political climate.

The vibrant independent media and the civil society mobilization were crucial factors in defeating the populist extremists. The Polish anti-fascist/anti-racist and anti-discrimination movement had been building its own cultural resources since the mid-1990s. It developed its own sources of legitimacy and it had bases of support in vital cultural circuits such as popular music. The high-profile awareness-raising campaigns 'Music Against Racism' and 'Let's Kick Racism out of the Stadiums' can serve as examples. As a result, the populist radical right faced a powerful social-cultural counter-movement to reckon with.

On the level of party politics, the liberal opposition managed to present a credible alternative to the populist right and translated the cultural resources of resistance into voter mobilization. Donald Tusk, the leader of the opposition Civic Platform party, inspired followers with his positive message of 'the politics of love' as a symbolic alternative to the government's politics of hate. The emotional aspects of the counter-movement to right-wing populism should not be underestimated. In the words of Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, 'the emotions most directly connected to moral sensibilities, such as shame, guilt, and pride, are especially pervasive as motivators of action'.[2]

It is interesting to note that liberal-democratic politics in Poland triumphed over the populist right with relatively little assistance from abroad. The international reactions to the populist extremists' participation in the government of an EU member-state were extremely low-key compared to the EU's response to the entry of Jörg Haider's far-right party into the Austrian government in 2000. The timidity of the European-level response was a source of disappointment to civil society activists in Poland. Clearly, the European Union needs to re-think what can be considered the right mechanism for its reaction to extremist populism in the future: at the moment such a mechanism is missing.

1 Jon Fiske, 'Opening the Hallway. Some remarks on the fertility of Stuart Hall's contribution to critical theory', in David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, London – New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 214.
2 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, 'Why Emotions Matter', in Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (eds.), Passionate Politics. Emotions and Social Movements, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001, p. 10.

LIVING TOGETHER IN CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Stephan Vopel, Director at the Bertelsmann Foundation

In the context of globalization and the most recent movements of refugees today, many European societies are experiencing an acceleration in cultural diversity. Against this background, modern societies see themselves facing increasing challenges and questions around the issue of cultural diversity or its lines of conflict around perceived cultural differences. Megatrends such as individualization and increasing social inequality also have their influence on questions concerning how to manage successfully with cultural diversity.

Yet cultural diversity has always been an inherent part of European societies, as many countries are historically characterized by regional and denominational diversity. Some of them are also immigration countries, including Germany.

Cultural diversity is first and foremost an empirical feature of modern European societies and its description as such is impartial. But it does have a great potential. Cultural diversity can be a source of innovation, as a productive momentum develops in competition with different perspectives. This way, diversity can become a motor for social, technological and economic progress and growth. Societies with experience in dealing with cultural diversity can respond more flexibly to external changes and are more able to adapt and develop. A trained experience with diversity can also be a better preparation for the challenges of a globalized world.

On the other hand, cultural diversity also makes it more complicated for people to live together. For most people it is very important that they have their own cultural identity. Background, religion and language, as well as customs, traditions and values, provide support and guidance. Confrontation with other cultures can be perceived as a threat to people's own identity and this often makes negotiation processes more difficult.

The challenges to dealing with cultural diversity have become visible in many European countries in the last few years. The refugee situation, which has brought with it a host of logistic, economic, social and also political challenges as well as experiences with Islamist terrorism – and which has also strengthened populist movements – has ensured that the discussion of cultural diversity has become a lot more heated. In various European countries, governments and societal groups have in the meantime taken harsh measures to limit diversity and suppress different opinions and values, alleging a need to protect their countries' supposed cultural homogeneity.

Yet pluralism is an essential core of democratic societies. Out of pluralism comes the responsibility not just to tolerate diversity, but to play an active part in shaping how people live together under culturally diverse conditions and, consequently, contribute to making this a success.

The conditions for successfully living together with diversity come from the normative foundations of liberal democratic societies. Its core is in the idea of a communal identity where citizens endowed with the same freedoms form a community that is politically self-determined. It is based on social and political participation, a sense of belonging and interaction. Specifically this means that the promise of liberal democracy is only given when all people – independently of their cultural identity – have the chance to participate in the prosperity of their society. Where they all can participate politically, feel part of their so-

ciety, cultivate trusting relationships and be in a lively exchange of views with each other. Clear strategies are required to achieve this goal of successfully living together in a state of cultural diversity.

These strategies need to be worked out and implemented on the basis of the normative and legal constitutions of modern liberal states. The foundations for different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups to live together peacefully in diverse societies are based on a free and democratic constitutional order. It is felt through the entire framework of the state, particularly through the principle of dignity for each individual and equal status, the commitment to universal human rights and the equality of each person before law. Last but not least it is felt through the requirement for non-discrimination, ensuring the free development of people's personalities and freedom of belief. Any laws and administrative guidelines need to have the effective practice of these basic rights as their objective.

This framework for a liberal state that is anchored in constitutional law forms the necessary, yet by no means adequate, basis for living together successfully in a state of cultural diversity. This is because the mentality and experience required for living together respectfully needs to be practiced through specific interactions and meetings on a day-to-day basis

A special strategic importance is now being attached to living together on a local basis. On the one hand, local governance is currently gaining in stature in the face of national governments' loss of control in the era of globalization. This generates a new necessity – but also an opportunity – for working out solutions to current challenges at a local level. We can already observe today how it is not national governments, but much more individual towns and cities, that are taking on a leading role in shaping diversity in our societies.

On the other hand particular importance is now attached to shaping diversity at a local level, as that is precisely where people meet on a day-to-day basis. This is the level where it can ultimately be determined whether the framework set out by the state is being used successfully. In the process, it is especially the urban contexts that come into view, as they are more strongly characterized by diversity than country regions. In practical terms, towns and cities are confronted with the challenges of living together in a state of diversity on a day-to-day basis. They may not be completely free in how they manage this, as local politics always remains embedded within the political framework conditions at state level. Yet some room to maneuver arises at a local level, which towns can use as a kind of "laboratory of diversity", for trying out and developing pragmatic and innovative solutions. This allows the development of a catalyst function which, in the long term, leads to mentalities and practices cultivated at urban levels having a reciprocal effect on the state as a whole as well as launching a corresponding development at that level.

The Bertelsmann Stiftung has dedicated itself to these town and city strategies in managing cultural diversity in the context of the 2018 Reinhard Mohn Prize. In a piece of international research into good practice, cities were identified where living together in a state of diversity is already successful today, where diversity is recognized and transformed into a strength. From these analyses and findings, eight recommendations for action can be derived for living together successfully in a state of diversity at a local level.

1.

First and foremost, cities clearly need to commit to the need for diversity as an integral part of urban society. They should take the opportunity to develop diversity as a positive feature of their town – and use this to strengthen the local identity and feeling of belonging. This commitment to diversity can, for example, be conveyed through awards, campaigns, placards or town celebrations.

2.

Furthermore towns need active drivers of successful diversity, who command respect and are seen as authorities. They act as role models, they encourage people and generate trust in the successful creation of

a diverse society. This is where the Mayor can play a decisive role. But it is also important to have a broader network of committed people in key positions. These could be teachers, youth workers, policemen and women, football trainers, theater producers or other "heroes" from civil society. The cross-cultural opening up of the municipal administration should also be promoted, as the administration has an important role model function as an employer and purchaser of services. The processes for recruiting personnel should be set out in such a way that the workforce is a reflection of the diversity of the residents. Cross-cultural aspects should also be taken into account in the guidelines for awarding public contracts.

3.

Diversity should also not be seen as an isolated issue that is separate from other urban management tasks, it should be kept in mind as a strategic issue that runs across the board in all areas of activity. This requires coordination and networking between the individual municipal management units as well as between the municipality and the people with central functions in society, who are practically involved in various areas of activity. This strategic and coordinated cooperation in the areas of youth work, schools and day nurseries, local business, housing and security forms the basis for acting effectively, where everyone is pulling in the same direction. It makes sense to set up an appropriate position to coordinate this within the municipal administration, to develop specific and verifiable objectives, define responsibilities and any successes as well as shortcomings in the implementation of the municipal strategy for developing diversity and making it clearly visible.

4.

Recognizing any special cultural features is important for living together successfully in a state of diversity. Different traditions and religions are associated with different customs. Towns and cities should actively recognize these as part of the statutory regulations that apply, to give all citizens a sense of sharing and belonging to their urban community. This could involve taking various burial rituals into account at the municipal cemeteries, or accepting religious head coverings in occupations or public service. For developing a shared identity and sense of belonging, however, there should also be a focus on the things that the townspeople have in common.

5.

Municipalities should also actively develop spaces for people to meet, both literally by making public areas available and figuratively by promoting communication and dialogue. The first option will happen by means of participative town planning that identifies shared interests as well as different needs, and creates a "place for everyone" – such as a youth center or a park – with the involvement of all parties concerned. Community centers, town libraries or sports facilities are also ideally suited for this. Professionally trained mediators and district managers – who support communication between residents with different cultural backgrounds and can mediate when misunderstandings or conflicts arise – are most helpful in this connection. Meetings in the second sense of the word can be promoted in the form of discussion forums, "buddy" and mentoring projects or municipal festivities and celebrations. Through communication and doing things together, personal relationships, trust and cooperation develops beyond any cultural boundaries. This should also actively counteract any excessive residential segregation. Districts that appropriately reflect the social and cultural mixture of the town are important in the long term for securing equal opportunity and cohesion of society and avoiding the development of parallel societies.

6.

Furthermore, all cities should deliberately create opportunities for people to contribute actively. When citizens actively participate socially with their own personal strengths and are able to make a contribution

that is valued and recognized by others, this strengthens that sense of belonging and creates an added value for everyone. The experience of making a difference through your own efforts and being able to help shape your own district, for example, creates a bond and a sense of responsibility for the living environment that you share with others. Such participative processes also increase acceptance of the achieved results, as various expectations and needs have been incorporated in the design process from the very beginning. On a formal political level this means that the diversity of the population is sufficiently well represented in the political institutions and bodies of the town. People with different cultural backgrounds having a say in parliaments and committees as well as involvement in round tables or other formats for exchanging views between politics and civil society ensures equality and prevents the development of misunderstandings, prejudices and rumors.

7.

In addition there is the aspect of attainment of equitable participation of all members of the society. As trust and openness towards others flourishes on the basis that the promise of equitable participation in essential social assets and services is realized in a convincing way. The sense of being discriminated against or systematically left behind only serves the development of frustration and envy and a subsequent search for scapegoats. That is why towns and cities should actively promote the fair participation of everyone in education, work, housing and infrastructure.

8.

Finally, for the long-term development of trusting relationships, it is fundamentally important that all citizens feel safe in public spaces. It is important here that security forces only concern themselves with activities that break the law in their work and do not let themselves be guided by any cultural stereotypes. Regular further education and training in dealing with a culturally diverse population should consequently be a fixed element of police work. Furthermore, the recruiting of police should be aimed at attracting people with different cultural backgrounds. This ensures greater equitable participation in relation to professions in the public service, brings cross-cultural capability to police work and makes a contribution towards developing trust in a diverse society as the normality. Beyond that, further trust and closeness to the citizens can be created with additional measures. An example of this are district police, who are always out and about in the same city district on foot or by bicycle and maintain good contact with the people there.

These recommendations for action do not need to remain limited to a local context, they also cannot be understood and implemented wholly independently from the overall state level. Any measures on a local level are dependent on being legitimized with reference to the overall given normative state legal framework. On this basis, by the same token, nothing in principle stands between a transfer of individual recommendations to the overall state level. A clear commitment to diversity as an integral part of a liberal society can, for example, also be formulated on a national level and establish itself as the way society as a whole sees itself, as shown quite clearly in an international comparison with Canada. So it is important to keep an eye on the connections and interdependencies between the different levels.

Against this background the recommendations relating to the political unit of the town can be understood as a tangible proposal for how we can live and breath diversity on a local level today in our own environment, how we can enable integration and shape our societies.

SPEECHES AND DOCUMENTS

THE POWER OF WORDS
IN THE BATTLE AGAINST HATE

OP-ED FOR THE CNN, 26TH JANUARY 2018

Moshe Kantor, president of the European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation and of the European Jewish Congress.

As a European Jewish leader who regularly calls out anti-Semitism, I am sadly all too familiar with those who dismiss verbal assaults on Jews or the Jewish people as mere rhetoric, some sort of misunderstanding or as the rants of unimportant extremists.

However, as a student of history, I know very well that when Jews are being openly attacked, violence can and frequently does follow.

Sadly, the Jewish people all too frequently have had bloody reminders about the power of words -- whether it was religious leaders in medieval times who roused their congregations to plow through Jewish quarters in a sacred frenzy or the continuous blood libels, which led to countless massacres and brutal expulsions.

Yet, many others do not recognize the distinct correlation between incitement and violence. In 1922, a New York Times article quoted "several reliable, well-informed sources" saying: "Hitler's anti-Semitism was not so genuine or violent as it sounded."

Of course, few, if any, could have predicted what was to befall European Jewry and others in the years to come. Nevertheless, one lesson we can learn, perhaps belatedly, is that when someone speaks about a people or group in vicious, dehumanizing and even genocidal terms, we must understand the power of their words.

"The power of words" is the theme of this year's International Holocaust Remembrance Day, marking 73 years since the **liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau** -- the largest Nazi concentration and death camp -- and it perhaps cannot come at a more crucial time.

Physical attacks on Jews in Europe are generally preceded by verbal attacks. Every person who has attacked Jews violently in the last few years has a clear record of receiving and disseminating violent anti-Semitic abuse, whether neo-Nazi or Islamist terrorist.

While hate speech and incitement is far too often dismissed as bigoted ranting or merely painful words, it can also serve as an important warning sign for much more severe consequences.

Almost every genocide, ethnic cleansing or inter-ethnic conflict in modern history was preceded by violent words. We witnessed inflammatory public speech rise steadily before outbreaks of mass violence, whether in Nazi Germany, Rwanda or in the former Yugoslavia.

What is also true of all of these instances is that the incitement and hate speech was widely known before the violence began -- yet it was largely ignored or dismissed.

While many will say that most extremists in Europe are peripheral and completely incapable of attaining any semblance of power, many more thought that of Hitler in the 1920s.

In fact, today, from Le Pen's National Front in France to Jobbik in Hungary, to Golden Dawn in Greece and the Freedom Party in Austria, anti-Semitism, anti-immigrant and xenophobic parties are on the march, literally and politically.

These parties are in almost every example rapidly increasing their support nationally and inching ever disturbingly closer to the hearts of mainstream disgruntled supporters who express disdain for the mainstream.

With this in mind, it is incumbent for Europeans to try to find a way to stop the hateful rhetoric of these parties and their leaders, while maintaining the values of our continent.

We cannot stand behind a complete and unfettered freedom of speech because lives are in danger, and other freedoms and rights are just as important. Dozens of researchers have found a clear correlation between xenophobic, racist and hateful speech, and violence, not just in the past, but also in the present.

Violence may be prevented, then, by interfering with this process in any of several ways: hindering the speech, restricting its dissemination, undermining the credibility and integrity of the speaker, or "inoculating" the audience against the speech so that it is less influential, or dangerous.

If, decades ago, incitement was delivered in city squares and on marches, today's invective is far more likely to be delivered online, ensuring that the message is multiplied and disseminated to untold millions. Hate speech and incitement online has a far more powerful and multiplying effect on social networks.

We must act against words that cause violence in ways similar to the way we would act against the violence itself. Just as we would stop a murder on its way to being carried out, we must see those who call for violence as part of the process that can far too frequently lead to injury or death.

We need to continue working with internet giants and social media companies to restrict speech that leads to violence and hate. We need greater education toward tolerance and understanding, and stronger legislation to act against incitement to violence and hate.

This is perhaps our greatest challenge. We must learn from the past to defend ourselves and our values in the present.

Our continent has produced some beautiful works of words, whether it is William Shakespeare, Albert Camus, Hans Christian Anderson or Leo Tolstoy.

However, there have also been Adolf Hitler and Slobodan Milošević, who used words to incite, harm and kill.

Words can make a difference to our lives and the future direction of our continent and societies, for good or bad.

When we say "Never Again!" we don't just mean the death and concentration camps, we also mean the language and rhetoric that led up to the genocide, millions inculcated with a hatred against Jews and others.

Words have power. Let's use them not to incite, vilify or divide, but to remember, educate, inspire and unite.

SPEECH BY THE EJC PRESIDENT MOSHE KANTOR AT THE 15th PLENARY ASSEMBLY OF THE WJC 24 APRIL 2017, NEW YORK

Ladies and gentlemen,

We are living in an age of contradictions and extremes.
Extreme poverty.
Extreme wealth.
Extreme happiness.
Extreme sadness.

Never before so many people had access to healthcare, clean water, education and jobs.

Yet more and more people are leaving their homes to build better lives elsewhere.

Never before have we seen such a fall in American and European standard of living and such a rise in Indian and Chinese standard of living.

Understanding the trends underlying the contradictions of our modern world is critical, because many of them pose a threat to the lives and peace of Jews everywhere. How can we counter or minimize them?

Let me start with what I see as the most important trends:

1.

Judeo-Christian civilization is no longer dominant, determining the course of world history. What is now remarkable is the extent to which China, India and the Muslim world have, over the past decades, become central to global affairs.

The world order is becoming polycentric - politically, economically and culturally. The consequence is that global governance based only on European or Western values is no longer possible in this world.

2.

The second but closely related trend I want to highlight is the evolution of globalisation, which has triggered a rise of neo-nationalism and isolationism.

Brexit is the first sign in the West. “Make America Great Again!” is the second.

One can easily detect similar slogans in the words of Viktor Orban, Shinzō Abe, Narendra Modi, Tayyip Erdogan and other leaders. The 2017 election campaigns in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Iran, South Korea and other countries are focusing on these ideas.

From the early 2000s, there has been a rise of political movements, which seek a return of power to the nation-state and away from the post-World War II international institutions – such as the European Union.

These movements, fuelled by the global recession of 2008 and rising poverty, infuse populism, racism and of course Antisemitism.

In this context, I agree with the English philosopher John Gray, who underlined the following contradiction in the twentieth's century, still accurate today, that intellectual and scientific values accumulate in the world, meaning that they pass on from generation to generation, unlike ethical values, which unfortunately do not have such a cumulative effect.

That is why each generation must learn these values on its own, because if it does not, there is always the possibility to be taught by new catastrophe.

This is true for the explosive nature of Antisemitism: everybody knows that the Shoah happened, but new generations are ethically uneducated. They are overloaded with information but lack ethical values.

In light of current economic dynamics, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde also noted right to the point, "Economic growth was too slow, for too long and for too few."

The GDP annual growth rate dramatically decreased in the U.S. and Europe.



In other words, the social contract, which worked well for the past fifty years, is no longer in place.

We, as citizens of the developed world, believed that every new generation would live better than the previous one. That children would live better than their parents. Is there really a better description of the concept of Jewish aspiration?

Unfortunately, this concept does not work anymore in the developed countries. But it is still valid in China and India.



The middle class – the pillar of social stability - is deteriorating. As a result, nearly one in four EU citizens, about 120 million people, are threatened with poverty or social exclusion.
So it is not surprising that even well-to-do European societies are dominated by fear rather than values - fear of poverty, fear of migrants, fear for their lives amid terrorist attacks.



There are indeed many things to fear. Threats are real and come from different horizons. The Jewish Street, together with the State of Israel, can play a major role in preventing those

threats, including the threat of nuclear terrorism, and we are strongly involved in this issue.

Ten years ago, on the EJC's initiative, the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe was founded. The Forum has brought together the world's leading experts in nuclear non-proliferation. Currently, the Forum is the most influential organization on this issue. I would like to stress the importance of promoting a strong coalition between the U.S., EU and Russia to fight together the threat of terror and nuclear proliferation. Israel and world Jewry will benefit most from this process.

Dear Friends, I have outlined the trends shaping our world. I now want to turn to the effect on us, Jews.

As a result of the trends I mentioned, across the political spectrum, both in Europe and in the United States, we are witnessing strange and sometimes dangerous coalitions.
Some of these coalitions make Antisemitism part of their political message. Radicals from all sides remove taboos – Antisemitism becomes trivial, routine and a part of the so-called new normality. And when we complain, extremists on the right and left tell Jews that we are "weaponising" Anti-semitism.

This is a new form of a very old Antisemitism. Jews are perpetrators while anti-Semites are victims.

Most of the people at this gathering are products of the post-1989 world, meaning that we spent most of our adult years in a period dominated by the spread of democracy and the absence of a global threat of war. This period has been almost ideal for all Jews (and not only in the Western World).

However, the prosperous and flourishing Jewish Street of that time does not exist anymore. In many parts of the world of the 21st century, the terror threat and violent Antisemitism forced us, Jews, to isolate ourselves and even to flee from some European countries.



And let's face it, no Jewish community, anywhere in the world, however strong and organised, is now immune from Jew hatred.

The findings of the annual report on Antisemitism worldwide issued yesterday by the Kantor Centre at Tel Aviv University make that clear and I recommend it to you.

While the number of anti-Semitic incidents, especially violent ones, has decreased worldwide in 2016, the enemies of the Jewish people have found new avenues to express their Antisemitism - with significant increase of hate online and against less protected targets like cemeteries.



We see from the statistics a decrease in the number of anti-Semitic incidents, especially violent attacks, mostly in countries with large Jewish population. In 2016, incidents of anti-Semitic violence fell by 12%.

A significant fall was noted in France, where the government outlined a 61% decrease in all forms of Antisemitism in 2016.

Among the reasons for the decrease in the number of violent anti-Semitic incidents is the visibility of improved security measures to protect European populations, as well as Jewish areas and institutions.

These positive results, however, are counter-balanced by a sharp increase in anti-Semitic incidents in English-speaking countries, which have historically been more welcoming for Jews.

The UK saw an increase of 11% during 2016.

In Australia the rate of increase was 10%.

However, most significantly, there was an alarming rise of 45% in anti-Semitic incidents in the United States, mostly on university campuses, where Jewish students are facing hate and intolerance.



We also see increasing cases of verbal and virtual Antisemitism - online and on social networks.

Finally, I would like to stress the direct correlation that exists between the number of anti-Semitic attacks worldwide and the decrease in standard of living and rising poverty in the top migrant sending countries. The common conclusion – the Antisemitism crisis has nothing to do with the Jewish street, but is a result of general negative trends.



To raise awareness about these challenges, the EJC has created a large network within the European institutions.

We speak to heads of state, ministers, commissioners and members of the European Parliament on a constant and ongoing basis.

Let me now turn directly to security.

The security of our communities is a vital issue and we need courageous leadership to fight for Jewish interests and not accept a situation where Jewish security is neglected by governments. Since 2012, the EJC launched the SACC programme, a major effort to enhance the security of our communities.

In five years, we have dramatically improved crisis management, opened a new office with a control room in Vienna and activated a very sophisticated application, which has been distributed to more than 30 communities in Europe.

Thanks to this application, all Jews in Europe can have on their smartphones a panic button, which will inform local police and our control room of their location and in some cases of the nature of their problem. This system could be extended up to 5 million people.

My security specialists have told me not to discuss further details in public. But let me tell you how proud I am that in this area we have seen dramatic progress.

I would like to conclude by raising an important issue concerning the relations between WJC and its European affiliate, the EJC. We had very interesting and very nice talk with Ronald yesterday about this and I believe we found all common points how to manage all this. But I want to say few words about this. We have only one complaint to the World Jewish Congress, the frequent duplication of EJC programmes in Europe, especially concerning our SACC programme where such duplication can impede its professional and operational capacities.

This harms the EJC, wastes our resources and confuses our partners across Europe. This must be stopped. Instead, we must focus our efforts and funds on existential issues faced by Jewish communities.

The Policy Council of the World Jewish Congress must clearly define the goals that we want to achieve and mobilize all our communities to reach these goals together.

For example, 70 years after Shoah was stopped, we still do not have the UN definition of Antisemitism. And maybe Mr. Guterres can succeed in this direction, but at least we have to have common understanding and definition of Antisemitism on the level of the OSCE. Let's unify our efforts in this direction.

I hope that after this Plenary Assembly, the Governing Board will form the Policy Council by electing its members according to the bylaws of the WJC.

Dear Friends,

I would like to conclude with words of Duke Leo Tolstoy who wrote more than a century ago something very touching:

> "What is the Jew?...What kind of unique creature is this whom all the rulers of all the nations of the world have disgraced and crushed and expelled and destroyed; persecuted, burned and drowned, and who, despite their anger and their fury, continues to live and to flourish. The Jew - is the symbol of eternity. ... He is the one who for so long had guarded the prophetic message and transmitted it to all mankind. A people such as this can never disappear. The Jew is eternal. He is the embodiment of eternity."

Exactly for these words and his position Duke Tolstoy was expelled from the Orthodox Russian Church. And I was crying with tears of appreciation when I read it for the first time.

This positive perspective gives us hope. We continuously proved to the world that we Jews are resilient, generous and tolerant, well-known for our love, for life and solidarity.

Unity is our strength, and this is what we need to strive for. Let's come together as "one person, with one heart". "Ke-Ish Echad, Be-Lev Echad".

Thank you.

WORLD MUST ACT ON ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

Tony Blair, ECTR Board Chairman and former Prime Minister of the UK

To defeat Islamist extremism we need to come to a common agreement, with a clear perspective, on what is the cause of this global threat.

Groups like ISIS and al Qaeda are the latest manifestation of a dangerous strain of totalitarian thinking that rejects and subordinates all universal norms and values to a single, violent, all-encompassing dogma. The groups are driven by a transnational religious-political ideology and a belief in violent jihad to enforce a return to a perceived Islam of the seventh century.

Their threat is based on a perversion of religion that gives its followers the certainty of being "the best" believers and justifying violence against "the rest" -- no surprise, then, that they mostly kill other Muslims.

Their ambition is the total annihilation of those people, institutions, and governments who don't agree with them.

But the battlefield isn't just in the Middle East or Sub-Saharan Africa. The long-range war is for hearts and minds: a sustained battle of ideas.

Security measures are vital. But you can't arrest an idea.

The movement's leaders and ideologues are often highly educated. They have the ability to radicalize and recruit with alarming speed on and offline.

If we can understand, discredit and disrupt their ideology, then we can undermine the very foundations on which this global movement is built.

A new global poll out this week from the Center for Strategic and International Studies has shown the vast majority of people around the world support doing just that. It is a widely shared belief that the threat of violent extremism is caused primarily by religious extremism -- above racism, poverty, military actions by foreign governments and human rights abuses. The polling shows that both people who identify as religious, and those who don't, believe the problem lies with religious ideology.

This is significant and a real opportunity. It is up to governments, civil society groups and others to use this support to develop a unified, global response.

We need a new global alliance, within Islam and outside of it, to lead this movement against extremism. Muslim motivation lies in a desire to help reclaim their peaceful religion from the fanatics who abuse it. They are the first victims and are on the frontline battling extremism.

This is not a war with Islam. To accept that is to accept the terms set out by ISIS, al Qaeda and some of the far-right of Western politics. We must expose the lie that "the West" is at war with Islam. The West is home to millions of Muslims.

But whilst the overwhelming number of people in Muslim majority countries believe that ISIS and others aren't true to the real faith of Islam, we need to face up to some uncomfortable truths. There is a set of wider attitudes held within tiers of Islamic societies that are a real problem.

Many polls still find in some majority Muslim countries an unfavorable attitude toward Jews. And a 2012 survey found five countries in the Middle East and North Africa in which over 40 per cent of respondents believed that Shia were not Muslims.

If people are brought up within a society that dislikes Jews or considers millions of Muslims to be apostates, inevitably that prejudice fertilizes the soil within which extremism can grow. Unless we can successfully counter religious prejudice within Muslim communities, extremists will use this bias to gain a foothold.

Recent steps by some in Pakistan to bolster blasphemy laws -- limiting freedom of those who are not Muslims -- are contrary to the views of many in the Muslim world. The majority of people in Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia and India believe that politics, government and religion should all be separate. According to this new survey, 67 per cent of people across the globe agree with them.

Seventy-three per cent of people, including those in the Muslim world, think that violent extremism is a solvable problem. Where we need to get to is an acceptance that prejudice against Jews, minorities, women, and any who disagree with radicals is itself the nature of the problem, and needs to be addressed. There is a clear need for leaders -- East and West -- to understand this and to act on it.

Any global response has to mobilize at every level.

My think tank, the Centre on Religion and Geopolitics, recently studied online extremism and found that 91 per cent of the counter arguments against extremism online are Muslim-led.

What's more, this latest poll found 90 per cent of people across the world feel that Muslim voices are the most effective at dismantling and countering extremism. Their efforts must be supported by all of us. ISIS had a foothold in Dabiq in Syria. With coalition support, Muslim Syrians have liberated that town and with it, the end-of-times apocalypse narrative that ISIS peddled to recruit thousands.

This is everyone's fight and we must see it as such.

This includes political leaders. On the left, it requires a move away from isolationism and a rediscovering of historic principles of internationalism. Most people across the globe agree that this threat has not been caused by Western foreign policy; only 12 per cent of people around the world cite it as the primary cause.

Left-leaning political leaders have to understand that whatever their criticisms of foreign policy, this is not the cause of the challenge. This means that we should stand ready to support actively those in the Middle East and elsewhere fighting this extremism and do so in alliance with them.

On the right, politicians have to appreciate that this isn't a fight against Islam but a fight against a perversion of Islam.

We have to defeat the narrative that underpins the ideology. Jihadists are flexible. Where they can't find something recent to justify their violence, they go back into history. ISIS has declared Spain an enemy target because they toppled the caliphate of the time in 1492.

When we allow the fanatics to define the debate, they win the battle of ideas.

The overwhelming majority of people around the world now believe that this is our generation's defining battle. They want to seize the moment.

This has to be understood and acted upon. The public is crying out for a response from world leaders that is comprehensive and strategic. And this is urgent. The time to act is now.

RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE, NOT IDEOLOGY, WILL FUEL THIS CENTURY'S EPIC BATTLES

Tony Blair, ECTR Board Chairman and former Prime Minister of the UK

The last weeks have seen a ghastly roll call of terror attacks in the obvious places: Syria, Libya, Iraq and Lebanon, as well as Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia and Pakistan. Also suffering are places where we have only in recent years seen such violence: Nigeria, and in many parts of central Africa, in Russia and across central Asia, and in Burma, Thailand and the Philippines. We can either see all of these acts of killing as separate – produced by various political contexts – or we can start to see the clear common theme and start to produce a genuine global strategy to deal with it.

The fact is that, though of course there are individual grievances or reasons for the violence in each country, there is one thing self-evidently in common: the acts of terrorism are perpetrated by people motivated by an abuse of religion. It is a perversion of faith. But there is no doubt that those who commit the violence often do so by reference to their faith and the sectarian nature of the conflict is a sectarianism based on religion. There is no doubt either that this phenomenon is growing, not abating.

We have to be prepared to take the security measures necessary for our immediate protection. Since 9/11, the cost of those measures, and their burden, has been huge. However, security action alone, even military action, will not deal with the root cause. This extremism comes from a source. It is not innate. It is taught. It is taught sometimes in the formal education system; sometimes in the informal religious schools; sometimes in places of worship and it is promoted by a vast network of internet communications.

Technology, so much the harbinger of opportunity, can also be used by those who want to disseminate lessons of hate and division. Today's world is connected as never before. This has seen enormous advances. It means there is a kind of global conversation being conducted. This is exciting and often liberating. But it comes with the inevitable ability for those who want to get across a message that is extreme to do so. This has to be countered.

At present, our screens are dominated by the hideous slaughter in Syria. We have to hope that the peace negotiations succeed. But with more than 130,000 dead – and, on some accounts, the total is nearer 200,000 – millions displaced and the country in a state of disintegration, it is hard to see how there can be a lasting agreement for peace unless it is based on a clear recognition that the Syria arising from this has to be one in which all people are treated equally, regardless of which faith they practise or which part within a faith they belong to. That will never work while either a minority religious group rules the country whose majority has a different adherence, or where those fighting the regime have powerful elements that also want to rule on the basis of religious difference – and are prepared to use terrorism to get their way.

This is not just a matter of what any new constitution says. Democracy is not only a way of voting. It is a way of thinking. People have to feel equal, not just be regarded by the law as such. Such religious tolerance has to be taught and argued for. Those who oppose it have to be taken on and defeated not only by arms but by ideas.

All over the region, and including in Iraq, where exactly the same sectarianism threatens the right of the people to a democratic future, such a campaign has to be actively waged. It is one reason why the

Middle East matters so much and why any attempt to disengage is so wrong and short-sighted. It is here in the centre of Islam that so many of the issues around how religion and politics coexist peacefully will be determined.

But this issue of extremism is not limited to Islam. There are also many examples the world over where Muslims are the victims of religiously motivated violence from those of other religious faiths.

So the challenge is clear. And it is one that could define the nature of peace and conflict in the first half of the 21st century. The battles of this century are less likely to be the product of extreme political ideology – like those of the 20th century – but they could easily be fought around the questions of cultural or religious difference.

The answer is to promote views that are open-minded and tolerant towards those who are different, and to fight the formal, informal and internet propagation of closed-minded intolerance. In the 21st century, education is a security issue.

For that reason, when I left office, and in part based on my experience post-9/11 of how countries whose people were freed from dictatorship have then had democratic aspirations thwarted by religious extremism, I established a foundation whose aim is to promote greater knowledge and understanding between people of different faiths. This is not a call to faith – it is a call to respect those of all faiths and not to allow faith to divide us but instead to embody the true values of compassion and humanity common to all faiths.

The foundation is now active in more than 20 countries, including some of those most affected by sectarianism, with a multimillion-pound budget, full-time and part-time staff, and expanding rapidly. We focus on practical programmes. The schools programme, accredited to the international GCSE and recognised by the international baccalaureate, uses video conferencing and online interaction to link classes of students from different countries across the world to learn about each other and to learn to live with each other.

There is a university programme, which we are building into a minor degree course, that began at Yale but is now in more than 20 universities, including in China and Latin America, where students study faith and globalisation – essentially the place of religion in modern society. And an action programme, pioneered in Sierra Leone but now being extended, where we help deliver the anti-malaria campaign of the UN by using the faith infrastructure of the churches and the mosques.

Later this year, in collaboration with Harvard Divinity School, we will launch a new website that will provide up-to-date analysis of what is happening in the field of religion and conflict; in-depth analysis of religion and its impact on countries where this is a major challenge; and basic facts about the religious make-up and trends in every country worldwide.

Evidently, we can reach only parts of the world and be a small part of fighting a huge problem. But the purpose is to change the policy of governments: to start to treat this issue of religious extremism as an issue that is about religion as well as politics, to go to the roots of where a false view of religion is being promulgated, and to make it a major item on the agenda of world leaders to combine effectively to combat it. This is a struggle that is only just beginning.

A EUROPEAN MODEL LAW FOR THE PROMOTION OF TOLERANCE AND THE SUPPRESSION OF INTOLERANCE

SUBMITTED WITH A VIEW TO BEING ENACTED BY THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURES OF EUROPEAN STATES

PREAMBLE

The purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for the promotion of tolerance and the suppression of intolerance in European societies.

The assumptions underlying this Law are:

(a) Respect for human dignity is the basis of observance of human rights.

> **Explanatory Note:**
> As the European Committee on Social Rights pronounced, human dignity is the fundamental value and indeed the core of human rights law (International Federation for Human Rights v. France, 2004).

(b) Without pluralism and tolerance there is no democratic society.

> **Explanatory Notes:**
> (i) The words in (b) are those of the European Court of Human Rights (Handyside Judgment, 1976).
> (ii) Tolerance must be seen as the glue that enables a pluralistic democratic society to function successfully.

(c) The concept of tolerance is incompatible with any form of unlawful discrimination.

(d) Tolerance is derived from recognition of the inherent right of every person to be different within a pluralistic society.

(e) Tolerance postulates an open mind to unfamiliar ideas and ways of life.

(f) The fabric of democratic society is enriched and strengthened by cooperation of diverse groups and peaceful coexistence.

* Explanatory notes must be viewed as an authentic interpretation of the text of the Model Law.

(g) Cooperation and coexistence within a democratic society require that individuals and groups make mutual concessions to each other.

(h) Integration within society does not mean assimilation.

(i) Diversity should not affect the fundamental identity - or the shared values, history and aspirations - of society.

(j) Respect for the distinctive characteristics of diverse groups should not weaken the common bonds of responsible citizenship within a democratic and open society.

Explanatory Note:
Every European society has its own shared values, history, and aspirations, yet all European societies share certain democratic values and goals.

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Law:

(a) "Group" means: a number of people characterized by national, racial or ethnic origin or descent, cultural roots, religious affiliation, linguistic links, gender identity or sexual orientation.

Explanatory Notes:
(i) There are many groups within a diverse society. The question is which ones must be protected for the purposes of the promotion of tolerance. The irreducible traditional minimum relates to national, racial, ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic groups. But modern developments militate in favour of the inclusion of groups based on sexual or gender identity,
(ii) Determination of criteria of belonging to a particular traditional group is primarily made by the group itself ("self-determination").
(iii) When statutory restrictions – relevant to criteria of belonging to a group - are enacted, they have to be reasonable and objective (see the Human Rights Committee's view in the matter of Lovelace v. Canada, 1981).
(iv) An individual cannot force himself/herself on a traditional group, but every individual is entitled to withdraw from any group.
(v) It is not proposed to go here into the complex question whether group rights are collective rights of the group as such or individual rights of the members of the group.

(b) "Group libel" means: defamatory comments made in public and aimed against a group as defined in Paragraph (a) – or members thereof – and intended to incite to violence, maliciously vilify the group, express contempt for it or subject it to false charges.

Explanatory Notes:
(i) This definition covers "blood libels" and anti-Semitic slurs, as well as allegations that, e.g., "all gypsies are thieves" or "all Moslems are terrorists".
(ii) Obviously, group libel does not consist of mere pejorative or even abusive language about a group. A malicious intent to defame the group is of critical importance.
(iii) The European Court of Human Rights held that freedom of expression covered the publication of an academic research book - not driven by a racist intent - according to which most gypsies in Ankara were earning their living from stealing, begging, door-to-door selling and fortune-telling (Aksu v. Turkey Judgment, 2012).
(iv) It must be understood that the group libel may appear to be aimed at members of the victim group in a different time (another historical era) or place (beyond the borders of the State).

(c) "Hate crimes" means: any criminal act however defined, whether committed against persons or property, where the victims or targets are intentionally selected because of their real or perceived connection with - or support or membership of - a group as defined in Paragraph (a).

Explanatory Note:
The need to suppress hate crimes is generally recognized in Europe today. Yet, there is no common definition of hate crimes. It is submitted that the definition must be comprehensive as stated here.

(d) "Tolerance" means: respect for the human rights of others, as well as acceptance of the peculiarities of the distinct identity of a group as defined in Paragraph (a).

Explanatory Notes:
(i) Tolerance means both respect (as an active term) and acceptance (as a passive term)
(ii) Coexistence of diverse groups within a pluralistic society requires, inter alia, some knowledge of local language as a means of communication with authorities and the social environment.
(iii) Tolerance is designed to include. But it also excludes intolerance as set out in Section 2(d)-(e).

SECTION 2.
PURPOSE

The purpose of this Law is to:

(a) Promote tolerance within a pluralistic society without weakening its common bonds.

(b) Foster tolerance between different groups.

(c) Condemn all manifestations of intolerance based on bias, bigotry and prejudice.

(d) Suppress intolerance, in particular with a view to eliminating racism, colour bias, ethnic discrimination, religious intolerance, totalitarian ideologies, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, Negrophobia, anti-feminism and homophobia.

Explanatory Notes:
(i) This formulation does not go into detail within the subsets listed. Thus, religious intolerance is understood to cover Islamophobia, anti-Catholicism, etc. Ethnic discrimination is understood to cover, e.g., anti-Roma activities.
(ii)Anti-Semitism is listed as a separate subset since it crosses the lines of various subsets. It is certainly not confined to religious intolerance (conversion did not save Jews from extermination under the Nazis).

(e) Suppress group libel and hate crimes as defined in Section 1(b)-(c).

Explanatory Notes:
(i) It is due to the need to preserve tolerance that a pluralistic society must show zero tolerance for hate crimes.
(ii) Hate speech is an illustration of hate crimes. In the words of the European Court of Human Rights, it is sometimes necessary to prevent "forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance" (Erbakan v. Turkey Judgment, 2006).
(iii) As for group libel, the European Court of Human Rights explicitly allowed interference with freedom of expression to prevent defamatory statements intended to incite racial hatred Garaudy v. France Judgment, 2003).
(iv) The European approach to this issue is admittedly different from the American approach.

SECTION 3.
EXERCISE OF RIGHTS

The Government must take concrete action to:

(a) Respect the preservation and development of the distinct identity of all groups as defined in Section 1(a);

(b) Suppress intolerance in line with Section 2(d)-(e).

(c) Foster tolerance in the relations between members of all groups

Explanatory Notes:
(i) The exercise of tolerance must be understood not only as a vertical relationship (Government-to-individuals) but also as a horizontal relationship (group-to-group and person-to-person).
(ii) What this means, first of all, is that the Government must do its utmost to ensure respect for all groups and suppress intolerance by State organs. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the termination of employment of a teacher in a public school who preached anti-Semitism (Ross v. New Brunswick Judgment, 1996). Of course, the special nature of teaching, as compared to other vocations (including research), must be fully perceived. Preaching anti-Semitism by teachers cannot be condoned even in private schools.
(iii) The obligations of the Government in this field are basically obligations of conduct (relating to best efforts) rather than obligations of result.
(iv) Tolerance must be practiced not only by governmental bodies but equally by individuals, including members of one group vis-à-vis another. This is in keeping with the general human rights law obligation not to infringe upon the rights and freedoms of others.
(v) That is to say, tolerance must be reciprocal. Members of a group who wish to benefit from tolerance must show it to (aa) society at large; (bb) members of other groups; and also (cc) dissidents within their own group.

SECTION 4.
LIMITATIONS

(a) There is no need to be tolerant to the intolerant.

Explanatory Note:
As pronounced by the European Court of Human Rights, individuals or groups with totalitarian aims can be prevented from exploiting in their own interests the principles of human rights (Norwood v. UK Judgment, 2004).

(b) Tolerance must not be used as a means for condoning terrorism or as a cover for those seeking to subvert domestic or international peace and security.

(c) Tolerance does not mean that a whole group can completely segregate itself from society as a whole, repudiating the need to interface with other groups.

Explanatory Note
The limitation regarding segregation relates to a whole group. It does not relate to specific communities such as monasteries.

(d) Tolerance is subject to other reasonable limitations in conformity with human rights law.

Explanatory Notes:
Examples:
(i) Freedom of expression may be restricted - for the protection of tolerance - in accordance with the provisions of Article 10(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
(ii) Tolerance does not denote acceptance of such practices as female circumcision, forced marriage, polygamy or any form of exploitation or domination of women.
(iii) The European Court of Human Rights dismissed a challenge against a legal ban of wearing clothing designed to conceal the face, in public places, is permissible even as regards women who wish to wear a full-face veil for reasons related to their religion (S.A.S. v. France Judgment, 2014).
(iv) City planning and zoning rules may override an attempt to build a place of worship on a particular site.

SECTION 5.
MIGRANTS

(a) Tolerance (as defined in Section 1(d)) must be guaranteed to any group (as defined in Section 1(a)), whether it has long-standing societal roots or it is recently formed.

(b) Foreign migrants, for their part, have to adhere to the principle of coexistence of diverse groups within a pluralistic society.

(c) If a foreign migrant - who has been admitted into the territory of the State but has not acquired citizenship – is clearly unwilling to comply with the principle of coexistence of diverse groups within a single national society, he or she may be obliged to leave the State (subject to applicable international legal standards).

(d) This Section is without prejudice to the obligation of non-refoulement of refugees in conformity with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Explanatory Notes:
(i) Under Article 3 of Protocol 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, "No one shall be expelled ... from the territory of the State of which he is a national". Obviously, once a new migrant has acquired nationality, Paragraph (c) is no longer applicable.
(ii) Even with non-nationals, it is necessary to bear in mind that, under Article 4 of the same Protocol, "collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited". The decision whether a new migrant has forfeited the right to remain within the State must therefore be made on an individual basis through an appropriate judicial or quasi-judicial procedure.
(iii) The right to expel migrant workers who "offend against public interest or morality" is explicitly expressed in Article 19(8) of the European Social Charter.
(iv) The question whether a foreign migrant is clearly unwilling to comply with the principle of coexistence of diverse groups within a pluralistic society is an issue of fact, which has to be determined by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority.
(v) Upon admission to the State, foreign migrants may be required to sign a statement in which they confirm that they are aware of the provision included in Paragraph (c).
(vi) The issues have to be explained to a foreign migrant in a language that he or she understands.

SECTION 6.
IMPLEMENTATION

To ensure implementation of this Law, the Government shall:

Explanatory Note:
It goes without saying that enactment of a Law does not suffice by itself. There must be a mechanism in place ensuring that the Law does not remain on paper and is actually implemented in the world of reality.

(a) Be responsible for the special protection of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.

Explanatory Notes:
(i) Members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are entitled to a special protection, additional to the general protection that has to be provided by the Government to every person within the State.
(ii) The special protection afforded to members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups may imply a preferential treatment. Strictly speaking, this preferential treatment goes beyond mere respect and acceptance lying at the root of tolerance (see the definition of tolerance in Section 1(d)). Still, the present provision is justified by the linkage between historical intolerance and vulnerability.
(iii) The answer to the question which group is vulnerable or disadvantaged in a particular society varies from one country to another.

(b) If necessary, set up a special administrative unit in order to supervise the implementation of this Law.

Explanatory Notes:
(i) The implementation of this provision depends on the existing structure in any given State. In any country which has already set up an administrative body vested with general competence to supervise laws such as the present Law, no further action has to be taken. However, where no such body exists, it has to be set up.
(ii) The special administrative unit should preferably operate within the Ministry of Justice (although the Ministry of the Interior is another reasonable possibility).

(c) Establish a National Tolerance Monitoring Commission as an independent body – composed of eminent persons from outside the civil service – vested with the authority to promote tolerance. The Commission will be empowered to:

(i) Issue general guidelines and specific recommendations for action.
(ii) Express views regarding the degree to which this law is implemented in practice.
(iii) Disseminate such guidelines, recommendations and views through the mass media and otherwise.
(iv) Foster international cooperation with similar bodies in other States.

Explanatory Notes:
(i) The thrust of Paragraphs (b) and (c) is the existence of two national bodies entrusted with the implementation of the present Law. The first body (referred to in Paragraph (b)) is a governmental department. The second body (established under Paragraph (c)) is external to the Government, acting independently (not unlike a special Ombudsman).
(ii) The independent Commission will be empowered to express its views regarding implementation of the Law by all concerned. Implementation in this context includes (but is not limited to) the imposition of penal sanctions, education and mass media coverage.
(iii) The independent Commission will also be empowered to organize national or international conferences, workshop0s, seminars, etc.
(iv) The powers and responsibilities of the National Tolerance Monitoring Commission may be assigned to an independent human rights commission which already exists.
(v) The National Tolerance Monitoring Commission may be subjected to the jurisdiction of an administrative court or tribunal.

SECTION 7.
PENAL SANCTIONS

(a) The following acts will be regarded as criminal offences punishable as aggravated crimes:

Explanatory Notes:
(i) This Sub-Section is without prejudice to any existing legislation on the same subject-matters.
(ii) The degree of punishment of these aggravated crimes is left to the discretion of the court in accordance with the circumstances of the case.

(i) Hate crimes as defined in Section 1(c).
(ii) Incitement to violence against a group as defined in Section 1(a).
(iii) Group libel as defined in Section 1(b).
(iv) Overt approval of a totalitarian ideology, xenophobia or anti-Semitism.
(v) Public approval or denial of the Holocaust.

Explanatory Note:
The European Court of Human Rights expressly held that the Holocaust is a clearly established historical fact the denial of which is removed from the protection of freedom of expression (Lehideux and Isorni v. France Judgment, 1998).

(vi) Public approval or denial of any other act of genocide the existence of which has been determined by an international criminal court or tribunal.
Explanatory Note:

(i) The European Court of Human Rights (in the Perin□ek case of 2013) drew a distinction between the historical facts of the Holocaust (e.g. the existence of the gas chambers) - confirmed by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg - and historical facts that are in controversy (such as the Armenian genocide of 1915).

(ii) Accordingly, sub-paragraph (vi) does not affect public (or private) discussions and differences of opinion as to whether acts not covered by decisions of international courts or tribunals amount to genocide.

(b) Juveniles convicted of committing crimes listed in paragraph (a) will be required to undergo a rehabilitation programme conducive to a culture of tolerance.

(c) Crimes listed in paragraph (a) will not be considered political offences for purposes of extradition.

(d) Victims of crimes listed in paragraph (a) will have a legal standing to bring a case against the perpetrators, as well as a right to redress.

(e) Free legal aid will be offered to victims of crimes listed in paragraph (a), irrespective of qualification in terms of impecuniosity.

SECTION 8.
EDUCATION

The Government shall ensure that:

(a) Schools, from the primary level upwards, shall introduce courses encouraging students to accept diversity and promoting a climate of tolerance as regards the qualities and cultures of others.

> **Explanatory Notes:**
> (i) The principle has been accepted for many years (cf. the Declaration Regarding Intolerance – A Threat to Democracy, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 14 May 1981).
> (ii) It is very important to start such courses as early as possible in the educational programme, i.e. in elementary school. Yet, these courses must be offered also at higher levels of education, up to and including universities.

(b) Similar courses shall be incorporated in the training of those serving in the military and law enforcement agencies.

(c) Training and tolerance awareness courses shall be made available to different strata of society, with an emphasis on professional groups.

> **Explanatory Notes:**
> (i) Training must be made available as part of continuing adult education.
> (ii) It is especially important to ensure advanced professional training of lawyers (including judges and criminal justice personnel), administrators, police officers, doctors, etc.

(d) Teaching materials for tolerance awareness courses (including syllabi) will be developed by Departments of Education to meet the needs.
(e) Instructors will be trained in a manner qualifying them to train others in tolerance awareness courses.
(f) Departments of Education shall ensure that teaching materials in ordinary courses will be free of any innuendos and slights directed against any group as defined in Section 1(a).
(g) The production of books, plays, newspapers reports, magazine articles, films and television programmes – promoting a climate of tolerance – shall be encouraged and, where necessary, subsidized by the Government.

SECTION 9.
MASS MEDIA

(a) The Government shall encourage public broadcasting (television and radio) stations will devote a prescribed percentage of their programmes to promoting a climate of tolerance, as per Section 8(f).
(b) The Government shall encourage all privately owned mass media (including the printed press) to promote a climate of tolerance, as per Section 8(f).
(c) The Government shall encourage all the mass media (public as well as private) to adopt an ethical code of conduct, which will prevent the spreading of intolerance and will be supervised by a mass media complaints commission.

Explanatory Notes:
(i) This is a delicate matter, inasmuch as there is no intention to censor news coverage by the mass media. All the same, it must be borne in mind that expression of opinions in the mass media must not consist of group libel or hate speech (see Section 1(b)-(c)).
(ii) The mass media complaints commission is supposed to consist of independent persons, but it has to be set up by – and report to - the media themselves, rather than the Government.

SECTION 10.
THE INTERNET

The Government shall take action against the propagation of group libel or hate crimes (as defined in Section 1(b)-(c)) in the Internet.

Explanatory Notes:
(i) The Internet is a commonly used tool for spreading hate speech.
(ii) The obligation to delete certain data from the Internet was approved by the European Court of Justice in the Google Judgment of 2014. It is believed that this case paves the way for the suppression of Internet publications that propagate hate crimes or group libel.

This text was prepared – under the aegis of the European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation – by a Group of Experts composed of Yoram Dinstein (Chair), Ugo Genesio, Rein Müllerson, Daniel Thürer, Rüdiger Wolfrum and Ireneusz Bil (Secretary).
The text has been revised in light of the conclusions of a conference on Tolerance and the Law convened in Heidelberg in February 2015.

PRAGUE DECLARATION
ON COMBATING ANTI-SEMITISM AND HATE CRIMES

Prague, 27th January 2015

We, the Roundtable of Speakers of Parliament gathered here today in Prague for the 70th commemoration ceremony of the Holocaust, express our grave concern about the rise in verbal, digital and physical manifestations of Anti-Semitism and hate crimes predominately in Europe and worldwide directed toward Jewish individuals and communities, institutions and religious facilities.

Anti-Semitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity and is often used to blame them for "why things go wrong." It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms, social networks, demonstrations and actions. Anti-Semitism employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits. Contemporary examples of Anti-Semitism in public life include the distortion or denial of the Holocaust with the intention of hurting Jews around the world and the State of Israel.

Indeed, many Jews experience an inability to express themselves in public as Jews without fearing verbal or bodily harm. These experiences are supported by findings of researches recently undertaken by respectable international NGO'S and intergovernmental bodies such as the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (2013).

As heads of Parliaments we wish to make it clear that Anti-Semitism, as well as other hate crimes constitute problems for every society in which they are allowed to manifest. History teaches us that for evil to prevail over good, it is enough that decent people remain indifferent, silent and complacent while the immoral and hateful few gain power. This is why it is imperative that parliaments, governments, international organizations and civil societies around the world adopt a "Zero-Tolerance" policy towards these phenomena.

We believe this can be achieved through threefold approach; education, legislation and enforcement of laws against hate crimes.

The Roundtable recommends therefore the establishment of an inter-parliamentarian Working Group to draft legal proposals strengthening tolerance and combating various forms of hatred and incitement to hatred in the spirit of this Declaration.

The President of the European Parliament is invited to make a call for such a meeting.

AZIMUTH MAP

Twenty Steps to Counteract Threats of Radical Islam, Neo-Nazism and Anti-Semitism in Europe

The Fourth International "LET MY PEOPLE LIVE!" Forum International Holocaust Remembrance Day – 70th Anniversary

World War II demonstrated the suicidal absurdity of nationalist rivalry, brought to extreme forms by totalitarian ideologies, which resulted in human losses, destruction and horrendous scale of genocide. Drawing the lessons from this unprecedented tragedy, European civilisation made a historic choice in favour of unity and integration, which served as a foundation for the European Union (EU). The endeavour of political leaders of post-war Europe created the unique system of European democratic legislative institutions and moral values - human rights, protection of ethnic and religious minorities, individual freedom, and tolerance.

However, as history has demonstrated, there are no final and eternal solutions. Social and technological developments create new challenges and threats and transform former virtues into sources of new tensions, hostility and violence. If the civilised world fails to react to such changes in order to preserve its basic institutions and values, it may plunge into chaos and eventually lose fundamentals of its prosperity.

Nationalism in any form is the biggest threat to stability and prosperity in Europe and the world at large. Anna Lindh, the famous Swedish politician, whose professional life was aimed at fighting the causes of violence, and who was murdered by an extremist in 2003, first coined the notion of "a culture of prevention." This concept can be interpreted as a set of institutional, structural preventive measures and immediate operational actions focused on restoration, upgrade and improvement of value, and legal systems to counteract extremism and terrorism, including prevention of and protection from threats and readiness for response action.

Prevention *aimed at combating radicalisation of societies and recruitment of activists by developing inter-cultural dialogue, as well as detecting and discrediting the methods, propaganda and other instruments used by terrorists:*

- ➔ Legal – amending national and international law in accordance with the Model Law on Tolerance, which sets stringent limits of permitted ethnic and religious behaviour and activities, so that these do not encroach on fundamental European norms and values
- ➔ Education – from the kindergarten to the university and advanced professional training for civil servants – creating special educational programmes enhancing understanding of the societal threat inherent in radical Islamist, neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic propaganda and activities
- ➔ Public commemoration of days of remembrance – establishing and supporting the existing national and international remembrance days – Holocaust Remembrance Day and commemoration of other mass terror victims in Europe and beyond
- ➔ Research activities by the civil society - creating and supporting think-tanks and non-governmental organisations engaged in the research of radical Islam, neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism

➔ Public sphere – creating and supporting non-governmental organisations (with special attention to groups of women, youth and journalists, and organisations of moderate European Muslims) that draw attention to and counteract manifestations of neo-Nazism and radical Islam
➔ Dissemination of information – carefully monitoring and publicly unmasking (in the media, social networks, etc.) neo-Nazi and radical Islamist manifestations of hate speech and propaganda
➔ Religion – supporting and promoting "practical ecumenism," oriented at commonality of religious values and "peaceful co-existence" of different religions. Organising joint prayers, as at the Vatican.

Protection *aimed at reducing the vulnerability of potential targets by establishing:*

➔ Collective action for border security, transport and other cross-border infrastructures by elaborating coherent legal norms of migration between the EU, the USA, Russia and Israel
➔ Police / migration services – preventing any forms of institutionalisation of radical Islam in Europe: preventing the creation of 'no-go areas', 'Sharia police'; concerted action must be taken to fight extremism through the imposition of travel restrictions and other measures, as exemplified in the trend-setting speech delivered to Parliament by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron on 1 September 2014
➔ Surveillance – supporting more effective cooperation between the U.S., Russian, European and Israeli intelligence services in order to counteract the threats of neo-Nazism and radical Islam. Such cooperation must transcend political differences animated by other issues on the international agenda
➔ Common information bank system on migrants and passengers, regular data exchange
➔ Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) – examining the weak spots of transport systems and enhancing the security of roads, trains, airports and seaports, storages of dangerous materials and industrial facilities
➔ Cooperation on the non-proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials (CBRN)

Pursuit *aimed at detecting terrorist plots across borders - while respecting human rights and international law - and eradicating sources of terrorist financing:*

➔ The exchange of information (in particular on deportations and expulsions related to terrorism) between intelligence and law enforcement authorities of the EU, the U.S., Russia, and Israel. Such cooperation must transcend political differences between the parties
➔ Monitoring travel to and from conflict zones
➔ Monitoring and arresting illegal transfer of arms, munitions and explosive devices and materials
➔ Blocking communication and dissemination of terrorists' technical knowledge, especially via the Internet
➔ Special organisations and norms for monitoring access, training, and employment of aircraft and drones
➔ Enhancement of cooperation on investigation and interception of financial flows among terrorist organisations and their sponsors on the basis of the EU Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme.

Response *aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist attacks:*

➔ Establishment of a secure comprehensive terrorist alert system to link all existing national rapid alert systems
➔ Training and exercises directed at the inter-operability of military and civilian assets in coping with terrorist attacks
➔ Protecting minority communities, which may be at risk of a backlash in the event of a major attack
➔ Joint training and exercises of secret services, Special Forces, and rapid deployment units with the task of pre-empting terrorist attacks, radical escapades, and bringing inevitable punishment on their organisers and sponsors.

CONFERENCE READER:

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